PH,
I don't disagree with you at all. No crew ever takes off with the intention of getting involved in an accident and without fail they always try their damnedest to get out of any dangerous situation. Unfortunately some crews are unable to. While a report is a good yard stick of an accident it cannot tell me the thought processes or intentions of a crew. Therefore while I can measure what I see in the report I am in no position to question the crews reasoning. Would I, in the same position make the same choices?
However, as with every accident there is more then one reason. The Swiss cheese model. Arranged in a certain way you cannot see through it but line up the holes and the cheese becomes see through. Same with accidents, many layers, in all of which the holes must line up for the accident to occur.
While I understand that you may feel that people commenting negatively on the Air Corps as an organisation in light of this and other accidents have an axe to grind or vested interests, and maybe some have, the simple fact is that the Air Corps alone and nobody else have put themselves yet again in a position where their safety is questioned.
Yet what is truly astounding about the organisational aspects of this accident is that the Air Corps doesn't seem to have a 'corporate memory'. Where are the lessons learnt from the countless accidents and incidents in recent memory all to many of which have been fatal. Unfortunately its my impression that no matter what statistical yard stick you use; Crew fatalities as percentage of total; flight hrs per write off; write offs by fleet type; accidents training vs operations the Air Corps don't seem to have an enviable safety record.
I don't disagree with you at all. No crew ever takes off with the intention of getting involved in an accident and without fail they always try their damnedest to get out of any dangerous situation. Unfortunately some crews are unable to. While a report is a good yard stick of an accident it cannot tell me the thought processes or intentions of a crew. Therefore while I can measure what I see in the report I am in no position to question the crews reasoning. Would I, in the same position make the same choices?
However, as with every accident there is more then one reason. The Swiss cheese model. Arranged in a certain way you cannot see through it but line up the holes and the cheese becomes see through. Same with accidents, many layers, in all of which the holes must line up for the accident to occur.
While I understand that you may feel that people commenting negatively on the Air Corps as an organisation in light of this and other accidents have an axe to grind or vested interests, and maybe some have, the simple fact is that the Air Corps alone and nobody else have put themselves yet again in a position where their safety is questioned.
Yet what is truly astounding about the organisational aspects of this accident is that the Air Corps doesn't seem to have a 'corporate memory'. Where are the lessons learnt from the countless accidents and incidents in recent memory all to many of which have been fatal. Unfortunately its my impression that no matter what statistical yard stick you use; Crew fatalities as percentage of total; flight hrs per write off; write offs by fleet type; accidents training vs operations the Air Corps don't seem to have an enviable safety record.
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