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  1. #1

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  3. #2
    billybob
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    All this discussion on IAC involvement in HEMS should be stopped straight away. Read the PC 9 crash report.

  4. #3
    Space Lord of Terra morpheus's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by billybob View Post
    All this discussion on IAC involvement in HEMS should be stopped straight away. Read the PC 9 crash report.
    WTF do you mean?
    "He is an enemy officer taken in battle and entitled to fair treatment."
    "No, sir. He's a sergeant, and they don't deserve no respect at all, sir. I should know. They're cunning and artful, if they're any good. I wouldn't mind if he was an officer, sir. But sergeants are clever."

  5. #4
    billybob
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    HEMS is a highy regulated operation that is overseen and audited by the external authority.
    Please read the report in full and then consider IAC involvment in a role that is civil and regulated by external independent authority.

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    Lt General Bravo20's Avatar
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    MOD: I'm sure that people don't need to be reminded that two people died in this incident. They have family and friends some of whom read this site. Please out of respect consider your comments carefully before posting.

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    Space Lord of Terra morpheus's Avatar
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    I thought billybobs comment regarding the pc9 crash was unfounded http://forum.irishmilitaryonline.com...l=1#post361354
    Having looked back at most of his AC related posts however I'm not surprised as it generally reflects his overall opinion of the IAC and is probably representative of his perception of their taking on "civvie" or private industry roles such as the air ambulance. everyone is entitled to an opinion, but that particular comment was just a tad sensationalised.
    "He is an enemy officer taken in battle and entitled to fair treatment."
    "No, sir. He's a sergeant, and they don't deserve no respect at all, sir. I should know. They're cunning and artful, if they're any good. I wouldn't mind if he was an officer, sir. But sergeants are clever."

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    that particular comment was just a tad sensationalised.
    And inaccurate, oportunistic and deeply insensitive.

  11. #8
    billybob
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    MOD. Im actually with Jet Jock on this. Ive made a point and Jet Jock does not see/ agree. Thats what this forum is about.

    Jet Jock my point is self auditing has been highlighted within the PC 9 report and has been deemed inadquate.

    The auditors were members of the IAC. While there can be a tacit acceptance from within an
    organisation of the status quo, nevertheless an objective overview is required from safety auditors in
    order to identify hazards and threats to safety.
    It is also noted that no FSS audits were provided to the Investigation between 2004 and 2009. The
    Investigation believes that this level of monitoring is inadequate and recommends that the IAC
    should review the effectiveness of the FSS auditing processes.
    The Investigation believes that all aspects of FTS functionality should be included in the FSS audit
    process and that an external input to the audit process is recommended.



    Here is the initial recommendation from the Dauphin crash report about the establishment of FSS.

    The Department of Defence should establish, as a matter of urgency, a full-time fully-resourced Air Safety Office in the Air Corps, to be headed up by a Flying Officer of Lieutenant Colonel rank. This issue has already been the subject of a similar recommendation in the February 1998 Price Waterhouse Report.

    Here is the PC 9 recommendation about SMS of which FSS is one of the main components.

    GOC AC should review the operation of the Safety Management System within the IAC,
    including the auditing process, and should consider an external input

    .
    I agree that the military are exempt to complying with civil rules and thats fine as long as they are carrying out military roles. Once the IAC become involved in purely civil roles involving civilian personal as part of the crew civil rules should apply . However can you really see the IAC agreeing to an IAA auditor showing up and carrying out a safety compliance audit as set out in JAR OPS.

  12. #9
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    I have read the report and have taken a good look at the conclusions. It's all there in black and White. Lessons that should have been learned from previous accidents were not. SOP's are mentioned , CRM gets a look in, safe practises ( lack of) gets a mention, failings within the organisation, its all there. Listening to RTE earlier today the IAC said they accepted the report in its entirety, which is telling in itself. Does that mean all recommendations will now be acted on and implemented.

  13. #10
    Commander in Chief hptmurphy's Avatar
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    It is not the purpose of any such accident investigation and the associated
    investigation report to apportion blame or liability.

    I think that about sums it up, read it ,form your own opinions,given the job in question accidents do happen, thankfully at a very low rate.

    Maybe something will be learned to save someone else the grief these families have been through.

    Rest In Peace.

  14. #11
    CQMS jack nastyface's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by hptmurphy View Post
    I think that about sums it up, read it ,form your own opinions,given the job in question accidents do happen, thankfully at a very low rate.

    Maybe something will be learned to save someone else the grief these families have been through.

    Rest In Peace.
    Rest in Peace lads. Given the size of the Corps, i would say accidents and unfortunataly deaths are quiet high over the years. And hopefully something will be learned at last. My heart go's out to all bereaved.

  15. #12
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    The AC is not the only org to ever have come under the spotlamp from the AAIU.Other orgs have had their knuckles rapped by the AAIU and this has not been confined to aero orgs.Let him who hasnt ....etc.

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    Very Sad reading the report, I had trouble sleeping, mulling over the same old problems throughout the Corps. I am astonished that FTS had gone the way of every other flying unit in Bal, that is with postholders that are either double or tripple jobbing and/or, who are not even type rated on the units aircraft. This problem has been a major issue throughout the organization for many years.
    Most squadrons were like ghost towns with the Pilots only being present to sign out the aircraft for a mission and spending the rest of there time in there “real” job somewhere else on the base. Remember you are an officer first and a pilot second! In my experience this meant that squadrons operated at the lower end of the aircrafts capabilities and the functioning of the squadron as an operational/training environment for young pilots was very much reduced compared to how it should be. That is with pilots spending time planning missions, passing on experience’s, developing operational ideas and refining SOP’s plus the hundreds of intangibles that are present in a fully functioning squadron with a full compliment of Pilots.
    When I went through BFTS the OC was the Boss he was present every day he wrote the flying detail and he did the 50Hr and Final Handling checks, as a result for the instructors at least, the unit operated like a proper squadron.

    It is shocking given the higher risk profile of operating high performance single engine aircraft in a training environment that AC management did not deem it important to have a full time OC but had let the role become diluted.

    I have nothing but the height of respect for the deceased instructor and immense sadness for the cadet, I also greatly respect the individual who was the postholder, who I am sure, was fully employed on the Lear.

    I lay the blame fully at the door of AC management who for years have, half run the Corps and have never fully engaged with the realities of running a modern aviation organization, this malaise is fully manifested in the Too many accidents and incidents and the lack of any development of the Air Corps roles or capabilities. Its current difficult position in which it lacks focus or indeed any meaningful role means its future is actually in doubt.

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  18. #14
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    Quote Originally Posted by Charlie252 View Post
    Remember you are an officer first and a pilot second!
    Two interesting points here , I think. I belive that as a matter of urgency the officer/ pilot suitation be changed, so that pilots can focus entirely on the job in hand, flying aircrafts of this type in this manner is dangerous, but is essential if one is going to even pay lip service of it being any kind of air arm that is of use to the armed forces of this country.

    Quote Originally Posted by Charlie252 View Post
    I lay the blame fully at the door of AC management who for years have, half run the Corps and have never fully engaged with the realities of running a modern aviation organization, this malaise is fully manifested in the Too many accidents and incidents and the lack of any development of the Air Corps roles or capabilities. Its current difficult position in which it lacks focus or indeed any meaningful role means its future is actually in doubt.
    I have been studying the Irish Air Corps as a Military organization for many years now, and I find that I have to fully aggree with Charlie252 on this. It is high time for an outside audit, but who can be trusted to carry it out, I do not believe it can be safely given to any civillian department, I think that the Air Corps will have to be judged by military organizations that have a proven record, in both peace or wartime. I accept that people may believe that it smacks of serious overkill, I nominate either the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm[while it still exists], or the United States Navy. as in my opinion they represent the best military avaition providers of the english speaking world.

    In the past 13 years the Air Corps have lost 7 aircrew in 3 different accidents, May they rest in peace.
    Last edited by Turkey; 26th January 2012 at 18:36.

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  20. #15
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    Like all accident reports it makes chilling and very sobering reading and for all those on the forum without an axe to grind or vested interest and who've actually taken the time to read the report in its entirity it forms the basis for comment and informed discussion on the inherent dangers and risks involved with aviation particularly in relation to SD and Somotogravic Illusion.
    The research on the subject, well summarised in the report is extensive and grabs the attention. According to Newman (2007) in App D of the report "Spatial disorientation is a very common problem.....studies show that SD accounts for some 6 per cent to 32 per cent of major accidents and some 15 to 69 per cent of fatal accidents". He further asserts "It has been reported that for a given pilot, the career incidence of SD is in the order of 100 per cent....In other words, if a pilot flies long enough as a career or even a hobby there is almost no chance that he/she will escape experiencing at least one episode of SD. Looked at another way, pilots can be considered to be in one of two groups: those who have been disorientated, and those who will"

    I'm certainly not in the category of those waiting to experience this phenomenon (SD) as I've experienced it already and for anyone else who's been there and got away with it, it can be quite an experience. Thankfully I wasn't in a high performance aircraft low to the ground like this crew who battled bravely all the way to save themselves and their aircraft. The report alludes to the fact that the crew were unfortunately unable to get into a stable wings level situation before a low-level abort was carried out and a rolling pull may have exacerbated the critical situation.

    That's the real focus of the report for me and hopefully the AC.

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  22. #16
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    PH,
    I don't disagree with you at all. No crew ever takes off with the intention of getting involved in an accident and without fail they always try their damnedest to get out of any dangerous situation. Unfortunately some crews are unable to. While a report is a good yard stick of an accident it cannot tell me the thought processes or intentions of a crew. Therefore while I can measure what I see in the report I am in no position to question the crews reasoning. Would I, in the same position make the same choices?

    However, as with every accident there is more then one reason. The Swiss cheese model. Arranged in a certain way you cannot see through it but line up the holes and the cheese becomes see through. Same with accidents, many layers, in all of which the holes must line up for the accident to occur.
    While I understand that you may feel that people commenting negatively on the Air Corps as an organisation in light of this and other accidents have an axe to grind or vested interests, and maybe some have, the simple fact is that the Air Corps alone and nobody else have put themselves yet again in a position where their safety is questioned.

    Yet what is truly astounding about the organisational aspects of this accident is that the Air Corps doesn't seem to have a 'corporate memory'. Where are the lessons learnt from the countless accidents and incidents in recent memory all to many of which have been fatal. Unfortunately its my impression that no matter what statistical yard stick you use; Crew fatalities as percentage of total; flight hrs per write off; write offs by fleet type; accidents training vs operations the Air Corps don't seem to have an enviable safety record.

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  24. #17
    Commander in Chief hptmurphy's Avatar
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    WTF..I was the second person to comment on the thread. All of a sudden there as a stack of posts on here posted prior to mine, but weren't visible at the time of my post, Had I seen any of these i would even want to be associated with the type of response its getting.

    I was of the opinion that posting should be limited as opposed to a secondary investigation.
    Just visiting

  25. #18
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    In any organisation there is a minimum capacity - be it headcount, missions executed, products produced - below which, if you fall under that level, the organisation becomes ineffective/dysfunctional. We've had many comments on related threads about work practices in the Don which undoubtably have a bearing on capability but you do have to ask whether the Air Corps has now fallen below critical mass. This is not a criticism of the organisation nor is it a plug for the ICG (which has the benefit of a major multinational corporate H/C operator to provide critical mass) - it is an observation based on 35 years seeing the A/C operate. The multi tasking of staff referred to above is not a choice - it's a function of trying to do too much with too few resources.

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  27. #19
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    The report alludes to the fact that the crew were unfortunately unable to get into a stable wings level situation before a low-level abort was carried out and a rolling pull may have exacerbated the critical situation.

    That's the real focus of the report for me and hopefully the AC.
    Sorry PH, but if that is the real focus for you and the AC as you put it, the bigger picture is being missed, and in my opinion we are going to be reading another accident report some where down the road. I really hope I will be proved wrong on that one.

  28. #20
    Commander in Chief hptmurphy's Avatar
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    Unfortunately its my impression that no matter what statistical yard stick you use; Crew fatalities as percentage of total; flight hrs per write off; write offs by fleet type; accidents training vs operations the Air Corps don't seem to have an enviable safety record.
    Show me a military air arm that has hasn't such a record, by the nature of the people involved , given that occassionaly envelopes are pushed beyond those normally associated with civil ops there may be a higher attrition rate,sometimes the stast highlight the facts that accidents can happen with a higher frequencey with people and machinery who are not not living working or operating within some of the more mundane profiles in life.

    Both seemed quite competent, more than likely were and probably pushed the envelope at times.


    An accident with attributable causes that would have been negated if they had't been military pilots just going that little bit beyond because of the training process they had been through which indeed does train them to push on regardless.

    If military flying is like other aspects of the DF there is an andrenalin rush, fear and pressure often make you try things way outside the norm to make things work, if in the case of an aeroplane this is what people do to get situations to work when the chips may be down, thats a risk they take. I have no doubt that both knew there were acceptable risks in this situation, Up to 25 seconds before impact the trainee was fully participant, he had the option to opt out up to a couple of minutes before hand, the other side being up to that 25 seconds the captain had full faith in his trainee.

    Attribute blame......Orville and Wilbur Wright and generations after them......give young men fast machines, tell them they are bullet proof they will want to try it.

    neither man is at fault or the system wrong, the light that burns twice as bright only burns half as long.....Push it to far just once you may not get away with it.

    Last multiple deaths was on a helo again a scratch crew trying to push the envelope , albeit with an unsuitable machine.

    Risk taking, where the guys know what the potential is......

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  30. #21
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    Jesus HPT,
    Please never stand in my corner. While I know it's far from correct in the field of aviation you just made the AC look like uncontrolled cowboys.

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    Sorry Tadpole, see your cheesy point alright but have to more or less disagree with you or your take on the accident. In this case there are no systemic causes identified and the only Contributary Factors are simply and clearly identified:

    1. Continued flight towards high terrain in deteriorating weather
    2. Very changeable weather conditions
    3. High speed in a high terrain area where visibility was reduced

    Unless I'm missing something they don't point to organisational issues! Yes it might have been better if the OC FTS was a PC9 pilot instead of an experienced Lear pilot but that IMO had no bearing whatsoever on the accident which was essentially a CFIT. Of course there are always points to be learned from any accident and the AC like any organisation will I hope seek to learn and move on. However the "countless accidents and incidents" you refer to "in recent memory" is misleading and a bit OTT don't you think!

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  33. #23
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    Quote Originally Posted by hptmurphy View Post
    Show me a military air arm that has hasn't such a record, by the nature of the people involved , given that occassionaly envelopes are pushed beyond those normally associated with civil ops there may be a higher attrition rate,sometimes the stast highlight the facts that accidents can happen with a higher frequencey with people and machinery who are not not living working or operating within some of the more mundane profiles in life.

    Both seemed quite competent, more than likely were and probably pushed the envelope at times.
    An accident with attributable causes that would have been negated if they had't been military pilots just going that little bit beyond because of the training process they had been through which indeed does train them to push on regardless.

    If military flying is like other aspects of the DF there is an andrenalin rush, fear and pressure often make you try things
    way outside the norm to make things work, if in the case of an aeroplane this is what people do to get situations to work when the chips may be down, thats a risk they take. I have no doubt that both knew there were acceptable risks in this situation, Up to 25 seconds before impact the trainee was fully participant, he had the option to opt out up to a couple of minutes before hand, the other side being up to that 25 seconds the captain had full faith in his training.

    Attribute blame......Orville and Wilbur Wright and generations after them......give young men fast machines, tell them they are bullet proof they will want to try it.

    neither man is at fault or the system wrong, the light that burns twice as bright only burns half as long.....Push it to far
    just once you may not get away with it.

    Last multiple deaths was on a helo again a scratch crew trying to push the envelope , albeit with an unsuitable machine.

    Risk taking, where the guys know what the potential is......

    Sorry hptm, but with respect could I ask you to clarify. Your third post to this thread was asking BB what he meant in his previous post (#2) in relation to another thread which is currently active on this board. Are you saying that pushing the envelope and risk taking ( which is a mindset) is the military way. If that is the case would you agree it has no place where civilians are concerned.

  34. #24
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    Did the aircraft have the instrumentation to fly it out of trouble without needing to look out the window.?

  35. #25
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    PH,
    Cheesy as you may see it I do believe it is valid. The organisational issues that I see in the report include the following (Bear in mind I see these as organisational, not individual failings)
    1. Poor over sight.
    2. Lack of direction to crews on speed in poor weather.
    3. Failings in the FSS and auditing system; despite being recommendations of a previous reports.
    4. Lack of external auditing.
    5. No in flight training for Low Level Aborts (Despite the AC manual stating you will 'maintain proficiency')
    6. A bizarre line in the manual that instead of instilling the use of the Low Level Abort as an emergency situation requires basically seeds in a pilots head that if you do a Low Level Abort you have f@@ked up. '; if it is your only option, you should have taken a better course of action earlier'

    Of course there are always points to be learned from any accident and the AC like any organisation will I hope seek to learn and move on
    On this we agree. I just hope they are implemented and adhered to fully unlike what appears to have happen previous report findings.

    However the "countless accidents and incidents" you refer to "in recent memory" is misleading and a bit OTT don't you think!
    On this one I dont really know where to start. I dont know what age you are so our 'recent memory' may be a little different but lets keep it to current and previous fleet only. (open to correction on these by any spotters out there!)

    SF260WE Fleet 8: At least 3 written off, 2 fatal. At least a further 3 substantially damaged (Gormo field, Upside down 29, off the east of 23)
    Cessna 172 Fleet 8: At least 4? written off, 1 fatal. At least another seriously damaged (Wires Knock)
    Casa Fleet 2 plus 250: 250 barely escaped with the lives of 6(8?) people on board after flying IMC through a tree.
    King Air Fleet 3: Actually none that I know about.
    Gazelle Fleet 2: 1 written off.
    AIII Fleet 8: 1 written off.
    Dauphin Fleet 5: 1 written off, 1 fatal. 1 substantially damaged (Hanger Inver)
    EC135 fleet 2: Again none that I know of.
    AW139 Fleet 6: Two serious incidents with potential for loss. 1 IMC loss of control on delivery flight. 1 almost contact with underslung load (PC9 wing) 2 days? after the PC9 crash, load dumped before contact with aircraft. Interestingly after the previous removal of a Piper aircraft from the Wicklow mountains the IAC banned the lifting of aerodynamic surfaces. (lessons learnt?)
    GIV Fleet 1: None
    Learjet Fleet 1: None
    PC9 Fleet 8: 1 written off, 1 fatal. At least 1(?) sent back to Pilatus after the airframe was overstressed.

    Total fleet in recent years 54. AC written off 11. Fleet percentage written of 20.4%, not including the 9 substantially damaged aircraft or very close calls.

    The above are only the ones that I know about. As I say, I am happy to be corrected on any of them but averaging about 6000hrs per year, the above even over the span of these fleets, just doesn't look particularly good. It is also interesting to note that very few of the above incidents happened under flight parameters that are not carried out by civil organisations on a daily basis therefore I for one don't accept the Military flying is dangerous mantra.
    Last edited by Tadpole; 27th January 2012 at 00:56.

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