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  1. #26
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    Quote Originally Posted by Pure Hover View Post
    Like all accident reports it makes chilling and very sobering reading and for all those on the forum without an axe to grind or vested interest and who've actually taken the time to read the report in its entirity it forms the basis for comment and informed discussion on the inherent dangers and risks involved with aviation particularly in relation to SD and Somotogravic Illusion.
    The research on the subject, well summarised in the report is extensive and grabs the attention. According to Newman (2007) in App D of the report "Spatial disorientation is a very common problem.....studies show that SD accounts for some 6 per cent to 32 per cent of major accidents and some 15 to 69 per cent of fatal accidents". He further asserts "It has been reported that for a given pilot, the career incidence of SD is in the order of 100 per cent....In other words, if a pilot flies long enough as a career or even a hobby there is almost no chance that he/she will escape experiencing at least one episode of SD. Looked at another way, pilots can be considered to be in one of two groups: those who have been disorientated, and those who will"

    I'm certainly not in the category of those waiting to experience this phenomenon (SD) as I've experienced it already and for anyone else who's been there and got away with it, it can be quite an experience. Thankfully I wasn't in a high performance aircraft low to the ground like this crew who battled bravely all the way to save themselves and their aircraft. The report alludes to the fact that the crew were unfortunately unable to get into a stable wings level situation before a low-level abort was carried out and a rolling pull may have exacerbated the critical situation.

    That's the real focus of the report for me and hopefully the AC.
    CRM and accident investigation have developed over the last thirty years or so, we have for many years through the detailed work carried out by accident investigators been able to determine the exact actions by a crew that resulted in an accident, however the real advance has been in the examination of the processes and systems that resulted in that error.

    I agree that the report is very well written and covers the physiological processes that can result in loss of SA. However I believe that is the result of a chain of events, let me give you an example.

    A regional turboprop crash in the states, an inexperienced crew crashes an aircraft on a Dark and Snowy Night at a small regional airport. The accident report can explain in great detail the handling error made by the crew that resulted in the crash, they can identify which crew member manipulated which control which resulted in the crash, however this is only the first layer of investigation.
    The more detailed modern view is to assess the chain of events that resulted in the crash.
    In this case the Airline management spent as little money as possible on crew or crew training.
    They paid very low salaries so only very inexperienced pilots were hired, they spent as little money as possible on training, so pilots received inadequate training and commanders were upgraded with minimal training and experience.
    They would not invest in flight ops management so there was no oversight of crews and limited support to crews operating the flights.
    And finally they based the inexperienced lowly paid pilots at far flung bases where they had to commute for duty on there own time, and then made them work long and difficult days in the poor weather of the northern US which led to chronic fatigue

    The result was the pilots made an error which RESULTED in the crash, the fault lay with the Bean counters.
    Of course the Bean Counters believe that Flight Safety is a given and would invest no money in that.

    There is another accident closer to home that is scarily similar to the above.

    I believe the same detailed examination should be applied to any Aviation accident and incident, I see that someone has detailed the AC accidents from the last 15-20 years, it fills me with no pride to see that listed nor do I feel any pride in the fact of knowing that it is the tip of the Iceberg. The near miss with the AW-139 within days of the PC-9 crash points to the AC’s stubborn self belief and naivety.

    Flight Safety is not an Accident, I saw that on a poster many years ago, I think given my years of flying I finally understand the meaning of that poster

  2. #27
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    Quote Originally Posted by hptmurphy View Post
    Show me a military air arm that has hasn't such a record, by the nature of the people involved , given that occassionaly envelopes are pushed beyond those normally associated with civil ops there may be a higher attrition rate,sometimes the stast highlight the facts that accidents can happen with a higher frequencey with people and machinery who are not not living working or operating within some of the more mundane profiles in life.

    Both seemed quite competent, more than likely were and probably pushed the envelope at times.


    An accident with attributable causes that would have been negated if they had't been military pilots just going that little bit beyond because of the training process they had been through which indeed does train them to push on regardless.

    If military flying is like other aspects of the DF there is an andrenalin rush, fear and pressure often make you try things way outside the norm to make things work, if in the case of an aeroplane this is what people do to get situations to work when the chips may be down, thats a risk they take. I have no doubt that both knew there were acceptable risks in this situation, Up to 25 seconds before impact the trainee was fully participant, he had the option to opt out up to a couple of minutes before hand, the other side being up to that 25 seconds the captain had full faith in his trainee.

    Attribute blame......Orville and Wilbur Wright and generations after them......give young men fast machines, tell them they are bullet proof they will want to try it.

    neither man is at fault or the system wrong, the light that burns twice as bright only burns half as long.....Push it to far just once you may not get away with it.

    Last multiple deaths was on a helo again a scratch crew trying to push the envelope , albeit with an unsuitable machine.

    Risk taking, where the guys know what the potential is......
    Seriously were you watching Topgun Again, "you can't think up there, if you think you die"
    Last edited by Charlie252; 27th January 2012 at 14:09.

  3. #28
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    I have to say, the last series of posts from TP AND 252, who seem to know what they are talking about have left me shocked. If it's the case that the series of incidents and accidents are fact, and I have no reason to think otherwise until someone counters with fact. In my opinion the IAC now have a duty of care to the public and to publish the reports mentioned that are still locked away somewhere gathering dust.
    Last edited by Helihead; 27th January 2012 at 18:18.

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  5. #29
    Private 2* DirkinDaHerc's Avatar
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    Hi all,

    It was chilling reading this report, right down to the last transmission, and looking at the terrain.

    My deepest sympathies to the family and friends, may no one else fall foul in future operations.

    DITH

  6. #30
    Closed account hptmurphy's Avatar
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    Your third post to this thread was asking BB what he meant in his previous post (#2) in relation to another thread which is currently active on this board. Are you saying that pushing the envelope and risk taking ( which is a mindset) is the military way.

    I'm posting in regard to this thread, no co relation should be taken from what is posted here. I could put down what I interpret from the report, I won't.I'm looking at it from a cultural overview as opposed to a specific incident.

    The AAIU report has published its results,it is not for me to apportion blame, and I haven't.

    While pushing the envelope and risk taking are often operational considerations to get the job done there are elements within the DF, all areas, who exceed the bounds of training in order to get the job done and reduce the safety margin at times.Again its a mindset often associated with younger people often given access to equipment, systems etc. that take very skilled operators to manage , exceed the bounds of safety and the outcome is often the result shown here.

    Aviation is one of those fields where the results of some times exceeding the limits by the tiniest of fraction or overlooking something that may seem insignificant at the time, or even trying to test your self may turn fatal.

    If that is the case would you agree it has no place where civilians are concerned.
    I would whole heartedly agree this to be the case ,but the world of general aviation is not immune to characteristics often mis associated with military aviation,and the consequences are often the same, take your mind back to 1990 and an Accident in Cork involving two Cessna 152s where one hit the other,I knew the crews of both aircraft, this was an avoidable incident that happened in clear skies , there was blame attributable, these were guys trying to imitate what military fliers do.

    Please never stand in my corner. While I know it's far from correct in the field of aviation you just made the AC look like uncontrolled cowboys.
    This is not my intention, what should be taken from it that these are not sunday morning puddle jumpers piddling around at 100kts dropping in some where for a coffee along the way. This accident was due to a series of issues that escalated beyond reversal due to factors that had not either been given priority or due to the captain being of the belief that he was capable of dealing with them. 99 times in 100 they would have come out the right side of it,too many factors involved here and luck took a part.


    Did the aircraft have the instrumentation to fly it out of trouble without needing to look out the window.?
    Aircraft is IFR equipped,Training captain was qualified to do so but when the situation changes from VFR to IFR(IMC) so rapidly and the hand over of control only took place seconds before the crash there wasn't time enough to change the plan...the speed element and the height along with the terrain all become factors that have to be dealt with before you can establish an alternative.

    Regarding the 'Top Gun' reference, doesn't come to mind.If you wish to suggest that my comments are based on how military pilots act on the big screen and that it influences how professional military pilots react, I refute that, but what I will say if you leave a man long enough in a room with a tea cosy, he will try it on.

    It has to be remembered that if it was for the feats that often exceeded that expected of normal pilots, that general aviation pilots would not even consider, lives would have been lost as Aer Corps pilots showed bravery and professionalism of the highest order in carrying out life saving missions.Whether it be part of the mindset or aspects of training it certainly is that extra 10% that occassionaly makes the difference,
    Last edited by hptmurphy; 27th January 2012 at 20:18.
    Pay them properly.....and they will come!

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  8. #31
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    I don't believe that risk taking and pushing the envelope have any place in aviation, this old nugget permeated the AC for many years where there was a belief that Military Pilots didn't need limits!!. I think that this is clearly not true, all aviation professionals should operate within the limits of the aircraft and their abilities. Pushing the limits leads to incidents and accidents.

    The AC have a fine record of life saving in the SAR arena for sure, however we now know that SAR can be performed equally as effectively by a regulated(AOC) organization. (I don't wish to drag the efficiency merits into this discussion.) In my opinion the Training in the AC is excellent an many areas, I think the organization falls down in the application of this training and in its management structure and flight ops regulation and supervision, remember that the IAC is the regulator and operator...

    A frontline fighter squadron operating in a hostile environment may have to push the limits to get ordnance on target or to escape from AA fire, but even my knowledge and contact with pilots flying Supersonic fighter aircraft leads me to believe they operate to a very strict set of SOP's and are actually highly regulated.

    None of which really maters in the context of the AC, where all of the operations could be covered by an AOC.

    I don't believe that AC mission effectiveness would have been reduced by the application of Professional Limits and Robust SOP's backed up by effective flight ops management and performance monitoring.

  9. #32
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    Hi there
    With regard to changes required to the AC system, D248 produced more institutional changes than even this accident. I served there before 248 and quite simply, the place was accidentally professional. The Don got a severe boot up the hole from 248's outcome and no doubt will get the same from 265. I have always wanted Don accident reports to be published because I belive that the public, who pay for their very existence, have a right to know and also because other air arms do so as a matter of routine.

    regards
    GttC

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  11. #33
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    Quote Originally Posted by hptmurphy View Post
    I would whole heartedly agree this to be the case
    hpt, thanks for the clarification.
    Last edited by Helihead; 27th January 2012 at 21:21.

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  13. #34
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    Quote Originally Posted by Charlie252 View Post
    I don't believe that risk taking and pushing the envelope have any place in aviation
    Everytime you step in board an aircraft (same as a car) you are taking a calculated risk.
    A frontline fighter squadron operating in a hostile environment may have to push the limits to get ordnance on target or to escape from AA fire, but even my knowledge and contact with pilots flying Supersonic fighter aircraft leads me to believe they operate to a very strict set of SOP's and are actually highly regulated.

    I don't believe that AC mission effectiveness would have been reduced by the application of Professional Limits and Robust SOP's backed up by effective flight ops management and performance monitoring.
    What makes you think there weren't SOPs?

  14. #35
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    Nothing to do with any level of management within the AC was found to be a cause or contributing factor to the accident.

    There were details about management in the findings.

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  16. #36
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    Quote Originally Posted by DeV View Post
    Nothing to do with any level of management within the AC was found to be a cause or contributing factor to the accident.

    There were details about management in the findings.
    ???

  17. #37
    Closed account hptmurphy's Avatar
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    Everytime you step in board an aircraft (same as a car) you are taking a calculated risk.
    Agreed

    I don't believe that risk taking and pushing the envelope have any place in aviation
    Again agreed.

    The AC have a fine record of life saving in the SAR arena for sure, however we now know that SAR can be performed equally as effectively by a regulated(AOC) organization. (I don't wish to drag the efficiency merits into this discussion.)
    Given the aircraft involved I believe that there were times where boundaries were exceeded but not to the point of recklessness,but sometimes pushing the limits in training give you an insight to what maybe available when required operationally .

    If all were to operate within a comfort zone we would have no heroes!
    The guys on the night of July 1st 1999 in 248 were well outside their comfort zone from the missions inception, but something else kicked in to make the push that extra 10%.

    Someone some where at some point in their training had instilled that value in them that should they believe it was justifiable to move out side of the accepted safety zone to get the job done and if the risks were acceptable they were justified in their actions.

    It has been proven to have tragic results at times but if every situation were to be put under the micro scope with the precision of an AAIU investigation , how may would be found to be flawed at the time of the action.

    Given some of the finest pilots crew people and even the AAIU people have come through the Air Corps system I'm slow to find fault with the people.

    The management checks and balances may need adressing but we only find out these things after incidents such as this.

    If a report such as this finds systems failures it is the management that are negligent and not the individual, as was the proven case from the Tramore Incident.

    Incidents as opposed to accidents, Incidents happen because of failures, accidents because of a quirk of fate, each person has to decide for themselves if there were failures and where the failures lay, if they were reported and who was responsible.

    If we say all fighter pilots were reckless and guilty of 'Hot Dogging' as the Americans call it, how come the Fougas were free of such incidents?

    Marchettis had the same potential and yes there were losses.

    We should have had more accidents with Dauphins, we got away with it.

    I'm afraid on the day, there is a luck element to be factored in.
    Pay them properly.....and they will come!

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  19. #38
    Moderator DeV's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Helihead View Post
    ???
    Read the report!

  20. #39
    Closed Account Goldie fish's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tadpole View Post
    PH,
    Cheesy as you may see it I do believe it is valid. The organisational issues that I see in the report include the following (Bear in mind I see these as organisational, not individual failings)
    1. Poor over sight.
    2. Lack of direction to crews on speed in poor weather.
    3. Failings in the FSS and auditing system; despite being recommendations of a previous reports.
    4. Lack of external auditing.
    5. No in flight training for Low Level Aborts (Despite the AC manual stating you will 'maintain proficiency')
    6. A bizarre line in the manual that instead of instilling the use of the Low Level Abort as an emergency situation requires basically seeds in a pilots head that if you do a Low Level Abort you have f@@ked up. '; if it is your only option, you should have taken a better course of action earlier'


    On this we agree. I just hope they are implemented and adhered to fully unlike what appears to have happen previous report findings.


    On this one I dont really know where to start. I dont know what age you are so our 'recent memory' may be a little different but lets keep it to current and previous fleet only. (open to correction on these by any spotters out there!)

    SF260WE Fleet 8: At least 3 written off, 2 fatal. At least a further 3 substantially damaged (Gormo field, Upside down 29, off the east of 23)
    Cessna 172 Fleet 8: At least 4? written off, 1 fatal. At least another seriously damaged (Wires Knock)
    Casa Fleet 2 plus 250: 250 barely escaped with the lives of 6(8?) people on board after flying IMC through a tree.
    King Air Fleet 3: Actually none that I know about.
    Gazelle Fleet 2: 1 written off.
    AIII Fleet 8: 1 written off.
    Dauphin Fleet 5: 1 written off, 1 fatal. 1 substantially damaged (Hanger Inver)
    EC135 fleet 2: Again none that I know of.
    AW139 Fleet 6: Two serious incidents with potential for loss. 1 IMC loss of control on delivery flight. 1 almost contact with underslung load (PC9 wing) 2 days? after the PC9 crash, load dumped before contact with aircraft. Interestingly after the previous removal of a Piper aircraft from the Wicklow mountains the IAC banned the lifting of aerodynamic surfaces. (lessons learnt?)
    GIV Fleet 1: None
    Learjet Fleet 1: None
    PC9 Fleet 8: 1 written off, 1 fatal. At least 1(?) sent back to Pilatus after the airframe was overstressed.

    Total fleet in recent years 54. AC written off 11. Fleet percentage written of 20.4%, not including the 9 substantially damaged aircraft or very close calls.

    The above are only the ones that I know about. As I say, I am happy to be corrected on any of them but averaging about 6000hrs per year, the above even over the span of these fleets, just doesn't look particularly good. It is also interesting to note that very few of the above incidents happened under flight parameters that are not carried out by civil organisations on a daily basis therefore I for one don't accept the Military flying is dangerous mantra.
    You can add to that list the Fouga that landed in a field in Cork, and the GASU heli(flown by air Corps) that sufferred a sudden loss of altitude due to pilot disorientation. The latter is noteworthy as some of the contributing factors also emerged in this latest tragedy.

  21. #40
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    "What makes you think there weren't SOPs?"

    Hi Dev, please reread my post, "Professional Limits and Robust SOP's backed up by effective flight ops management and performance monitoring." I don't think writing a set of SOP's automatically produces flight safety, the other parts of my post are the other essential pieces if the Pie.

    During my career we operated in a Vacuum with regard to SOP's and even where there were SOP's, they were more "Advisory" in nature, best example is Flight Duty Limits... but there were many others

  22. #41
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    Quote Originally Posted by hptmurphy View Post
    Agreed



    Again agreed.



    Given the aircraft involved I believe that there were times where boundaries were exceeded but not to the point of recklessness,but sometimes pushing the limits in training give you an insight to what maybe available when required operationally .

    If all were to operate within a comfort zone we would have no heroes!
    The guys on the night of July 1st 1999 in 248 were well outside their comfort zone from the missions inception, but something else kicked in to make the push that extra 10%.

    Someone some where at some point in their training had instilled that value in them that should they believe it was justifiable to move out side of the accepted safety zone to get the job done and if the risks were acceptable they were justified in their actions.

    It has been proven to have tragic results at times but if every situation were to be put under the micro scope with the precision of an AAIU investigation , how may would be found to be flawed at the time of the action.

    Given some of the finest pilots crew people and even the AAIU people have come through the Air Corps system I'm slow to find fault with the people.

    The management checks and balances may need adressing but we only find out these things after incidents such as this.

    If a report such as this finds systems failures it is the management that are negligent and not the individual, as was the proven case from the Tramore Incident.

    Incidents as opposed to accidents, Incidents happen because of failures, accidents because of a quirk of fate, each person has to decide for themselves if there were failures and where the failures lay, if they were reported and who was responsible.

    If we say all fighter pilots were reckless and guilty of 'Hot Dogging' as the Americans call it, how come the Fougas were free of such incidents?

    Marchettis had the same potential and yes there were losses.

    We should have had more accidents with Dauphins, we got away with it.

    I'm afraid on the day, there is a luck element to be factored in.
    Hi,

    Again you persist in the belief that somehow military pilots are supermen and limits are a target. In my opinion there is no extra 10%, there are limits.. its either safe or not..
    Certainly there was a perception in the AC for many years that we as Military Pilots did not require Limits, this was stated by Senior Officers, and there was always a reluctance to write anything in ACFO's that would limit the AC's much vaunted Operational Flexibility.
    I think quite clearly given the High level of accidents and incidents over the years that something was wrong with that approach.

    The Fougas appear to have had a very safe and long career, and certainly we never had a fatality. But the aircraft retired with a fleet airframe average hours of about 2000hr, and believe me there were plenty of close calls...

  23. #42
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    Quote Originally Posted by DeV View Post
    Read the report!
    I have read the report. It's your reply I don't understand?

  24. #43
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    If you want to be picky about it no management issues were found to be direct causes to this accident, however the report mentions a number of management issues that were at least 'failings' and for me the kicker is this:

    The final fatal dive appears to have been caused by severe disorientation caused by the low level maneuvering followed by an attempted low level abort, which at least initially cleared the immediate terrain.
    The IAC PC9 manual gives clear direction that a low level abort can cause severe disorientation, it also states that the pilot will 'maintain proficiency'. Yet up until the time of the accident the IAC pilots did not practice in flight low level aborts. So, the final fatal act of the accident was caused by a well known side effect of the low level abort, one which is outlined in the IAC manual and which at least in part would have been negated by a pilot maintaining proficiency as per IAC regulations. Now lets look at this from the report perspective:

    1. Lack of proper oversight: Was the OC aware that pilots were not maintaining proficiency? Could he as he wasn't type rated?
    2. Lack of direction to crews: While the regs say you will maintain proficiency does the manual outline currency requirements such as once a month, once every 6 months? If not why not, whats the point of a requirement for proficiency without a currency requirement? If it did have a currency requirement it is obvious from the report that no currency was kept.
    3. Problems within the FSS system: If the FSS system and self auditing system was properly working it would have noted that pilots were not carrying out proficiency in something as basic as emergency procedures.
    4. No external auditing: Again, would an external auditor have noted that basic emergency procedure weren't being practiced.

    So, we have an aircraft that gets to 34 degrees nose up at 1700' in 1500' terrain. All that was required was to maintain wings level, nose where it is and climb. This didn't happen due to disorientation, a known potential result of a low level abort. Now:

    Would currency and proficiency in low level aborts have saved this crew?
    Why was the required proficiency not carried out?
    Still think management have nothing to answer for?

  25. #44
    Closed Account Goldie fish's Avatar
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    I think it is ironically unfortunate that the disorientation that caused the loss was a topic that the Instructor was considered an expert on.

  26. #45
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    Hi Golide,
    Unfortunately in many walks of life having the knowledge and practical application are 2 completely different things. While awareness and knowledge arms the pilot for such dangers absolutely nothing trumps hands on experience.

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  28. #46
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    Again you persist in the belief that somehow military pilots are supermen and limits are a target. In my opinion there is no extra 10%, there are limits.. its either safe or not..
    ok


    Certainly there was a perception in the AC for many years that we as Military Pilots did not require Limits, this was stated by Senior Officers, and there was always a reluctance to write anything in ACFO's that would limit the AC's much vaunted Operational Flexibility.
    Is there a possibility that elements of that culture still exist?


    I think quite clearly given the High level of accidents and incidents over the years that something was wrong with that approach.
    We only become aware of such incidents when they end up with fatal circumstances, however if all incidents were to be tabulated would it show that there is a lack of management?

    It was cited in the report that the PIC charge had been investigated for a low flying incident. If all these were to be presented does it increase the amount of 'incidents' dramatically?

    Would currency and proficiency in low level aborts have saved this crew?
    Why was the required proficiency not carried out?
    Has the matter been raised at those levels that manage such issues?


    Still think management have nothing to answer for?

    If the questions are raised then they have to account for lack of input.

    Problem being who gets to ask the questions?

    The Fougas appear to have had a very safe and long career, and certainly we never had a fatality. But the aircraft retired with a fleet airframe average hours of about 2000hr, and believe me there were plenty of close calls.
    I have no doubt but the incidents are not in the public arena so I can't comment.


    I'm taking from all this that the lack of external auditing of the systems in place has failed to highlight

    (a) That procedures are not being adhered to
    (b) that those tasked from within the Aer Corps with self assessment of the systems are either overlooking basic system failures or are not aware of the potential risks around what they area auditing because they not be qualified to the degree required to carried out impartial audits.

    So in effect the AC has not moved on from the Tramore incident and the flaws pointed out in the management structure back then have either never been adressed or have been allowed to resurface if they had indeed been removed?

    So in effect while the people continue to fly they do so in an environment that lacks the control to minimize accidents?

    Am I reading that correctly?
    Pay them properly.....and they will come!

  29. #47
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    You can have all the best training, procedures, tools etc. in place, but if a pilot makes a decision. or a trainee in a marchetti on a solo flight decides to try

    a loop de loop not much management can do about that.

  30. #48
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    As a newcomer to IMO I was kindly informed by a moderator that members of the Air Corps are not permitted to post here.Having read all the posts on this thread there have been no substantive posts (citing actual current policy and procedures) that counter any of the claims being made about/against the air corps. Fron this I can assume that members of the Air Corps are respecting the order not to post here. With that in mind anyone can make any claim "air corps pilots are only trained to turn left" and nobody can prove them wrong with anything other than additional conjecture. This is the basic flaw with an online "debate", especially regarding such serious matters... it is inherently one sided and in favour of those so called 'vested interests' (if there are any here) who can start a post with some obligatory hand wringing before getting the knife in. I joined IMO recently having been a spectator for quite a while, maybe I joined at a bad time but the experience has left a bad taste in the mouth. And for that reason, as Duncan Banatyne might say, I'm out. Cheerio IMO.

  31. #49
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    Quote Originally Posted by hptmurphy View Post
    ok




    Is there a possibility that elements of that culture still exist?




    We only become aware of such incidents when they end up with fatal circumstances, however if all incidents were to be tabulated would it show that there is a lack of management?

    It was cited in the report that the PIC charge had been investigated for a low flying incident. If all these were to be presented does it increase the amount of 'incidents' dramatically?



    Has the matter been raised at those levels that manage such issues?


    Still think management have nothing to answer for?

    If the questions are raised then they have to account for lack of input.

    Problem being who gets to ask the questions?



    I have no doubt but the incidents are not in the public arena so I can't comment.


    I'm taking from all this that the lack of external auditing of the systems in place has failed to highlight

    (a) That procedures are not being adhered to
    (b) that those tasked from within the Aer Corps with self assessment of the systems are either overlooking basic system failures or are not aware of the potential risks around what they area auditing because they not be qualified to the degree required to carried out impartial audits.

    So in effect the AC has not moved on from the Tramore incident and the flaws pointed out in the management structure back then have either never been adressed or have been allowed to resurface if they had indeed been removed?

    So in effect while the people continue to fly they do so in an environment that lacks the control to minimize accidents?

    Am I reading that correctly?

    IMHO Yes.

  32. #50
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    Quote Originally Posted by sofa View Post
    You can have all the best training, procedures, tools etc. in place, but if a pilot makes a decision. or a trainee in a marchetti on a solo flight decides to try

    a loop de loop not much management can do about that.
    I agree completely, if the stuff you mentioned is not there, the chances are greatly increased..

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