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  • #31
    I don't believe that risk taking and pushing the envelope have any place in aviation, this old nugget permeated the AC for many years where there was a belief that Military Pilots didn't need limits!!. I think that this is clearly not true, all aviation professionals should operate within the limits of the aircraft and their abilities. Pushing the limits leads to incidents and accidents.

    The AC have a fine record of life saving in the SAR arena for sure, however we now know that SAR can be performed equally as effectively by a regulated(AOC) organization. (I don't wish to drag the efficiency merits into this discussion.) In my opinion the Training in the AC is excellent an many areas, I think the organization falls down in the application of this training and in its management structure and flight ops regulation and supervision, remember that the IAC is the regulator and operator...

    A frontline fighter squadron operating in a hostile environment may have to push the limits to get ordnance on target or to escape from AA fire, but even my knowledge and contact with pilots flying Supersonic fighter aircraft leads me to believe they operate to a very strict set of SOP's and are actually highly regulated.

    None of which really maters in the context of the AC, where all of the operations could be covered by an AOC.

    I don't believe that AC mission effectiveness would have been reduced by the application of Professional Limits and Robust SOP's backed up by effective flight ops management and performance monitoring.

    Comment


    • #32
      Hi there
      With regard to changes required to the AC system, D248 produced more institutional changes than even this accident. I served there before 248 and quite simply, the place was accidentally professional. The Don got a severe boot up the hole from 248's outcome and no doubt will get the same from 265. I have always wanted Don accident reports to be published because I belive that the public, who pay for their very existence, have a right to know and also because other air arms do so as a matter of routine.

      regards
      GttC

      Comment


      • #33
        Originally posted by hptmurphy View Post
        I would whole heartedly agree this to be the case
        hpt, thanks for the clarification.
        Last edited by Helihead; 27 January 2012, 21:21.

        Comment


        • #34
          Originally posted by Charlie252 View Post
          I don't believe that risk taking and pushing the envelope have any place in aviation
          Everytime you step in board an aircraft (same as a car) you are taking a calculated risk.
          A frontline fighter squadron operating in a hostile environment may have to push the limits to get ordnance on target or to escape from AA fire, but even my knowledge and contact with pilots flying Supersonic fighter aircraft leads me to believe they operate to a very strict set of SOP's and are actually highly regulated.

          I don't believe that AC mission effectiveness would have been reduced by the application of Professional Limits and Robust SOP's backed up by effective flight ops management and performance monitoring.
          What makes you think there weren't SOPs?

          Comment


          • #35
            Nothing to do with any level of management within the AC was found to be a cause or contributing factor to the accident.

            There were details about management in the findings.

            Comment


            • #36
              Originally posted by DeV View Post
              Nothing to do with any level of management within the AC was found to be a cause or contributing factor to the accident.

              There were details about management in the findings.
              ???

              Comment


              • #37
                Everytime you step in board an aircraft (same as a car) you are taking a calculated risk.
                Agreed

                I don't believe that risk taking and pushing the envelope have any place in aviation
                Again agreed.

                The AC have a fine record of life saving in the SAR arena for sure, however we now know that SAR can be performed equally as effectively by a regulated(AOC) organization. (I don't wish to drag the efficiency merits into this discussion.)
                Given the aircraft involved I believe that there were times where boundaries were exceeded but not to the point of recklessness,but sometimes pushing the limits in training give you an insight to what maybe available when required operationally .

                If all were to operate within a comfort zone we would have no heroes!
                The guys on the night of July 1st 1999 in 248 were well outside their comfort zone from the missions inception, but something else kicked in to make the push that extra 10%.

                Someone some where at some point in their training had instilled that value in them that should they believe it was justifiable to move out side of the accepted safety zone to get the job done and if the risks were acceptable they were justified in their actions.

                It has been proven to have tragic results at times but if every situation were to be put under the micro scope with the precision of an AAIU investigation , how may would be found to be flawed at the time of the action.

                Given some of the finest pilots crew people and even the AAIU people have come through the Air Corps system I'm slow to find fault with the people.

                The management checks and balances may need adressing but we only find out these things after incidents such as this.

                If a report such as this finds systems failures it is the management that are negligent and not the individual, as was the proven case from the Tramore Incident.

                Incidents as opposed to accidents, Incidents happen because of failures, accidents because of a quirk of fate, each person has to decide for themselves if there were failures and where the failures lay, if they were reported and who was responsible.

                If we say all fighter pilots were reckless and guilty of 'Hot Dogging' as the Americans call it, how come the Fougas were free of such incidents?

                Marchettis had the same potential and yes there were losses.

                We should have had more accidents with Dauphins, we got away with it.

                I'm afraid on the day, there is a luck element to be factored in.
                Covid 19 is not over ....it's still very real..Hand Hygiene, Social Distancing and Masks.. keep safe

                Comment


                • #38
                  Originally posted by Helihead View Post
                  ???
                  Read the report!

                  Comment


                  • #39
                    Originally posted by Tadpole View Post
                    PH,
                    Cheesy as you may see it I do believe it is valid. The organisational issues that I see in the report include the following (Bear in mind I see these as organisational, not individual failings)
                    1. Poor over sight.
                    2. Lack of direction to crews on speed in poor weather.
                    3. Failings in the FSS and auditing system; despite being recommendations of a previous reports.
                    4. Lack of external auditing.
                    5. No in flight training for Low Level Aborts (Despite the AC manual stating you will 'maintain proficiency')
                    6. A bizarre line in the manual that instead of instilling the use of the Low Level Abort as an emergency situation requires basically seeds in a pilots head that if you do a Low Level Abort you have f@@ked up. '; if it is your only option, you should have taken a better course of action earlier'


                    On this we agree. I just hope they are implemented and adhered to fully unlike what appears to have happen previous report findings.


                    On this one I dont really know where to start. I dont know what age you are so our 'recent memory' may be a little different but lets keep it to current and previous fleet only. (open to correction on these by any spotters out there!)

                    SF260WE Fleet 8: At least 3 written off, 2 fatal. At least a further 3 substantially damaged (Gormo field, Upside down 29, off the east of 23)
                    Cessna 172 Fleet 8: At least 4? written off, 1 fatal. At least another seriously damaged (Wires Knock)
                    Casa Fleet 2 plus 250: 250 barely escaped with the lives of 6(8?) people on board after flying IMC through a tree.
                    King Air Fleet 3: Actually none that I know about.
                    Gazelle Fleet 2: 1 written off.
                    AIII Fleet 8: 1 written off.
                    Dauphin Fleet 5: 1 written off, 1 fatal. 1 substantially damaged (Hanger Inver)
                    EC135 fleet 2: Again none that I know of.
                    AW139 Fleet 6: Two serious incidents with potential for loss. 1 IMC loss of control on delivery flight. 1 almost contact with underslung load (PC9 wing) 2 days? after the PC9 crash, load dumped before contact with aircraft. Interestingly after the previous removal of a Piper aircraft from the Wicklow mountains the IAC banned the lifting of aerodynamic surfaces. (lessons learnt?)
                    GIV Fleet 1: None
                    Learjet Fleet 1: None
                    PC9 Fleet 8: 1 written off, 1 fatal. At least 1(?) sent back to Pilatus after the airframe was overstressed.

                    Total fleet in recent years 54. AC written off 11. Fleet percentage written of 20.4%, not including the 9 substantially damaged aircraft or very close calls.

                    The above are only the ones that I know about. As I say, I am happy to be corrected on any of them but averaging about 6000hrs per year, the above even over the span of these fleets, just doesn't look particularly good. It is also interesting to note that very few of the above incidents happened under flight parameters that are not carried out by civil organisations on a daily basis therefore I for one don't accept the Military flying is dangerous mantra.
                    You can add to that list the Fouga that landed in a field in Cork, and the GASU heli(flown by air Corps) that sufferred a sudden loss of altitude due to pilot disorientation. The latter is noteworthy as some of the contributing factors also emerged in this latest tragedy.


                    Catch-22 says they have a right to do anything we can't stop them from doing.

                    Comment


                    • #40
                      "What makes you think there weren't SOPs?"

                      Hi Dev, please reread my post, "Professional Limits and Robust SOP's backed up by effective flight ops management and performance monitoring." I don't think writing a set of SOP's automatically produces flight safety, the other parts of my post are the other essential pieces if the Pie.

                      During my career we operated in a Vacuum with regard to SOP's and even where there were SOP's, they were more "Advisory" in nature, best example is Flight Duty Limits... but there were many others

                      Comment


                      • #41
                        Originally posted by hptmurphy View Post
                        Agreed



                        Again agreed.



                        Given the aircraft involved I believe that there were times where boundaries were exceeded but not to the point of recklessness,but sometimes pushing the limits in training give you an insight to what maybe available when required operationally .

                        If all were to operate within a comfort zone we would have no heroes!
                        The guys on the night of July 1st 1999 in 248 were well outside their comfort zone from the missions inception, but something else kicked in to make the push that extra 10%.

                        Someone some where at some point in their training had instilled that value in them that should they believe it was justifiable to move out side of the accepted safety zone to get the job done and if the risks were acceptable they were justified in their actions.

                        It has been proven to have tragic results at times but if every situation were to be put under the micro scope with the precision of an AAIU investigation , how may would be found to be flawed at the time of the action.

                        Given some of the finest pilots crew people and even the AAIU people have come through the Air Corps system I'm slow to find fault with the people.

                        The management checks and balances may need adressing but we only find out these things after incidents such as this.

                        If a report such as this finds systems failures it is the management that are negligent and not the individual, as was the proven case from the Tramore Incident.

                        Incidents as opposed to accidents, Incidents happen because of failures, accidents because of a quirk of fate, each person has to decide for themselves if there were failures and where the failures lay, if they were reported and who was responsible.

                        If we say all fighter pilots were reckless and guilty of 'Hot Dogging' as the Americans call it, how come the Fougas were free of such incidents?

                        Marchettis had the same potential and yes there were losses.

                        We should have had more accidents with Dauphins, we got away with it.

                        I'm afraid on the day, there is a luck element to be factored in.
                        Hi,

                        Again you persist in the belief that somehow military pilots are supermen and limits are a target. In my opinion there is no extra 10%, there are limits.. its either safe or not..
                        Certainly there was a perception in the AC for many years that we as Military Pilots did not require Limits, this was stated by Senior Officers, and there was always a reluctance to write anything in ACFO's that would limit the AC's much vaunted Operational Flexibility.
                        I think quite clearly given the High level of accidents and incidents over the years that something was wrong with that approach.

                        The Fougas appear to have had a very safe and long career, and certainly we never had a fatality. But the aircraft retired with a fleet airframe average hours of about 2000hr, and believe me there were plenty of close calls...

                        Comment


                        • #42
                          Originally posted by DeV View Post
                          Read the report!
                          I have read the report. It's your reply I don't understand?

                          Comment


                          • #43
                            If you want to be picky about it no management issues were found to be direct causes to this accident, however the report mentions a number of management issues that were at least 'failings' and for me the kicker is this:

                            The final fatal dive appears to have been caused by severe disorientation caused by the low level maneuvering followed by an attempted low level abort, which at least initially cleared the immediate terrain.
                            The IAC PC9 manual gives clear direction that a low level abort can cause severe disorientation, it also states that the pilot will 'maintain proficiency'. Yet up until the time of the accident the IAC pilots did not practice in flight low level aborts. So, the final fatal act of the accident was caused by a well known side effect of the low level abort, one which is outlined in the IAC manual and which at least in part would have been negated by a pilot maintaining proficiency as per IAC regulations. Now lets look at this from the report perspective:

                            1. Lack of proper oversight: Was the OC aware that pilots were not maintaining proficiency? Could he as he wasn't type rated?
                            2. Lack of direction to crews: While the regs say you will maintain proficiency does the manual outline currency requirements such as once a month, once every 6 months? If not why not, whats the point of a requirement for proficiency without a currency requirement? If it did have a currency requirement it is obvious from the report that no currency was kept.
                            3. Problems within the FSS system: If the FSS system and self auditing system was properly working it would have noted that pilots were not carrying out proficiency in something as basic as emergency procedures.
                            4. No external auditing: Again, would an external auditor have noted that basic emergency procedure weren't being practiced.

                            So, we have an aircraft that gets to 34 degrees nose up at 1700' in 1500' terrain. All that was required was to maintain wings level, nose where it is and climb. This didn't happen due to disorientation, a known potential result of a low level abort. Now:

                            Would currency and proficiency in low level aborts have saved this crew?
                            Why was the required proficiency not carried out?
                            Still think management have nothing to answer for?

                            Comment


                            • #44
                              I think it is ironically unfortunate that the disorientation that caused the loss was a topic that the Instructor was considered an expert on.


                              Catch-22 says they have a right to do anything we can't stop them from doing.

                              Comment


                              • #45
                                Hi Golide,
                                Unfortunately in many walks of life having the knowledge and practical application are 2 completely different things. While awareness and knowledge arms the pilot for such dangers absolutely nothing trumps hands on experience.

                                Comment

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