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  • #46
    Again you persist in the belief that somehow military pilots are supermen and limits are a target. In my opinion there is no extra 10%, there are limits.. its either safe or not..
    ok


    Certainly there was a perception in the AC for many years that we as Military Pilots did not require Limits, this was stated by Senior Officers, and there was always a reluctance to write anything in ACFO's that would limit the AC's much vaunted Operational Flexibility.
    Is there a possibility that elements of that culture still exist?


    I think quite clearly given the High level of accidents and incidents over the years that something was wrong with that approach.
    We only become aware of such incidents when they end up with fatal circumstances, however if all incidents were to be tabulated would it show that there is a lack of management?

    It was cited in the report that the PIC charge had been investigated for a low flying incident. If all these were to be presented does it increase the amount of 'incidents' dramatically?

    Would currency and proficiency in low level aborts have saved this crew?
    Why was the required proficiency not carried out?
    Has the matter been raised at those levels that manage such issues?


    Still think management have nothing to answer for?

    If the questions are raised then they have to account for lack of input.

    Problem being who gets to ask the questions?

    The Fougas appear to have had a very safe and long career, and certainly we never had a fatality. But the aircraft retired with a fleet airframe average hours of about 2000hr, and believe me there were plenty of close calls.
    I have no doubt but the incidents are not in the public arena so I can't comment.


    I'm taking from all this that the lack of external auditing of the systems in place has failed to highlight

    (a) That procedures are not being adhered to
    (b) that those tasked from within the Aer Corps with self assessment of the systems are either overlooking basic system failures or are not aware of the potential risks around what they area auditing because they not be qualified to the degree required to carried out impartial audits.

    So in effect the AC has not moved on from the Tramore incident and the flaws pointed out in the management structure back then have either never been adressed or have been allowed to resurface if they had indeed been removed?

    So in effect while the people continue to fly they do so in an environment that lacks the control to minimize accidents?

    Am I reading that correctly?
    Covid 19 is not over ....it's still very real..Hand Hygiene, Social Distancing and Masks.. keep safe

    Comment


    • #47
      You can have all the best training, procedures, tools etc. in place, but if a pilot makes a decision. or a trainee in a marchetti on a solo flight decides to try

      a loop de loop not much management can do about that.

      Comment


      • #48
        As a newcomer to IMO I was kindly informed by a moderator that members of the Air Corps are not permitted to post here.Having read all the posts on this thread there have been no substantive posts (citing actual current policy and procedures) that counter any of the claims being made about/against the air corps. Fron this I can assume that members of the Air Corps are respecting the order not to post here. With that in mind anyone can make any claim "air corps pilots are only trained to turn left" and nobody can prove them wrong with anything other than additional conjecture. This is the basic flaw with an online "debate", especially regarding such serious matters... it is inherently one sided and in favour of those so called 'vested interests' (if there are any here) who can start a post with some obligatory hand wringing before getting the knife in. I joined IMO recently having been a spectator for quite a while, maybe I joined at a bad time but the experience has left a bad taste in the mouth. And for that reason, as Duncan Banatyne might say, I'm out. Cheerio IMO.

        Comment


        • #49
          Originally posted by hptmurphy View Post
          ok




          Is there a possibility that elements of that culture still exist?




          We only become aware of such incidents when they end up with fatal circumstances, however if all incidents were to be tabulated would it show that there is a lack of management?

          It was cited in the report that the PIC charge had been investigated for a low flying incident. If all these were to be presented does it increase the amount of 'incidents' dramatically?



          Has the matter been raised at those levels that manage such issues?


          Still think management have nothing to answer for?

          If the questions are raised then they have to account for lack of input.

          Problem being who gets to ask the questions?



          I have no doubt but the incidents are not in the public arena so I can't comment.


          I'm taking from all this that the lack of external auditing of the systems in place has failed to highlight

          (a) That procedures are not being adhered to
          (b) that those tasked from within the Aer Corps with self assessment of the systems are either overlooking basic system failures or are not aware of the potential risks around what they area auditing because they not be qualified to the degree required to carried out impartial audits.

          So in effect the AC has not moved on from the Tramore incident and the flaws pointed out in the management structure back then have either never been adressed or have been allowed to resurface if they had indeed been removed?

          So in effect while the people continue to fly they do so in an environment that lacks the control to minimize accidents?

          Am I reading that correctly?

          IMHO Yes.

          Comment


          • #50
            Originally posted by sofa View Post
            You can have all the best training, procedures, tools etc. in place, but if a pilot makes a decision. or a trainee in a marchetti on a solo flight decides to try

            a loop de loop not much management can do about that.
            I agree completely, if the stuff you mentioned is not there, the chances are greatly increased..

            Comment


            • #51
              Hi all
              It's a pity that it takes fatalities to make an organisation improve itself. Like a wise old Canadian human factors instructor once told a class of us mechs, "you might hate air law, but every rule that's in the books was written with dead men's blood". The institution learned from 248 and will do so again from 265. Personally, I'd regard having FTS with no active CO as a serious institutional mistake. It goes against the grain of hard-won experience.

              regards
              GttC

              Comment


              • #52
                As a newcomer to IMO I was kindly informed by a moderator that members of the Air Corps are not permitted to post here.
                Officially...and thats DF policy that is not to say that members of the Aer Corp could actually post here but couldn't identify themselves.

                Given the nature of the subject and given a lot of the details that would either corroborate or deny some of the comments made here would be exclusive to the Aer Corps it would be a dangerous time for any serving Aer Corps memeber to add to the debate something which might compromise their identity.

                It has happen in the past with members and other branches of the DF.

                If however former members or those who have additional information chose to post it is accepted that the post may be debated.

                Should there be a 'agenda' or perceptions there of it is then the moderators place to either delete posts or lock down a thread.

                Depending on what people are prepared to discuss or comment on the thread lives or dies a natural death.

                If there are aspects of the thread you don't like its should be brought to the attention of a Mod who will act accordingly.

                Yes this one is getting close to the bone but given the nature of the subject and how there was an attempt to keep it out of the public domain I think the discussion will be quite biased at attempting to highlight failures that led to the incident, as it has already been suggested that incidents involving fatalities and loss of aircraft in the AC may be above an acceptable level.
                Covid 19 is not over ....it's still very real..Hand Hygiene, Social Distancing and Masks.. keep safe

                Comment


                • #53
                  Loki,
                  I am sorry you feel this way but I can understand sensitivities around this subject. However from what I have seen on this thread in particular the discussion has revolved around facts substantiated in the crash report and publicly known facts on accidents and incidents in the Air Corps. This has at some stages been evaluated against the experience of ex Air Corps personnel who have moved on to civil operations and seen the operation from both sides.
                  While it may be an official no no for AC personnel to come on here they do. Before you depart, please just read some of the threads and see how robust some of the threads can get. Both sides are here in force and it's never one sided.

                  Comment


                  • #54
                    Originally posted by DeV View Post
                    Nothing to do with any level of management within the AC was found to be a cause or contributing factor to the accident.

                    There were details about management in the findings.
                    Originally posted by Helihead View Post
                    I have read the report. It's your reply I don't understand?
                    3. Conclusions
                    (a) Findings
                    19. OC FTS was not qualified on the PC-9(M). The Investigation considers that this situation was
                    not conducive to optimum oversight of FTS.
                    20. Self-authorisation by the Instructor (CFI) was found to be the norm in FTS. This reduced
                    supervisory oversight and was not in accordance with good safety practice.
                    21. Visibility was not assessed in the Sortie Risk Assessment Form.
                    22. The level and scope of the audits of FTS was limited.

                    (b) Probable Cause
                    Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) attributable to Spatial Disorientation due to a Somatogravic
                    Illusion following the loss of Situational Awareness.

                    (c) Contributory Factors
                    1. Continued flight towards high terrain in deteriorating weather.
                    2. Very changeable weather conditions.
                    3. High speed in a high terrain area while visibility was reduced.




                    Originally posted by Tadpole View Post
                    which at least in part would have been negated by a pilot maintaining proficiency as per IAC regulations. Now lets look at this from the report perspective:

                    1. Lack of proper oversight: Was the OC aware that pilots were not maintaining proficiency? Could he as he wasn't type rated?
                    2. Lack of direction to crews: While the regs say you will maintain proficiency does the manual outline currency requirements such as once a month, once every 6 months? If not why not, whats the point of a requirement for proficiency without a currency requirement? If it did have a currency requirement it is obvious from the report that no currency was kept.
                    3. Problems within the FSS system: If the FSS system and self auditing system was properly working it would have noted that pilots were not carrying out proficiency in something as basic as emergency procedures.
                    4. No external auditing: Again, would an external auditor have noted that basic emergency procedure weren't being practiced.

                    So, we have an aircraft that gets to 34 degrees nose up at 1700' in 1500' terrain. All that was required was to maintain wings level, nose where it is and climb. This didn't happen due to disorientation, a known potential result of a low level abort. Now:

                    Would currency and proficiency in low level aborts have saved this crew?
                    Why was the required proficiency not carried out?
                    Still think management have nothing to answer for?
                    I would point you to Finding number 3 - 3.
                    The flight crew were appropriately qualified with valid IAC ratings.
                    Originally posted by loki View Post
                    As a newcomer to IMO I was kindly informed by a moderator that members of the Air Corps are not permitted to post here.Having read all the posts on this thread there have been no substantive posts (citing actual current policy and procedures) that counter any of the claims being made about/against the air corps. Fron this I can assume that members of the Air Corps are respecting the order not to post here. With that in mind anyone can make any claim "air corps pilots are only trained to turn left" and nobody can prove them wrong with anything other than additional conjecture. This is the basic flaw with an online "debate", especially regarding such serious matters... it is inherently one sided and in favour of those so called 'vested interests' (if there are any here) who can start a post with some obligatory hand wringing before getting the knife in.
                    Your correct! However that is how discipline is maintained in a military organisation.


                    Originally posted by Tadpole View Post
                    Loki,
                    I am sorry you feel this way but I can understand sensitivities around this subject. However from what I have seen on this thread in particular the discussion has revolved around facts substantiated in the crash report and publicly known facts on accidents and incidents in the Air Corps. This has at some stages been evaluated against the experience of ex Air Corps personnel who have moved on to civil operations and seen the operation from both sides.
                    While it may be an official no no for AC personnel to come on here they do. Before you depart, please just read some of the threads and see how robust some of the threads can get. Both sides are here in force and it's never one sided.

                    Comment


                    • #55
                      I would point you to Finding number 3 - 3.
                      The flight crew were appropriately qualified with valid IAC ratings.
                      Yet as already pointed out the emergency procedure that was initiated by the instructor had cleared the terrain and if held would have saved the crew and aircraft. However, the IAC DID NOT practice low level aborts in flight, despite their own manual requiring proficiency, leaving the pilots inexperienced in and open to the IAC documented disorientation effects of the low level abort. Who is responsible for that?
                      While finding 3-3 of the report undoubtedly set off this chain off events it was loss of control due to disorientation that finally led to the aircraft impacting the surrounding terrain.

                      While the crew certainly made poor choices on the day I am afraid when it comes to the overall management responsibility you are sticking your head in the sand.

                      Comment


                      • #56
                        Yet as already pointed out the emergency procedure that was initiated by the instructor had cleared the terrain and if held would have saved the crew and aircraft. However, the IAC DID NOT practice low level aborts in flight, despite their own manual requiring proficiency, leaving the pilots inexperienced in and open to the IAC documented disorientation effects of the low level abort. Who is responsible for that?
                        Management of course, however if it had not be the case to practice this type of drill with other types perhaps the whole scenario had been overlooked, this would suggest that either they were totally ignorant of such instances over the entire history of the AC or they chose to ignore it?

                        The other point being given the relative recent introduction of the aircraft had a proper evaluation been carried out by those responsible for developing manuals drills etc, and did those again responsible have sufficient experience on the type to be able to develop these things?

                        I'm sure the manufacturer had addressed all such scenarios during development but did the AC include the manufacturers recommendations in operation and training for the AC?
                        Covid 19 is not over ....it's still very real..Hand Hygiene, Social Distancing and Masks.. keep safe

                        Comment


                        • #57
                          I say again according to the completely independent AAIU report - The flight crew were appropriately qualified with valid IAC ratings.

                          Comment


                          • #58
                            Management of course, however if it had not be the case to practice this type of drill with other types perhaps the whole scenario had been overlooked, this would suggest that either they were totally ignorant of such instances over the entire history of the AC or they chose to ignore it?
                            Don't see how they could be considered to be ignorant of the drill when they wrote it in their own manual and even stated that crews would be proficient in it. So that only leaves two possibilities: 1. They deliberately ignored it or 2. they accidentally ignored it. Either way its a serious indictment of the management of this operation.

                            The other point being given the relative recent introduction of the aircraft had a proper evaluation been carried out by those responsible for developing manuals drills etc, and did those again responsible have sufficient experience on the type to be able to develop these things?
                            Again, the procedure that could have saved this crew is in the IACs own manual, they just weren't proficient in it.
                            WRT other drills such as slow flight in poor weather it is certainly something that was taught in the SF260 while the high level return option was also taught and briefed in the Fouga for nav exs. Dont know how or if these translated into the PC9 but the basics were there long before the PC9 op.

                            Comment


                            • #59
                              I say again according to the completely independent AAIU report - The flight crew were appropriately qualified with valid IAC ratings.
                              And the same independent AAIU report also states that the IAC up until the time of the accident performed no in flight low level abort training.
                              The excerpt from the IAC PC 9 manual, in the same independent AAIU report, also states the crews will be proficient in the maneuver. Funny old thing, they are now practicing this maneuver.

                              Also in the independent AAIU report " The discipline of staying on and following instruments is fundamental to controlled flight in
                              IMC. The indications are that this did not happen following the final pitch up, probably due to
                              overwhelming sensations causing him to disbelieve his instruments.By the time ground was seen
                              there was insufficient height to recover"

                              Now where have we read in the same independent AAIU report about a maneuver that can cause serious disorientation? A Maneuver that pilots would 'maintain proficiency' in? A maneuver that they didn't 'maintain proficiency' in.

                              So were they rated on type: Yes
                              Were they IFR rated: Yes
                              Were they proficient in the emergency low level abort that ultimately could have saved them: No.
                              Last edited by Tadpole; 29 January 2012, 16:41.

                              Comment


                              • #60
                                The AAIU didn't find that to be a contributing factor in the accident!

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