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PC 9 Crash report

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  • #61
    Don't see how they could be considered to be ignorant of the drill when they wrote it in their own manual and even stated that crews would be proficient in it. So that only leaves two possibilities: 1. They deliberately ignored it or 2. they accidentally ignored it. Either way its a serious indictment of the management of this operation.
    OK.........They as in the pair involved...which leads to the next stage. Who is ultimately responsible for everything related to safe around the operation?

    No need for an answer but you see where its going.

    Again, the procedure that could have saved this crew is in the IACs own manual, they just weren't proficient in it.
    WRT other drills such as slow flight in poor weather it is certainly something that was taught in the SF260 while the high level return option was also taught and briefed in the Fouga for nav exs. Dont know how or if these translated into the PC9 but the basics were there long before the PC9 op.
    Why would a training captain not be proficient in something that could get himself out of trouble and if he wasn't why wasn't it discovered during an evaluation, of course assuming there is an evaluation process.?

    I'm getting a bigger picture the image of which I don't like.

    Thanks for the input

    Does at all finish with the AAIU report or is there dues process such as a court of enquiry?
    Covid 19 is not over ....it's still very real..Hand Hygiene, Social Distancing and Masks.. keep safe

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    • #62
      OK.........They as in the pair involved...which leads to the next stage. Who is ultimately responsible for everything related to safe around the operation?

      No need for an answer but you see where its going
      Sorry HPT, when I said 'they' I had meant the Air Corps as it is their manual and it was the IAC that wrote it. However, you are correct that the crew should have been aware of the potential problems and proficiency requirements of the low level abort as it was in the manual for an operation they were involved in. Unfortunately, if it was the cultural norm not to practice low level aborts then this crew wouldn't have done anything different.

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      • #63
        Sorry HPT, when I said 'they' I had meant the Air Corps as it is their manual and it was the IAC that wrote it. However, you are correct that the crew should have been aware of the potential problems and proficiency requirements of the low level abort as it was in the manual for an operation they were involved in. Unfortunately, if it was the cultural norm not to practice low level aborts then this crew wouldn't have done anything different.
        Thanks for the clarification, I have to agree with you on your last point , but no one is going to admit to cultural norms that compromise safety.
        Covid 19 is not over ....it's still very real..Hand Hygiene, Social Distancing and Masks.. keep safe

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        • #64
          The AAIU didn't find that to be a contributing factor in the accident!
          OK, then perhaps you can explain to me which of the contributing factors outlined in the report (and below) lead to the actual "Spatial Disorientation due to a Somatogravic
          Illusion"

          (b) Probable Cause
          Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) attributable to Spatial Disorientation due to a Somatogravic
          Illusion following the loss of Situational Awareness.
          (c) Contributory Factors
          1. Continued flight towards high terrain in deteriorating weather.
          2. Very changeable weather conditions.
          3. High speed in a high terrain area while visibility was reduced

          Again, back to the report, that I can see there is only one maneuver preformed during the flight that lead to the probable cause, spatial disorientation following the low level abort followed by Somatogravic Illusion caused by the -3g pushover. Both of which were the result of an attempt maneuver which the pilot wasn't proficient in.

          Findings 13 and 14
          13. The final turn ended with a rolling pitch-up into cloud when an Emergency Low Level Abort manoeuvre was probably commenced.The vigorous manoeuvring prior to this made the onset of spatial disorientation more likely.
          14. The aircraft then commenced a push-over, ultimately reaching -3G, which most likely led to somatogravic sensations causing a False Climb and Inversion Illusion

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          • #65
            Originally posted by DeV View Post
            I say again according to the completely independent AAIU report - The flight crew were appropriately qualified with valid IAC ratings.
            I make the following statements without any inference to the Individuals involved in the accident, however the report states "The flight crew were appropriately qualified with valid IAC ratings" so maybe its worthwhile to investigate the Organization and assess its perception of standards and qualification..

            Do AC pilots have a license? Do they have a document that lists there level of training, there currency and there type qualification, or even there medical status??

            What are the periodic currency requirements, what items are checked each currency period and what are the minimum standards required, if a pilot is found to be out of currency or not meeting the required standard what are the processes to train the individual to standard.

            Who conducts the checks and finally who "checks the checker"?

            Is still not the Case that the AC is the operator and the regulator???
            Last edited by Charlie252; 29 January 2012, 20:06.

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            • #66
              Hi all,
              It's not that long ago when AC pilots had to remind them upstairs when their IR renewals were due. I saw several letters of that nature in my time. In the airline system, the pilots licensing and medical renewal dates are tracked by computer and is printed for them when they book in for a flight, yet they are, by law, held responsible for their personal licensing. One other point about this report is that the names of the investigation team were not published, which is not normal practise for the AAIU.

              regards
              GttC

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              • #67
                The Sunday Times today are running an article entitled" Department of Defence fight claim over cadets death in crash"
                Link to follow, however in my opinion it does not read very well in reference to DOD stance. Cadet Jevins father is quoted within the article in relation to his sons actions during the last 5 minutes of the flight.


                Moved by Turkey; wrong thread.
                Last edited by Turkey; 30 January 2012, 00:25.

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                • #68
                  Fianna Fáil has said it is concerned at the conduct of an Air Corps inquiry into a fatal accident four years ago in which a flight instructor and a trainee lost their lives.


                  Interesting turn of events.


                  Catch-22 says they have a right to do anything we can't stop them from doing.

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                  • #69
                    Would the findings of the inquiry be made public?

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                    • #70
                      This is the usual cynical shit from Fianna Fail, they don't give a rat's ass about the families of the deceased except to use this opportunity to score political points. Reopening an investigation won't bring back the dead and it makes a mockery of the independence of the AAIU if politicians feel that they can interfere into things they know nothing about.

                      regards
                      GttC

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                      • #71
                        They aren't talking about the AAIU. They are talking about the Internal Air Corps Inquiry, which seems to have picked and chosen the AAIU findings to suit themselves, and certain peoples careers.


                        Catch-22 says they have a right to do anything we can't stop them from doing.

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                        • #72
                          They are talking about the Internal Air Corps Inquiry, which seems to have picked and chosen the AAIU findings to suit themselves, and certain peoples careers.
                          Nobodys fault, shit happens, shuffle a few deckchairs and pray it doesn't happen again....but it will.
                          If history has taught us anything lack of proper accountability by 'Managers' just lets the same old scenarios play out again and again and again. Until somebody has a genuine fear of personal loss the extra work to sort shit out just isn't worth the hassle. Never has been.

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                          • #73
                            Giving that the Court of Inquiry is a closed court we don't know what they are!

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                            • #74
                              Giving that the Court of Inquiry is a closed court we don't know what they are!
                              Do we need to? Considering that the family of one of the pilots has had to go down a political route says it all. Nobody will be found guilty of any wrong doing, nobody will be held accountable and therefore nothing will change.

                              Accidents aren't for hiding, they are for learning from.

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                              • #75
                                Was't it the instructors fault. ?
                                Ultimately the final decisions, like on any flight, were made by the aircraft commander but rarely does an accident start and end on the final flight.
                                For example, the final dive was consistent with disorientation caused by the low level abort. This possibility was not only well known about but also written about in the IACs PC-9 operations manual. It was also stated that because of this pilots would be trained and practiced in the low level abort but up to the date of the accident no crews had practiced the low level abort and therefore had not experienced its debilitating effects, despite it being in the operations manual. So:

                                1. Who decided that low level aborts didn't need to be practiced?
                                2. Who decided to ignore the PC-9 operations manual?
                                3. Where was the oversight to ensure the operations manual was being followed and enforced internal to the unit and above unit level?

                                Unfortunately on the day in question, irrespective of what decisions the commander did or didn't make to begin with, they started and almost successfully pulled off a low level abort (they cleared the surrounding terrain before descending again) before succumbing to a phenomenon that was known to cause disorientation in a manoeuvre that was never practiced. As far as I'm concerned there are questions to be answered beyond the crew on the flight. Questions that, lets be honest, will never be answered.
                                Last edited by Tadpole; 5 March 2013, 22:05.

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