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  • #16
    So, with this review ‘imminent’ and certain notable anniversaries arriving soon, I thought I’d add a bit of those lofty reflections on some of the commonly perceived aims, objectives and purposes of the Defence Forces..(..of Ireland.. remember the branding!) from a high level vantage.

    It would seem most ordinary people, and probably most perusing IMO, would consider that the ‘A’ scenario:
    INVASION!!! - of Ireland is unthinkable, and so extremely unlikely, that the eventuality is not just out of this world, but in a distant galaxy. Also, that any country so inclined to conventionally INVADE!!! would roll over the Defence Forces in 1-3 days, and the country would revert to the guerrilla style ‘flying columns’ we all learnt about in junior/inter-cert level school history. Presuming though, that the British or Americans save us first.

    Unless it is them.

    However, maybe a more subtle question could be asked... could the country in a scenario ‘B’ – be ‘attacked’...? Still extremely unlikely, but a lot less so than ‘INVASION!!!’.
    ‘Attack’ in the form say of a punishment ‘raid’ by bombardment by air, sea, or ‘commando’ hit-and-run. Think ex-Yugoslavia (Serbia), Gulf War 1&2, Libya, Israel/Palestine (rockets or aircraft either side), Syria or any nation versus nation conflict since and including WW2/The Emergency.

    Then a ‘C’ scenario – a blockade by air &/or sea.

    Also, this consideration; (i) Everybody (circa 30 years old and above) is aware of the concept of domestic subversives, and nowadays, foreign also, and ‘lone wolves’.
    Otherwise, and less drastically, consideration (ii) UN service and other domestic civil and EU commitments.

    [Seriously, ask the average ‘Jo’ the purposes of the Defence Forces... Though saying that, i’m not arguing for the Defence Forces to be seen self-promoting themselves on the street/media everyday, not by any means. I think some of the bigger nations do that too much].

    Comment


    • #17
      Taking above into account, I would be of the opinion that Defence Forces should have at a minimum, near token force examples of most ‘heavier’ more capable and generally more advanced equipment families than are at present available. Reasons been, as a modicum of a deterrent to scenarios A, B and C above, and to not allow such aggression pass unmolested (as would mostly be the case now)...Why allow damage to be done pretty much while the country has to wait before it can react when or IF, ‘they’ decide to land?

      Additionally, if the country has to resort to guerrilla tactics almost from the outset – it does not say much for the advancement of the country from its foundation almost 100 years ago with same limitations...

      [To say that the Defence Forces should not have more heavy equipment because it is an infantry based force, is a circular argument I think, i’m not sure there is any overwhelming nobility to the idea either. Also, in the case of scenario ‘A’ (!) above, all citizens would have the ‘opportunity’ to revert to small group, infantry level action very rapidly anyway...].
      To have enough said equipments to have a home presence and, simultaneously deploy elements abroad on UN service, allowing the country to operate as a mostly self-sufficient, independent and/or lead element on missions with larger nations/less capable nations. This would likely involve some rethink on the balancing and mind-set of the Defence Forces as a whole.

      The nationwide and relatively numerous spread of barracks/bases around the country has been criticised on IMO I think, as been a historical anachronism, related to their past as part of the apparatus of an army of occupation/ with counter insurgency functions – and that fewer, bigger and more centralised barracks would better suit today’s training and logistics.

      I would generally disagree, and i’d guess that many people on informed reflection would think that in the case of scenarios A and B – that the geographical spread of the Defence Forces makes sense (also in the case of consideration (i) to be borne in mind that we have a civil society stable enough to allow the Gardai to be a predominantly unarmed civil force, a fact I consider, to be cherished). As to the logistics and training argument – many ‘Jo Publics’ would probably view training constraints, unfortunately, in similar light to teachers closing schools early for training and parent teacher meetings. They are more likely to say that the PDF is akin to the civil service, to deploy when and where they like for their tax payer’s money worth, and to their convenience not the PDF’s - as the nation’s insurance policy.

      Further, notwithstanding many advocating training abroad, the logistics of travelling around Ireland for training cannot be that onerous? On top of that, while the military is a very peculiar career/industry in itself – I cannot think of too many industries where so many of the [ordinary] staff need to travel abroad for training, let alone bring their equipment with them. Saying that, on balance, membership of PfP should probably be retained, to see what everyone else is doing at close quarters but not more, and there is no shame I think, in continuing as ‘mostly neutral’. There would be more risk, i think, in fully joining NATO proper, and been eventually pressurised/ compelled, into some dubious mission somewhere, where the big boys have some more intractable or inscrutable interests - best avoided by the little fish like Ireland.

      When not training on said improved/heavier arms equipments, the PDF could still dual task (as now) as ‘ordinary’ infantry most of the time in their respective locations. Prevailing education standards and full time service should facilitate this.

      It is unclear to me, exactly what the consensus is on the outcome of the Reserve Defence Forces reorganisation is?.. .is it now just a much leaner organisation, better trained and with better integration with the home barracks, or is it leaner, but two-tier, with integrated/very good/ very committed personnel and then others less so due to normal life commitments etc...

      Personally, taking the ‘A’ scenario and (i) consideration together, along with many people’s assumption of the guerrilla warfare national insurance policy into account – I would venture that quantity and geographic spread is more important (for various reasons) (and comparable somewhat to the GAA clubs locally and not so barrack dependant) overall than quality (Reserves wise) – with equipment and pay to members rising along with their time committed. No harm either, in a lot more people running around society with First Aid skills and an enhanced sense of civic duty... Developing the main assumption further (and I think, related to an assertion on IMO, that the PDF is somewhat top –heavy officer wise – to allow for quick expansion in case of ‘Emergency’) I’d ask, expansion with whom, and with what? The Reserves are small and already have allocated officers, previous members will be increasingly thin on the ground and, as i’ve alluded to before, I think the Defence Forces/country will always be too small and short on investments to throw away any proven, long established and still half-useful armaments. In this regard, I think a Naval Service officer quipped in the press, justifying purchasing bigger vessels, that steel was relatively cheap, and air is free... i’d say similar about half empty buildings(?) in existing barracks/bases.

      Historically, it would seem that many conflicts start with everything, including long stored armaments, being rolled out e.g. Libya ‘the locals’ with like-brand new, but long stored, army rifles. There also seems (small arms wise) to be too much ‘fashion of the day’ to contemplate disbursing the nation of previously expensive and hard to replace arms stores – though it does feel over the years, that there is an almost vindictive (or fearful) approach, to retaining obsolete (but not in an emergency?!) arms equipment e.g where even scrappage was not used, but equipment dumped at sea or, rolled over/buried, smashed, left to rot. (Noting that maintenance of anything... does not seem to be a national forte).

      For example, old rifles, sub- and light- machineguns, and anti-armour weapons may not be ‘cool’ or as efficient as contemporary equipments, but as long as human anatomy has not changed, and the qualities and cost of steel and other armours do not change fundamentally, such weapons will frankly I think, still kill/damage at a rate not vastly different to many contemporary weapons – and impact to a lesser or greater extent related to the quality of opposition, and/or the breadth of deployment. So it would be nice to have items in a mothballed reserve, just in case (or change in fashion) as a fall back option and a larger potential reserve body (think Switzerland or Scandinavian approach to this).

      A continued ‘decentralised’ force of barracks could also serve the function to accommodate such storage (and as a generality, tax Euros spent by resident PDF in regional Cities/primary towns having more of an economic impact than if they were just folded into the main city barracks). A better spread of barracks would also reduce the less than realistic commutes serving members, and some reservists, seem to experience – staff retention, attraction and productivity possible issues if you want to look at it from the management side of things and/or from HR and accounting points of view.

      Overall, and given some of above, a re-balancing of the Defence Forces and allocation of funds, might also be of merit.
      Seeing as a number of nations currently have similar modernisation of equipment and doctrine/organisation programmes ongoing, with impressive if somewhat opaque names, lets call above suggestions; ‘Paddywhack 2016’ or more imaginatively (and opaque-ish but kinda obvious) ‘Trinity 16/22’. Yay.

      Do not be surprised that I have specific arm chair General equipment, operational and acquisition suggestions on these issues. Prepare to be later annoyed/confounded/amused!

      Comment


      • #18
        Realistically if you are talking scenario A, you are talking about an army probably 4+ times the size it is currently, with a much better equipped AC and NS.

        Depending on the scale of a scenario B, the DF could potentially cope.

        It depends on what you mean by heavy equipment and the scale? Are we talking an all-arms armoured brigade. I would say that although probably necessary for scenario A, that it would be overkill as it would be limited in where it could be deployed within the country.

        If you retain a wide geographic spread you reduce the operational effectiveness as it make training harder, but obviously if there is a high threat you would disperse to combat positions.

        Comment


        • #19
          Seems like someone is hankering back to the old days of the DF.
          Lots of troops,lots of bks,obsolete equipment and weapons.
          IE Quantity rather than quality.
          As a professional soldier I think i would prefer the latter.
          "Let us be clear about three facts. First, all battles and all wars are won in the end by the infantryman. Secondly, the infantryman always bears the brunt. His casualties are heavier, he suffers greater extremes of discomfort and fatigue than the other arms. Thirdly, the art of the infantryman is less stereotyped and far harder to acquire in modern war than that of any other arm." ------- Field Marshall Wavell, April 1945.

          Comment


          • #20
            Originally posted by apod View Post
            Seems like someone is hankering back to the old days of the DF.
            Lots of troops,lots of bks,obsolete equipment and weapons.
            IE Quantity rather than quality.
            As a professional soldier I think i would prefer the latter.
            Couldn't agree more.

            Comment


            • #21
              I was more trying to set the scene above than trying to get into specifics from the outset. I actually agree with the perceived consensus that trying to establish a Defence Forces big enough, and comprehensively armed enough, to repel a scenario 'a' conventional foreign force invasion would be a futile exercise. I'm thinking more along the lines of a better deterrent - 'on all fronts' possibly to the eventual detriment of the army...but only to a relatively small extent (numbers wise).

              At present, the anti-air defences would, in aerial terms, require the opposing aircraft to be almost on top of us before the DF's could respond. As for multiple entries of aerial whatevers - as missiles, large rockets and/or aircraft - would be very difficult for the existing (essentially one-shot, then run/drive to a new position) systems to counter, and with only a finite amount of defensive missiles to draw on. No effective anti-aircraft - aircraft either. There are essentially no anti-ship (or anti-submarine) weapons available. The existing anti-armour weapons require soldiers to expose themselves to the elements, never mind bullets and bombs, and there are effectively no self-propelled anti-armour and protected weapons i.e. tank-like vehicles. There is no long range artillery, and the nearest thing to it is in short supply, and again, requires soldiers to expose themselves to the elements and everything else, meaning any force with heavy/long range artillery or artillery rockets could strike out at the DF with little chance of recourse from this side. In other words, even in the 'B' or 'C' scenarios, many nations of the world could strike out at the country from a relatively short distance with general physical (if not diplomatic!) impunity.
              E.G. most anyone could fly an ordinary jet airliner over the country at cruising altitude and drop a 'payload' of propaganda leaflets and there would be little that could be done about it.

              So, I'm not suggesting a larger, all over better equipped army, with an all arms brigade, or loads and loads of barracks and poorly and lightly equipped troops...but I am suggesting...
              Last edited by WhingeNot; 15 November 2014, 02:59.

              Comment


              • #22
                (I) That PDF - army - acquires more heavy and advanced equipment - to concentrate on what they can be good at... so say, say heavy wheeled, tank like vehicles, some tracked MICVs, some long range artillery (not necessarily 'heavy' artillery) including self-propelled vehicles. Longer range (and less advanced) anti-armour weapons, and similar dual purpose weapons, and more shared/added value items in amounts likely to make a difference e.g. night vision equipment. Longer range anti-aircraft missiles, and accurate gun systems capable of staying put and defending against multiple targets (CIWS like). Some anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons (not including Battleships and aircraft carriers!).
                (II) Some enhanced naval vessels.
                (III) Some upgrades and expansion of air (flying) assets.

                [Noting, (II) and (III) are likely to draw personnel and finances away from the army element].

                Basically, a sum of weapons that says to opponents: you can try scenario 'B' or 'C' yes, but unlike previously, it will cost you a few wasted millions in missiles etc. shot down, and run the risk of tens of millions of capital equipment (and human losses) in the case of aircraft, ships, armour damaged or destroyed... to the point where the less attractive scenario 'A' needs to be contemplated.

                The new equipment could more realistically though, be deployed overseas with the UN, and some left at home for training.

                As for the reserves (army) yes, more quantity and less quality if it means vice versa for the permanent forces...
                I.e. more quality for the permanent defence forces, possibly requiring less quantity.
                This may be more of the Scandinavian/Swiss model again.

                Comment


                • #23
                  Originally posted by WhingeNot View Post
                  (I) That PDF - army - acquires more heavy and advanced equipment - to concentrate on what they can be good at... so say, say heavy wheeled, tank like vehicles, some tracked MICVs, some long range artillery (not necessarily 'heavy' artillery) including self-propelled vehicles. Longer range (and less advanced) anti-armour weapons, and similar dual purpose weapons, and more shared/added value items in amounts likely to make a difference e.g. night vision equipment. Longer range anti-aircraft missiles, and accurate gun systems capable of staying put and defending against multiple targets (CIWS like). Some anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons (not including Battleships and aircraft carriers!).
                  (II) Some enhanced naval vessels.
                  (III) Some upgrades and expansion of air (flying) assets.

                  [Noting, (II) and (III) are likely to draw personnel and finances away from the army element].

                  Basically, a sum of weapons that says to opponents: you can try scenario 'B' or 'C' yes, but unlike previously, it will cost you a few wasted millions in missiles etc. shot down, and run the risk of tens of millions of capital equipment (and human losses) in the case of aircraft, ships, armour damaged or destroyed... to the point where the less attractive scenario 'A' needs to be contemplated.

                  The new equipment could more realistically though, be deployed overseas with the UN, and some left at home for training.

                  As for the reserves (army) yes, more quantity and less quality if it means vice versa for the permanent forces...
                  I.e. more quality for the permanent defence forces, possibly requiring less quantity.
                  This may be more of the Scandinavian/Swiss model again.
                  Are you planning a blitzkreig on belfast or do you worry we might not being able to stop the brits on the Boyne when they attack Dublin.

                  The state is is a political and monetary union called the EU, is at peace with its neighbours. Even at the height of the cold war there was no real conventional soviet threat to ireland. There is no point in talking about resisting an invasion, its simply not going to happen. What is going to happen is peace support missions with EU states. And that means a modern nato style army.
                  Last edited by paul g; 15 November 2014, 09:01.

                  Comment


                  • #24
                    Adopt NATO STANAGs as THE standards for all logistic, ordnance, Cis, transport etc

                    Comment


                    • #25
                      Originally posted by TangoSierra View Post
                      Adopt NATO STANAGs as THE standards for all logistic, ordnance, Cis, transport etc
                      That's what interoperability is supposed to be about

                      Comment


                      • #26
                        WhingeNot - your musings make for interesting reading and I do hope you submitted them for condideration during the WP process. Whether they'll be considered or even read is another matter entirely. Most commentators with a modicum of interest in our DF await the publication of the new WP with a sense of hopeful anticipation that it will provide a pathway or framework for the use and development of our forces for the next decade or so.
                        Four years delay aside I don't have much confidence that we'll see the sort of lofty strategic document, most likely now quietly published Christmas week or so, that we all hope for. Essentially because those writing the document i.e. DOD policy branch don't have the necessary knowledge or strategic vision to complete the process. Give it to the SPO to complete a draft and then you'd see an altogether different document.

                        The capabilities of our forces have been progressively and systematically eroded by a drive to reduce numbers. We now see ourselves with three major obstacles to clear before any real recovery can take place; 1. The lowest Defence spend per GDP in The EU. 2. The chronic low pay of a lot of our soldiers 3. The continuing increase in pension provision for mass retirements that must be paid for out of the Defence Vote

                        Address these first and then get people who know what they're talking about to write a White Paper.
                        Last edited by Pure Hover; 15 November 2014, 10:19.

                        Comment


                        • #27
                          Let's talk purely about the conventional threats

                          What level threat do we face?
                          Realistically extremely low
                          Realistically the only threats we face are countries in Europe (most of whom are stable countries within the EU), Russia (or Eastern bloc) and the USA due to our geographic location.
                          The threat from and of these would more than likely be based on a serious change in relations between these external actors.

                          Taking Ireland to take Ireland (ie take every inch) is extremely unlikely, we would have a have seriously pissed off another nation.
                          The only conceivable threat would be:
                          air and/sea landing
                          Up to brigade strength (or brigades at multiple locations)
                          Primarily infantry based force
                          Depending on the force they could may have IFVs, APCs or be light infantry
                          Depending on the force they could have light (105) or heavy (155) arty in regimental strength
                          Depending on the force they could have MBTs in squadron strength
                          They are likely to have some support helicopters and possibly attack helicopters
                          They are likely to have naval (possibly amphibious) and air support

                          However, they are likely to be in or be soon to be in a major war (probably involving nuclear powers), so the vast bulk of their forces (especially their best and most capable) are likely to be already committed or be otherwise unavailable (including assets mentioned above)

                          Potental targets?:
                          Major airports (most likely Shannon)
                          Major ports (most likely Cork, possibly Shannon Estuary)
                          Possibly major natural resources (eg Corrib, Kinsale, Whitegate, Whiddy Island)

                          So we should potentially equip ourselves to meet the threat.

                          However, we thing of a USA-v-Russia scenario (with Shannon being taken by the Russians) we could expect help from the USA as it would be a strategic threat to them.

                          Comment


                          • #28
                            DAIL COMMITTEE REPORT

                            Wednesday, 12 November 2014

                            Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality Debate


                            The Joint Committee met at 14:30
                            MEMBERS PRESENT:
                            Deputy Niall Collins, Senator Martin Conway.
                            Deputy Alan Farrell,
                            Deputy Finian McGrath,
                            Deputy John Paul Phelan,

                            In attendance: Deputies Seán Ó Fearghaíl and Kieran O'Donnell, and Senators Gerard P. Craughwell and Hildegarde Naughton.
                            DEPUTY DAVID STANTON IN THE CHAIR.

                            The joint committee met in private session until 2.56 p.m.

                            Reserve Defence Force Reorganisation: RDFRA

                            Chairman: Apologies have been received from Deputy Anne Ferris and Senators Ivana Bacik and Tony Mulcahy. The purpose of the meeting is to engage with members of the Reserve Defence Force Representative Association. A briefing has been circulated to members. I welcome Mr. Patrick Mulley, Mr. Neil Richardson, Mr. Martin Cooney, Mr. Eoin Colgan, Mr. James Scanlon and Mr. Rob Gilbey to the meeting. The format is that I will invite them to make some brief opening remarks to highlight the key points, which will be followed by a question and answer session with members.

                            I draw attention of all witnesses to the situation in relation to privilege. By virtue of section 17(2)(l) of the Defamation Act 2009, witnesses are protected by absolute privilege in respect of their evidence to the committee. If they are directed by the Chairman to cease giving evidence on a particular matter and continue to do so, they will be entitled thereafter only to qualified privilege in respect of their evidence. They are directed that only evidence connected with the subject matter of these proceedings is to be given and asked to respect the parliamentary practice to the effect that, where possible, they should not criticise or make charges against any person or an entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable.

                            Members are reminded of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person or persons outside the Houses or an official, either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

                            I invite Mr. Mulley to lead off the presentation.

                            Mr. Patrick Mulley: I thank the Chairman and members for inviting us again to address them. We appeared before the joint committee on 24 April 2013. We were bedding in the process of the reorganisation of the Reserve Defence Forces on foot of the value for money report which had been completed in November 2012.
                            Without further ado I will hand over to Mr. Martin Cooney.

                            Mr. Martin Cooney: When we addressed the committee in 2013, we were still in the middle of a reorganisation of the Reserve Defence Force following on from the value for money review. We touched on a number of items in our submission. We gave a high level overview of our issues with the value for money review. We indicated the value that the Reserve Defence Force brings to the State, the civilian skills that the Reserve Defence Force has at its disposal and we indicated we would seek an independent review of the Reserve Defence Force. We also expressed a view that there was a very real risk that, because of the value for money review and reorganisation of the Reserve Defence Force, the force would cease to exist by 2016.

                            The value for money review recommended that a further formal review of the Reserve Defence Force be conducted after a period of four years with a view to examining the utility and capacity levels and the progress of the reserve. We are now at the half way mark and we think it opportune to provide our views on what has transpired. We will do this under four main pillars: first, the introduction of key performance indicators; second, the structural conflict between the Permanent Defence Force and the Reserve Defence Force; third, recruitment; and fourth, the package of support required for the Reserve Defence Force.

                            These areas can be explored in depth with my colleagues during the question and answer session. I ask for the indulgence of members as I can give them the view of the Army Reserve but not of the Naval Service reserve. I will invite my colleague Mr Colgan to make some points in that regard when I finish.

                            While we have always objected to the premise for the latest reorganisation, we do have to commend the Defence Force on how it has approached its task.
                            As always, it has demonstrated that leadership in change management, so much so that the administrative order that was to change the Reserve Defence Force was issued the same month as the value for money review was published. That was a very quick timeframe. It was not formalised until 2013, but this is the document that governed the restructuring in the Reserve Defence Force and what was to happen thereafter. A core tenet of this administrative order is what is known as “the single Force concept”. This entailed the disestablishment of Army Reserve and Naval Service Reserve units and the insertion of Reserve elements into permanent units. The theory behind that is that a single chain of command would allow greater scope for collective training and operational effectivenes.

                            The administrative instruction also sets out how the new Reserve Defence Force is to operate and identifies a number of key performance indicators against which Reserve Defence personnel will be evaluated. These are used to assess the individual effectiveness of members of the Reserve Defence Force. They consist of a number of criteria, which include paid and unpaid training, a medical test, a fitness test and an annual personal weapons test. The concept of objective measurement criteria is welcomed within the Reserve. It is not something to which we are adverse. It should serve as a true measure of the output of the organisation and it also serves as a motivational aspect that can individual reservists seek to achieve and obtain. However, any such criteria must be realistic and achievable, and adequate resources must be given to personnel in order to achieve them. Unfortunately, this has not been the case and there is a number issues with the key performance criteria that have been imposed on the Reserve Defence Force. These issues relate both to the criteria themselves and to the method in which they have been implemented.

                            I will not go into the merits of the key performance indicators, but I would like to explore some of the issues that we have encountered when we have tried to achieve them. At the outset, the Reserve Defence Force has been imposed upon permanent units, so immediately there is a mismatch between the working hours of each element. Whilst the terms of service of the Permanent Defence Force are 24-7, in reality the usual working hours outside of operational duties or training are Monday to Friday, 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. For the Reserve, on the other hand, the majority of the training is conducted in the evenings or at weekends in order to accommodate our civilian employment and our other obligations. This presents an immediate problem when it comes to the administration of the key performance indicators. For example, if I have to undergo a medical test it will be conducted by the Medical Corps, which operates during normal working hours.

                            The test consists of two parts, with each part conducted on two different days. My fitness test consists of three parts, with the first two parts conducted on one day and the third part on another. Another two days are now gone. Additionally, if the permanent unit conducts its annual range practice, where I am tested on my weapon, on a weekday, I have now potentially used up five days of annual leave to satisfy administrative requirements. That is essentially a reservist using up 25% of his or her statutory annual leave entitlement on administrative matters. That is without taking into account the fact that we may be called up for full-time training. If I do one period of full-time training, I have now used up 50% of my annual leave, and if I try to do a career course, which is generally structured over two weeks, I will have used up 75% of my statutory leave entitlement. It is a ridiculous situation; reservists cannot be expected to meet this. We cannot be expected to use up our annual leave on administrative tasks. It is an unreasonable expectation, particularly where there is no legislation to protect reservists in their civilian employment. In addition, we are being asked to meet these criteria without the same support that our permanent colleagues have. We are not entitled to the same medical care or benefits and we do not have the access to facilities that they have. It is specifically set out in the administrative instruction that reservists will not be afforded the facilities or time to train for these key performance indicators during full-time training. All responsibility lies with the reservists, in their own time, and that is something that cannot be said for their permanent colleagues.

                            ............

                            Comment


                            • #29
                              DAIL COMMITTEE REPORT

                              Wednesday, 12 November 2014

                              Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality Debate


                              ...........

                              When the next review is conducted, the cold figures will indicate that a certain percentage of reservists have not met their key performance indicators. No investigation will be conducted into what actually occurred, or into the organisational and administrative obstacles that were put in reservists' way. Nor will anything be said in regard to the personal time and sacrifice that was required to meet these criteria. Instead, the criteria will be used to denigrate reservists and will completely ignore the fact that the process has been implemented in a way that was completely unworkable.

                              What is particularly striking is that are no similar key performance indicators for our permanent colleagues. The Reserve Defence Force is a training output of the Permanent Defence Force. Our standards should reflect on the input of the Permanent Defence Force. When assessing the output of any service, surely it would make sense to assess the service provider. Yet again the regime is set up to scrutinise the reservists and we must stand up and be counted. There is no similar situation for our permanent colleagues, who will say they have training standards to meet each year which include accounting for the Reserve. This is a circular argument because they will use the key performance indicators of the Reserve to see whether or not they have made their training output. Our fear is that, as happened in the last Value for Money report, questions will not be asked as to what our permanent colleagues did or did not do in respect of the Reserve. Instead, there will be a focus on the Reserve failing to meet its objectives. When we fail, as is already pre-determined, the true problems will conveniently be ignored. Reservists face eventual discharge for failing to meet their key performance indicators but the same cannot be said of our permanent colleagues if they fail in their obligations to the Reserve.

                              I would like to speak about the structural conflict between the Permanent Defence Force and the Reserve Defence Force. Aside from the issues with key performance indicators, we have to contend with the difficulties of dealing with a full-time professional Force as part-time professionals. There is no doubt in our minds that there is commitment to the Reserve Defence Force at the very highest levels in the Defence Forces. The General Staff has indicated that it is committed to making this work. The addition of Reserve elements to permanent units represents an additional workload on top of the existing workload, with no incentive or reward in return. We noted when we were last before this committee that the loss of the cadre staff was significant in terms of the loss of experience and knowledge. It appeared to us that the reorganisation was being pushed through in a very tight timeframe without adequate consideration of the inherent differences between both organisations. Many of our concerns have proven justified.

                              The reorganisation was supposed to be implemented by 30 March 2013, yet in 2014 we were still dealing with issues arising from it. As the reorganisation progressed, it was very evident that there were significant issues in the records and administration of the Reserve Defence Forces and this impeded the smooth transition of the Reserve into the permanent Defence Forces. On top of this, many of the cadre staff retired and, with them, their knowledge and experience was lost. Permanent units were left to grapple with an administration system with which they were not familiar and on which they were not trained. As a result, reservists have suffered delays in pay, restrictions on training and denial of entitlements. Greater demands are being placed on reservists in respect of training during normal working hours so that they can train with their permanent colleagues. By no means is this a criticism of the permanent Defence Force. It would be unrealistic to expect someone to work all week and then come in again in the evenings or at weekends for no extra incentive or reward. The irony is that this is exactly what reservists are expected to do. We have gone to a situation where our rewards and incentives have been taken away and the incentive is more “stick” than “carrot” at this point.

                              Compounding this is the problem that the complete military legislative and administrative structure to govern the reorganised Reserve has not been put in place. It is astounding that 20 months into the reorganisation, we are still working under old administrative systems which do not take account of the reorganisation or the increased standards and commitment required of the Reserve. There is an inconsistency between the old regulations and the newly introduced key performance indicators and this has led to confusion as to what governs reservists and what happens if reservists do not meet their key performance indicators.

                              As a result of the knowledge deficit the permanent units have been forced to do the best they can under the circumstances. Unfortunately, this has resulted in a lack of uniformity of decisions, with unit commanders taking varying approaches to clothing, equipment, training, recording of training hours, development of courses and limits on paid training. Depending on their unit, some reservists have been able to engage in training that was beyond their wildest dreams and others have suffered through what we would term "malicious obedience" on the part of middle management, whereby the focus is on attaining key performance indicators, with no advancement of reservists' military skills or training.

                              On the issue of recruitment, the administrative instruction for the organisation identifies that a priority for it will be whether it can maintain the level of quality recruitment necessary to staff the Reserve Defence Force for the next 3–5 years. The establishment of the Reserve Defence Force went from 9,500 to 4,069. By January 2014 we were already 1,200 under strength. The current strength is 1,734. In order to meet our establishment by 2016, we must recruit 2,335 reservists. This represents a figure of over 1,000 recruits a year, which would prove a difficult task for full-time personnel and absolutely out of reach for part-time professionals. Simply put, the resources are not there to train that number of people in this time period. The Reserve Defence Force will not be able to meet this and the shortcomings in its previous administration by its permanent staff meant that the numbers on the books never reflected the numbers in reality.

                              On a positive note, a recruitment campaign ran from March to April 2014. This was a very professional campaign and was run through a combination of national and regional press media, social media and national careers portal. It was the first time that a campaign for the Reserve Defence Forces was run in a centralised manner. The media campaign was very positive and progressive and it represented an innovative approach to the use of many and varied forms of social media and serves only to underscore the professionalism expected in the Reserve Defence Force today. The "single force" concept was reinforced by the fact that there was no difference between the campaign for reservists and the Permanent Defence Force and there was no sense of disparity in the value that either arm of the Defence Forces provides to the State. Objective bystanders would have obtained an impression of a young, professional combined force with plenty of opportunities for the young, willing and able.

                              Nevertheless, there were some disadvantages to the approach. Advertising for both the Permanent Defence Force and the Reserve Defence Force on the same platform caused confusion. This was compounded by the fact that applicants were directed to the Defence Forces’ website where the application process was conducted under the "careers" section. The Army Reserve and the Naval Service Reserve have their own dedicated sections of this website and it would have been logical for applications for either element to go through that. However, it went through the careers section, which caused confusion for people who are less knowledgeable about the Defence Forces. In addition, service in the Reserve is not technically a career. This added to the confusion. From our research, we know that certain applicants erroneously applied for the Reserve when they had intended to apply for the Permanent Defence Force.

                              Successful applicants then progressed to the assessment stage of the campaign. The assessments consisted of a fitness test, interview and medical exam. Again, this is a positive development for the Reserve Defence Force as it demonstrates a professional approach to the recruitment and selection of appropriate candidates for the Reserve. This assessment process is usually the first time these candidates meet face-to-face and the process reinforces the fact that candidates are joining a modern and well-equipped Defence Force. However, issues arose at this stage whereby candidates for the Reserve Defence Force were treated in a similar manner to candidates for the Permanent Defence Force. Some were given short notice of medical tests and interviews. Interviews were conducted during the working week which meant that those in employment had to take leave from work to attend.

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                              • #30
                                DAIL COMMITTEE REPORT

                                Wednesday, 12 November 2014

                                Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality Debate


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                                To its credit, the Permanent Defence Force has learned from the early campaign and is implementing a new recruitment campaign that has taken on some of our recommendations. Unfortunately it does not take away from the fact that of two recruitment campaigns in 2014, one was flawed and the other will not provide output until 2015. We are therefore in a situation where we cannot reach our established strength by 2016 and we believe that this will again be pointed to as a failure on the part of the Reserve.

                                We would like to make it clear that we embrace the single Force concept and its ideals. However, this concept cannot be implemented successfully by the Defence Forces alone. It requires a robust and holistic approach based on four pillars. In order to have a viable and effective Reserve Defence Force, we need a complete package which includes a shift in Government defence policy, legislative underpinning and engagement with employers.

                                This approach will require bravery. It requires the same type of courage demonstrated by the current Chief of Staff in the reorganisation of the Reserve Defence Force. This courage is now also required on the part of politicians, such as this committee. As it stands, the Reserve Defence Force is being set up to fail - the outcome of the next review is virtually preordained. The authors of the value for money review have been quite clever. They did not get their way the first time, so they have set up a structure whereby, at the next review, they will sit back and say “We told you so”. That is sad on so many levels.
                                With the Chair's indulgence, I would like to ask Mr. Eoin Colgan to make some remarks.

                                Chairman: We are way over five minutes, but I would like to give the witnesses as much flexibility as possible if my colleagues do not mind.

                                Mr. Eoin Colgan: I addressed this committee in 2013 and I thank it for granting me that privilege on that occasion. On that occasion we were dealing with the fall-out from the value for money report and we made a conscious decision to take a positive and proactive approach to this report. We were happy that it had come and we were going to get on with it. We were then, and still are, very much committed to making it work. For the public record, I would like to make the point that from the perspective of the Naval Service Reserve, the value for money report was an odious document, which was reverse-engineered to arrive at a predetermined conclusion that the Reserve Defence Force, both the Army Reserve and the Naval Service Reserve, were a bad lot and had to be got rid of. Naval Service Reserve personnel found it particularly galling that the efforts and successes of the force had been quite washed out. No naval officer was on that value for money board and therefore we feel the Department took the chance to airbrush the Naval Service Reserve success out of that report. One might ask why it would do that. The answer is simple: the Naval Service Reserve showed the inconvenient truth that the professional military organisation, the Navy, could use its reserve in an effective manner for the benefit of both the navy and the general public. If one had the time to go back and read that report, one would find that there are far more references to and discussion of the Garda Reserve than the Naval Service Reserve. The net result of this report from our perspective is that we were slashed from an establishment of 400 to 200, despite the fact that we live on an island in the Atlantic, with a coastline of some 7800 km. Some 200 personnel between our four units left us with 50 personnel for each unit and a long list of key performance indicators to be achieved. We feel we have been set up to fail.

                                In practice the Naval Service Reserve's experience of the single Force concept has been that it is a lot of paperwork and very little in the way of actual support regarding increased training or equipment. The truth is that the single Force concept of trying to merge the Permanent Defence Force and the Reserve Defence Force into a seamless unit is a bit like trying to merge the HSE and Ryanair. It will take a long time and will require many changes of mentality on both sides. I emphasise both sides here, not just the Reserve. In fact, the single Force concept, were it to be properly executed in all its aims and goals, would be far more traumatic to the Permanent Defence Force than ourselves. At the moment the land-based element of the naval service operates like the army. That is to say that it operates within a bubble world within the naval base Monday to Friday, 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. The navy, like the army, has become very good at wrapping itself up in its own self-imposed regulations and paperwork. Their idea of a single Force concept is that we operate exactly like they do. They have made no compromise in the way they operate to incorporate us. To give a perfect example of this, we were told in early 2013 that just like the naval service, the Naval Service Reserve must use a document called the Manual of Staff Duties when planning and applying for anything

                                The manual of staff duties was hand typed in 1980, so we had to operate to a 34-year old hand-typed document, which could not be removed from the barracks. I will give three very brief examples of the other kind of non-compromising procedures and bureaucracy that the Naval Service Reserve, NSR, has to contend with in our battle to try to make the single Force concept successful. The first one is NSR, similar to Army reserve units, are meant to be self-administrating so a prerequisite for the MIF course, which is a course pertaining to logistics and the computer system, is having a European computer driving licence, ECDL. To do an ECDL in the Defence Forces takes a mere four weeks of solid full-time training while, if one were to do it in the civilian world it would take ten hours in various evening courses.

                                As Mr. Cooney outlined, we had a recruitment campaign and the fitness tests are now the exact same as for the Permanent Defence Force, PDF, which is to be welcomed. However, in our unit, the Naval Service ran the fitness tests in the middle of the day over a Tuesday and Wednesday. The new recruits who wanted to join the Naval Service Reserve were asked to come for a fitness test in Limerick in the middle of the day on a Tuesday and Wednesday. No consideration was given to the fact that such people are part-time, that they have jobs or are students on courses. In fairness, the Naval Service learned from the experience and now they will run the fitness tests at the weekend. However, the suggestion is that the course will be run at the naval base which means people from Limerick and Waterford must travel there. Why could they not come to us?

                                The third and final example of what goes on relates to eyesight standards. Due to a bureaucratic anomaly the Naval Service Reserve must now have a higher eyesight standard than any other branch of the Defence Forces – Army, Air Corps, Army Reserve and even the Naval Service itself. When we proposed a solution to get around the anomaly, the Naval Service looked at it and thanked us and said it made very interesting reading. Following that, it responded with a half-page e-mail with nine references to our proposal being either “impossible”, “not currently possible” or “very difficult”. One would think we were trying to land a man on the moon.
                                Those are just three examples of what we encounter. The non-compromising paperwork and bureaucracy is being successfully used to waste time. The changes called for in the value for money report are not being made. The full list of key performance indicators are not being met. No preplanning has taken place with us to discuss what changes have to be made, despite several requests from our side of the fence.

                                Our fear is that the value for money review, which is set for 2016, has been set to coincide with the election and following the election there will be a new Minister for Defence and that sometime after the Easter commemorations the Department of Defence will drop a review report on the new Minister’s desk and say it gave the reserve a chance but it could not meet it, and that it is time to disband the reserve. As the Taoiseach himself recently said, the Civil Service has the best people in the world to write a 300 page report on why things cannot get done. In order to get where we need to get, what we in the NSR want and need, is a far more positive, flexible and accommodating response from the Naval Service, the Army and the Department of Defence.

                                Chairman: I thank Mr. Colgan. That was a long five minutes. In case of a perceived conflict of interest, I am a former member of the FCA, as it was then.


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