Scorpion replacment?

**spider** · 16th February 2006, 00:50

http://www.proletariatcomics.com/wor...g/2%20Para.pdf

Interesting article. I am almost certain there was a brief Scorpion v Panhard AML 90 engagement in the Falklands, can't find any references to it tonight but I will dig out a few old books and have a look.

**GoneToTheCanner** · 16th February 2006, 00:59

Hi there
I read somwhere that the Scorpion/Scimitar crews were dreading an encounter with the AML-90s on the basis that the 90mm gun outranged the CVR(T)s guns. The AMLs were not, as far as I know, deployed off firm ground and were captured intact. From a later war, I recall a Scimitar crew in Bosnia, in a turret-top TV interview, bemoaning the lack of the 76mm gun for bunker-busting.They demonstrated this by shooting up a Serbian bunker and not causing any damage to the interior. Incidentally, the Rarden magazine can hold at least three or four 30mm clips at once and give a modicum of sustained fire.Didn't one get credited with shooting down a Skyhawk in the Falklands? Must be some good, after all.
regards
GttC

**California Tanker** · 16th February 2006, 01:14

Originally Posted by GoneToTheCanner

Incidentally, the Rarden magazine can hold at least three or four 30mm clips at once and give a modicum of sustained fire.Didn't one get credited with shooting down a Skyhawk in the Falklands? Must be some good, after all.
regards
GttC

Two clips. Six rounds total. Same as all the other Rarden-armed vehicles.

NTM

**HE_Load** · 16th February 2006, 10:26

Only used in mopping up ops.

Wrong

Blues and royals would be the first to admit it

No they would not, have you spoken to them about it?

they weren't deployed in their intended role

Yes they were...if you are talking from an Armd Recce point of view there are many more considerations to be taken account of: the fluidity of the conflict, battle org etc, as opposed to the terrain factor which you have singled out.

In hind sight ..the Band Rs would have been better of on horse back!

... WTF over.

"After 2 Para has finished marching that Sunday evening (13th) from Furze Bush Pass, supporting fire is opened on 'Rough Diamond' at 9.15 pm, and 30 minutes later, D Coy crosses its start line backed up by the fire of four Scimitars and Scorpions". This is not a "mopping up" role.

**hptmurphy** · 16th February 2006, 11:33

Not its not a mopping up role......merely an artists rendition....and it certainly ain't Armoured Recce!
There was a certain misconception that people had at the time regarding the deployability of AMLs. Yes in certain situations they would have been superior to the CVRTs but as the south africans had leaerned with the ELAND...take them off road...especially into wet areas and you are in big trouble.

As for fire power they are about equal and it would have been down to tactics and training in any fighting..the CVRTs having the greater mobility off road....and speed on road.....but lacking the manoueverability of the AMLs.

As in all forms of mechanised warfare ..if you don't have the definete edge in fire power and manouverability ..you don't engage.

As for the horse element what was intended was under the conditions ..given the sudden loss of helios...lack of cross country mobilty except on foot....and general lack of confidence in the armoured option ...because of the battle ..or lack of consideration....horseback mounted troops would probably have had greater mobilty than other methods available at the time.

Given that the land based engagements were a very low tech affair and the Brits Regular forces.5 brigade, were so far up their own arses about their own capabilities.....shortages of ammunition..etc...it was a damn close run thing as in the words of one authour.

I agree with Murph the armour played a negligble part in the whole thing and was only deployed in the latter stages instead of being deployed ahead of any brigade as per the concept of Armoured recon...rather than being used as fire support as depicted in the rendering...which is only a secondary tasking of any Cavalry unit...which The Blues and Royals are!

It is wrong to depict these vehiclers as force mulitpliers..as they were only used as support.

**hptmurphy** · 16th February 2006, 11:58

having read the attachment at some lenght..I still maintain the case that the CVRTs were not deployed in their intend role as Recce vehicles are were employed as fire support vehicles...so that role was not the primary intended role of any cavalry unit.

Not wanting to take from that role...it would show that the commanders as ususal..as in all armies oour own included are slow to fully utilise Cavalry to its maximum potential and usualy only give them singular taskings rather than the multi tasking which they train for.

Cav can be formidible force mutipliers when deployed correctly..but are under utilised when used in imitation roles such as fire support...flank protect and their many other roles,
The B and Rs certainly deemed this to be the case on their return from the falklands as they felt if the battlefield commanders had understod their multiple capabilities fully they would have been more usefully deployed in all types of engagements.
I am not trying to under mine the roles carried out..just stating that the Skorpion..its crews and capabilities...as our own cavalry units are rarely deployed to their full potential..with the exception in our own armies case of a recent operation in liberia.

Even if you want to examine their role overseas at the moment..they mainly carry out convoy protection duties....which again is a secondary role..purely suited to wheeled rather than tracked vehicles.

**Bosco** · 16th February 2006, 12:35

Originally Posted by Harmon Rabb

As for the horse element what was intended was under the conditions ..given the sudden loss of helios...lack of cross country mobilty except on foot....and general lack of confidence in the armoured option ...because of the battle ..or lack of consideration....horseback mounted troops would probably have had greater mobilty than other methods available at the time.
.

I've heard of this in the Rhodesian bush war in the 80's, they used troops on horseback to track and insurgents and call in the fireforces on their positions. Cannot remember what the particlar unit was called will try and find it out.

**hptmurphy** · 16th February 2006, 13:10

Greys Scouts being the unit in Rhodesia...the Yanks also used them in Afghanistan.

**hptmurphy** · 16th February 2006, 14:14

Having just checked it out..there was a total of 4 scorpions and 4 scimitars and 1 sultan deployed to the falklands. These were split into two troops..of two types per troop.

They were used as fire support...and taxis.

One was lost to an ani personel mine...and one suffered gear box failure.

There were no inter armour engagements as the Argie AML 90s never left Stanley.

The Blues and Royals Troop were awarded the grand total of three mentions in dispactches..suffered no casualties..fire 120 rounds of amo per scorion......and the troop was comanded by LT Ian Jones.

**HE_Load** · 16th February 2006, 14:26

would have been down to tactics and training in any fighting

This is a huge factor in any conflict.

the CVRTs having the greater mobility off road....and speed on road.....but lacking the manoueverability of the AMLs.

CVRT far out manoeuvre an AML at every level Harmon on road/ off road, speed of engagement, ability to break contact etc.

horseback mounted troops would probably have had greater mobilty than other methods available at the time.

Yes using them for hauling supplies etc may be used in poor terrain e.g Afganistan. Using them in high intensity conflict....not a good option, direct and indirect fires in modern conflict would wreak havoc.Planning and logistical considerations: Ride up to assy area leave the horses and advance to contact?Noise discipline..loss of the element of surprise before it gets "noisy" with arty fire.Many many more considerations that would need to be taken into account.Thats another topic.

It is wrong to depict these vehiclers as force mulitpliers..as they were only used as support

These vehicles were a HUGE force multiplier
"...by which time 2 Para has taken the whole feature at a cost of three men killed, considerably aided by the fire of the Scorpions and Scimitars ".
Armoured vehicles are a force multiplier when used in the fire support role, they had a huge impact in this engagement., along with other all arms employed. Your argument is absolutely flawed here.

I still maintain the case that the CVRTs were not deployed in their intend role as Recce vehicles are were employed as fire support vehicles...so that role was not the primary intended role of any cavalry unit.

I disagree once more, they British Forces had a very good idea as to the location of Argentine positions, they had obtained this information from SF sources on the ground and recce which was conducted by organic ground forces as well as aerial recon. The use of Armd recce was not essential in this case, why expose the vehicles to Argentine defensive fires. I would agree with how the commander employed them, he was successful in his mission.

The B and Rs certainly deemed this to be the case on their return from the falklands as they felt if the battlefield commanders had understod their multiple capabilities fully they would have been more usefully deployed in all types of engagements.

I have not read of any such observations, yes there may well have been other elements of that conflict where they could have been used and were not. This may be due to a number of variables: Cautious commander etc. Lessons are learned, expierence is gained.

Even if you want to examine their role overseas at the moment..they mainly carry out convoy protection duties....which again is a secondary role__________________

Of course they are conducting one of their secondry roles, they are now working in an area of non-conflict. Things have stabilised, they are there for force protection,the proverbial "hand with big stick".There is no need for conduct of Armd Recce operations in that A.O. other than route recce maybe.

..purely suited to wheeled rather than tracked vehicles.

Another alternate argument where I disagree with you. The majority of the tracks in Liberia away from the more urban populated districts actually favour tracked platforms due to the tropical climate and its effects on dirt tracks making them very much anti wheel.

**hptmurphy** · 16th February 2006, 15:00

" have not read of any such observations, yes there may well have been other elements of that conflict where they could have been used and were not. This may be due to a number of variables: Cautious commander etc. Lessons are learned, expierence is gained."

Was referred to in Marshall Cavendishes Falklands war published in 82. It also acknowledges that the force commander was unsure what to do with the actual vehicles and hence deployed them to fire support roles.

The wheeled option in Liberia is the most cost effective one due to low life and levels of spares available.

As per used in accessible areas in Rhodesia.....in the recce role...adversly to your comment

"Ride up to assy area leave the horses and advance to contact?Noise discipline..loss of the element of surprise before it gets "noisy" with arty fire.Many many more considerations that would need to be taken into account.Thats another topic."

"
These vehicles were a HUGE force multiplier"

Eight vehicles could hardly be quantified as a huge force multiplier when you have deployed against twice your strength 7 thousand miles from home .

"

**hptmurphy** · 16th February 2006, 15:04

The above mentioned reference dedicates one paragraph to the deployment of armour during the Falklands war and attritubutes its individual action as purely fire support operation..and taxiing....and not as the vehicles( Scimitars included) were employed for.

**HE_Load** · 16th February 2006, 16:14

Eight vehicles could hardly be quantified as a huge force multiplier when you have deployed against twice your strength 7 thousand miles from home .

Yes they can when employed with all other all arms i.e combined arms operations and they did.

The above mentioned reference dedicates one paragraph to the deployment of armour during the Falklands war and attritubutes its individual action as purely fire support operation..and taxiing....and not as the vehicles( Scimitars included) were employed for.

This publication is by no means the gospel on the conflict, the author is giving his view in hindsight.
The vehicles were employed effectively for that phase of operations. The commander used his asset as he seen fit. as I have mentioned previously yes they may have been used for other roles and may have proved very effective. Mines fields, Argentine anti-armour capabilites coupled with terrain issues, the field commander would have to have to paid close attention to these considerations.

As per used in accessible areas in Rhodesia.....in the recce role...adversly to your comment

Rhodesia was counter Insurgency (COIN), the Sealous Scouts were conducting COIN operations, Greys Scouts were a unit operating as a sub-unit, Mounted Infantry they were referred to as I believe. They operated as a tracker unit and guided in stronger forces once a terrorist unit was located.Horse have their place on the battlefield under certain conditions in certain conflicts. The Falklands was High Intensity conflict, different ballgame. ** Gone off topic there ..apologies..**

The wheeled option in Liberia is the most cost effective one due to low life and levels of spares available.

Focus here...cost effective...(in your opinion) may not be the most suitable though.

We have also drifted off topic from Falklands war to battlefield employment of Horses. Back to the main topic I say.

**hptmurphy** · 16th February 2006, 16:23

Which was the up grade of scorpions.....interesting discussion though.

The Marshall cavendish publication was the most recent after the cessation of hostilities and is in my opinion one of the most generally comprehensive works available. Other works focusssed on individual aspects. This one gave a good over view.

See as you know your stuff in depth and are well able to back up your opinions......whats next.....

Welcome BTW.

**HE_Load** · 16th February 2006, 16:32

See as you know your stuff in depth and are well able to back up your opinions......whats next.....

Welcome BTW.

Thank's Harmon. Great to see an individual capable of intelligent discussion. Long live CVR(T) i say!

**Aidan** · 16th February 2006, 16:47

Horses schmorses! What about the rebuild for the Scorpions?

**California Tanker** · 16th February 2006, 17:22

If you've got the only tank around, it doesn't matter if it's not a particularly capable one. It's very scary, and is capable of killing lots of the enemy.

Part of the reason the Scorps weren't used much until the end was also that a lot of the battles were within range of the warships which provided NGS, far more effective than the odd 76mm or 30mm round.

I believe you'll find that the ninth CVR(T) was a Sampson (Recovery vehicle) not a Sultan (command vehicle)

NTM

**yellowjacket** · 16th February 2006, 17:57

What about the rebuild for the Scorpions?

I'll defer to someone more knowledgeable here, but I understand that subject is still up in the air, and no decision has been made. A large number of proposals have been in the frame, ranging from the minimal to the radical.

**Docman** · 17th February 2006, 01:47

Originally Posted by Harmon Rabb

Having just checked it out..there was a total of 4 scorpions and 4 scimitars and 1 sultan deployed to the falklands. These were split into two troops..of two types per troop.........and the troop was comanded by LT Ian Jones.

2 troops from B Sqn, the Blues and Royals were involved attached to 3 Cmdo Bde. Each Troop had 2 Scorpions and 2 Scimitars. A Samson recovery vehicle was also deployed. 3 troop was commanded by Lt Mark Coreth and 4 troop by Lt Lord Robin Inness-Ker.

During the San Carlos landing, Scorpions and Scimitars were transported in LCUs in the initial landings with their guns trained over the ramps in an effort to provide extra fire support to the landings. Scimitars also successfully engaged Agentinian planes later in the campaign

The unit suffered greatly from the fact that it was commanded by a Lt and had no more senior rank in what was basically an Infantry Bde. 3 Commando officers were unsure as to how to use them and were not sure that they were of any use at all in the Falklands Terrain. The biggest attack that they were involved in was 2 Paras attack on Wireless ridge where 4 troop provided fire support. While they were initially only supposed to provide support during the initial part of the attack, They proved immensely useful as they were able to see their targets using NVE and provided extremely accurate direct fire at all times to the Paras. As the battle progressed, the troop was actually able, despite predictions to the contrary, to make it all the way up the first summit and provided fire support throughout D Coy, 2 paras attack on the main ridge. Such was 2 Paras love of the Troop for the support that was given that they were given the honour of leading 2 Para into Port Stanley flying the Regimental flag. However it is noted that the Paras love of the Troop also came from the fact that they transported many weary troops across the formidable terrain.

The Blues and Royals were also involved in 3 Paras attack on Mount Longdon and The Scots Guards attack on Tumbledown. Here they launched a diversionary attack past Mount William towards Port Stanly supported by a Recce Pl of the Scot Guards. The attack is reputed to have cause consternation in Stanley as Argentian troops rushed to defend against an armoured assault into Stanley that never came thereby successfully pulling away troops that could otherwise have been used to reinforce Mt Tumbledown.

**Gunner Who?** · 18th February 2006, 05:01

Saw an BBC interview with Julian Thomson , who was I think the field commander in the Falklands War, he was asked what in hindsight he would have done differently. His answer was that he would have used the Scorpions more widely as he underestimated their usefulness.

He is not alone in that , we all do it, The rough terrain crossing ability of those AFVs is truely astonishing.

**Bosco** · 18th February 2006, 05:55

Originally Posted by Harmon Rabb

Greys Scouts being the unit in Rhodesia

They are the boys I was on about I got onto my aunt, she said they were used a lot to track the terrs(her words not mine) once they found them they called in the Fireforces(para's or heli borne troops that seriously ****ed up the bad guys). Off topic I know.

**California Tanker** · 18th February 2006, 09:07

Have the claims of effeciveness of the Scimitars vs Aircraft in the Falklands actually been verified? Or is it just a bit of a brag by the crews? I'm having some difficulty in accepting that a hand-fed (and hand-cranked) cannon with all of six rounds in it, could be a viable weapon against anything that wasn't headed directly for it.

NTM

**GoneToTheCanner** · 19th February 2006, 03:18

Hi Cal et al
The story goes that the Scimitar Gunner was looking thru his sight and suddenly saw the arse-end of a Skyhawk and simply fired.One round went up the tailpipe and blew the back end of the turbine to pieces.The pilot realised his engine was useless and ejected and was taken alive.I'm sure this can be traced and confirmed.
GttC

**spider** · 19th February 2006, 14:23

I emailed the Bovington Tank Museum re my query about a Scorpion v Panhard engagement. They say it did'nt happen, apologios !!!

I thought I had read somewhere that a brief contact occurred, with no hits on either side. Wrong again.

**California Tanker** · 19th February 2006, 17:52

The two units might have met each other. Apparently the AML crews grabbed their submachineguns and attempted a dismounted attack for some reason.

NTM

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