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Defence Forces Personnel Strength Figures

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  • #91
    Is it too simplistic to suggest that is because he is an idiot?
    For now, everything hangs on implementation of the CoDF report.

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    • #92
      Oh ya, forgot the whole trivial Brexit (Good Friday Agreement), Islamic Terrorism and Organised Cybercrime things. Sure it'll be grand. Move along, nothing to see here.

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      • #93
        This would be the same Paul Kehoe that couldn't do a Ministerial review for the 111th Battalion UNIFIL contingent in Sarsfield last Thursday because he had a cabinet meeting.

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        • #94
          Cabinet meetings are held on Tuesday, usually. If it was in Rosslare he'd make it though. Even on a Saturday.
          Gobdaw.
          For now, everything hangs on implementation of the CoDF report.

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          • #95
            Originally posted by TangoSierra View Post
            Figures from Paul Kehoe and DoD:


            Current PDF FTE = 9062

            Now subtract the following numbers due to the fact that there is a time associated to become fully competent:

            No. In 1st year of Training/Employment (2017) = 645

            No. In 2nd year of trg/employment (2016) = 690

            No in 3rd year of trg/employment (2015) = 415

            SubTotal = 1750

            Total effective professionally competent = 9062 - 1750 = 7312

            Now subtract numbers serving overseas (633)

            At best case scenario the DF is being forced to provide a Military Service Capability based on 9,500 personnel with only 6,679 personnel on island that are professionally developed.

            The DF have to provide on island capability with only 70% of its authorised establishment.

            Now subtract leave, sick leave, maternity leave, etc etc.

            But still the Minister for State thinks there's no crisis, the DoD hires another Assistant Principle Officer and every politician in the country fights tooth and nail to keep unneeded and unwanted barracks in their constituency. Unfortunately as per usual, DF personnel will have to die before action is taken and even then it will be tokenism.
            In fairness, I do agree with some of what you say but you are making a few assumptions.

            It is much more accurate to look at establishment versus strength by rank and service.

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            • #96
              What assumptions? These are written answers from the DoD/Minister

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              • #97
                There are serious issues:

                Army Capt -13%
                Army Lt -31%
                Army BSM -11%
                Army BQMS -19%
                Army CS -27%
                Army CQMS -17%
                Army Sgt -18%

                AC Col -33%
                AC Lt Col -21%
                AC Capt -21%
                AC Lt -54%
                AC RSM -13%
                AC RQMS -25%
                AC FQMS -29%
                AC Sgt -23%
                AC Cpl -18%
                AC Airman -33%

                NS Lt -36%
                NS SCPO -15%
                NS CPO -12%
                NS SPO -14%
                NS PO -27%
                NS LS -26%


                That is ignoring those ranks with less than 10% vacancies!!


                Supernumeraries:
                Army privates +1%
                NS Lt Cdr +11%
                NS Lt +7%
                NS Seaman +24%


                Cadets:
                Army 151 - which if no one leaves solves the army officer problem
                AC 43 - which doesn’t if no one leaves goes a fair way to solving the AC junior officer issue
                NS 24 - which comes close to solving the issue if no one leaves
                Last edited by DeV; 31 October 2017, 18:01.

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                • #98
                  Originally posted by TangoSierra View Post
                  What assumptions? These are written answers from the DoD/Minister
                  That all the people who were those recruits passed out, that none of them have left after passing out, that none of them are overseas, that number 3 rifleman in 2 Pln isn’t effective at his job (2.5 years after making 3*). Of course the aircraft tech isn’t he is still in training.

                  That leave can’t be cancelled, that overseas units can’t be brought home.

                  To me this implies that we should have 9000+ personnel available within x hours who sit on their Bergen waiting for something to happen
                  Last edited by DeV; 31 October 2017, 18:23.

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                  • #99
                    Originally posted by DeV View Post
                    That all the people who were those recruits passed out, that none of them have left after passing out, that none of them are overseas, that number 3 rifleman in 2 Pln isn’t effective at his job (2.5 years after making 3*). Of course the aircraft tech isn’t he is still in training.

                    That leave can’t be cancelled, that overseas units can’t be brought home.

                    To me this implies that we should have 9000+ personnel available within x hours who sit on their Bergen waiting for something to happen
                    I qualified it as a "best case scenario". The reality is its much worse.

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                    • Originally posted by TangoSierra View Post
                      I qualified it as a "best case scenario". The reality is its much worse.
                      It doesn’t take 2.5 years to make an effective rifleman

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                      • People aren't machines that come off an assembly line finished and ready for war. They have the basics but are not technically or tactically competent. Unit cohesion, teamwork, ethical and leadership development, relationship building, a driving and weapons course or two, experiential learning during the a daily grind, etc. There are those that will adapt quicker and have maturity, but there are those that will take longer. Also it takes longer than 3 years to develop corps tech personnel.

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                        • The raw personnel numbers are only an element of the equation. As was pointed out in an earlier post, effective strength is a more useful metric. IE subtract people on courses, long term sick leave, in training, etc. and you have a realistic picture.

                          A better question to ask would be "What are the defined criteria for readiness and how many units can meet that metric?". Over 'ere readiness is part art & science but we are about to field a new system which will link training reports (say weapons scores), human resource data (unit strength, trained personnel, etc.), medical data (are people medically deployable?), equipment data (do you have it and is it working?) among some other data points. The initial tests of active units were ugly with a big "U". Reserve units, will be definition, only be able to get to a certain waypoint in readiness until called up.

                          If the DF were to generate such data, that would be interesting. It may be done, and if so, the results should be rightly classified. However, as a general statement, the minister should be able to say something to the effect of "the mission required units are meeting the defined readiness standards" The ministers remarks of " the DF assure us they are capable of meeting all assigned requirements (paraphrase)" makes me raise an eyebrow. What mission and by what standard?

                          Granted, Ireland doesn't have the need to have large forces ready to deploy in 72 hours, but surely there has to be some basic requirement even if it's a company sized element ready to deploy in 24 hours for and be self sustaining for 72 hours.

                          Mind you, beyond numbers and the "don't close the barracks in my constituency" Ireland lacks any military advocate at the national policy level, so I don't see the hard questions being asked. Frustrating.

                          A

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                          • Sorry, meant to add this. We have the same retention issues over here, people sign on, do a 4 year hitch and get out. It's constant churn of both officer and enlisted personnel. Re-enlistment bonuses, choice of duty assignment, schools, etc, are all handed out but we still bleed people. Some of it is self inflicted, we recruit a lot of young people to join & get school money, so they do and move on. Even a West Point officer only has to serve 6-8 years active. Bloody waste IMHO.

                            A recent analysis also noted, like other employers, especially public service, the 20-30 demographic is not as set on the "same job for life" many of us grew up with. They try things, jump from career to career, no loyalty. I'd be willing to bet there is an element of that playing into things to in Ireland. Here they are trying to figure out how can career breaks, lateral entry and so on fit into the traditional career paths of the military...not a simple fix I'm sure.

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                            • Ireland doesn’t have the US problem to maintain what is basically an army in a dispersed, undeclared war without A draft.
                              I don’t think it is necessarily a bad thing to have a constant churn of privates and corporals, so long as you can retain a solid NCO and officer corps and maintain technical skills. “Job for life” as a private is no longer that attractive and not every soldier can aim for the exalted and honourable rank of sergeant unless the army is constantly expanding.
                              So long as the churn is managed, you are increasing the number of people in the country with direct knowledge of the military and that is only good for the attitude the country has to the forces. If those ex-soldiers had a decent experience.
                              Having ten thousand or so voters in every generation who know what the DF does and needs is useful.
                              But you have to pay the people you want to keep, and have enough other bodies so that everyone isn’t doing the job of ten.

                              As for unit effectiveness, apart from border ops in the bad old days the DF has never needed to consider that because units do not deploy.

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                              • Which becomes part of the problem. So long as a battalion can be deployed the goverment doesn't know or care if it has to be scraped together from the odds and ends of a dysfunctional force.

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