That route giude took them through the airspace at blackrock at under 300ft?
"He is an enemy officer taken in battle and entitled to fair treatment."
"No, sir. He's a sergeant, and they don't deserve no respect at all, sir. I should know. They're cunning and artful, if they're any good. I wouldn't mind if he was an officer, sir. But sergeants are clever."
R116 had no comms with R118 directly? Am I reading this right?
Everyone who's ever loved you was wrong.
Please Read the report. WHile the avionics does indicate the spot height, it did not indicate the correct terrain. The FLIR Operator warned the pilot before impact. Avionics gave the pilot an incorrect situational awareness.
Honeywell provided the specific avionics, which has geographic data provided by a third party (Unnamed in the report).
The Secondary, and to me more concerning aspect to the interim report was the apparent failure of the crew PLB due to the storage of the PLB antennae on Mk 44 Crewmans lifejacket.
Should this be later identified as a failure, it could have serious consequences worldwide for the manufacturer. One could speculate that their failure to operate led to the loss of at least 1, if not 3 of the crew of R116.ICAO Annex 13 requires that survival aspects of an aviation accident are considered as part of the Investigation. At this preliminary stage, the Investigation has not gathered all of the evidence and information required to deal with this matter comprehensively. However, the Investigation identified a matter of concern relating to the installation of the locator beacons in the lifejackets worn by the pilots. The installation appeared to be in accordance with a picture contained in a Service Bulletin issued by the lifejacket manufacturer showing the GPS antenna in the same pouch as the beacon. However, the beacon manufacturer’s publications recommend a minimum separation between beacon and GPS antenna of 30 centimetres (cm). In order to ensure that locator beacons in Mk 44 lifejackets function as expected a Safety Recommendation is issued to the manufacturer of the lifejacket
German 1: Private Schnutz, I have bad news for you.
German 2: Private? I am a general!
German 1: That is the bad news.
To me this "preliminary" report is notifying the wider aviation community that the aircraft did not have an engineering issue that requires urgent grounding of other aircraft, but has identified some safety issues that do require attention.
So lets just leave the investigation to the professionals and wait for the final report.
Well, government doesn't stop just because the country's been destroyed! I mean, annihilation’s bad enough without anarchy to make things even worse!
And the other to a manafacturer of safety equipment, and by putting it in a publicly available report they have also notified other organisations of these issues, who can then see if their equipment is up to standard. There are other things mentioned in this report other then the two recommondations that could also be key to the investigation, which is no where near finished.
Well, government doesn't stop just because the country's been destroyed! I mean, annihilation’s bad enough without anarchy to make things even worse!
I guess there are still a lot of questions to be considered ....
Is it not best to let the official process follow its course
Primetime is covering the Crash tonight, reporting that during testing of the 92's the lack of island was flagged 4 years ago.
On now.
Prime time are covering safety failings in CHC Ireland tonight
the IAA's charts were found to be seriously wanting. When you buy an IAA chart, they always ask you to review the chart and point out an errors, such as a failure to include a wind farm and so on. Now, you would have to fly the entire island to find all the faults unless you consult literally every pilot of every aircraft type on the island and that's not practical, so you depend on the OS, who drew up the original, to be accurate........apart from all that, why were the crew at 282 feet, facing inland, when the same quadrant on the chart has the mountains of Achill exceed 2000 feet. Normal instrument flight practise is to stay at least a thousand feet above the highest land mass or obstacle in the given quadrant at all times, unless you are actually "in" an approach procedure, ie conducting an ILS or VOR or NDB approach. To me, they appear to have believed that they were safely "in" the approach procedure but didn't grasp that they were too low and therefore not protected from terrain. It makes no sense to me to instigate an approach at only 282 feet, as it leaves little room for error.
AAIU Interim Statement no 2
http://www.aaiu.ie/sites/default/fil...tatement_2.pdf
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