Rescue 116

[Sparky42]

Prelim AAIU report

http://www.aaiu.ie/sites/default/fil...RELIMINARY.pdf

Not sure printing the final conversations really helps anything, though I'm surprised that the Stack (having a Lighthouse) wasn't in their system.

[DeV]

Not sure printing the final conversations really helps anything, though I'm surprised that the Stack (having a Lighthouse) wasn't in their system.

Evidence (unfortunately) and if it was to prevent another accident

[Sparky42]

Evidence (unfortunately) and if it was to prevent another accident

I'm not debating the value in terms of preventing another accident, I just meant in terms of the Papers/sites when there's still two crew missing. Would they be using nav data supplied by the State or a third party?

[DeV]

I'm not debating the value in terms of preventing another accident, I just meant in terms of the Papers/sites when there's still two crew missing. Would they be using nav data supplied by the State or a third party?

The route guide to Blacksod which they were following was CHC Ireland's.

The various navaids/safety equipment use various sources

[morpheus]

That route giude took them through the airspace at blackrock at under 300ft?

[The real Jack]

R116 had no comms with R118 directly? Am I reading this right?

[DeV]

That route giude took them through the airspace at blackrock at under 300ft?

On the map it says "282" very close to Blackrock, is that the start of the approach (28 feet under the top of the light house)?

[DeV]

R116 had no comms with R118 directly? Am I reading this right?

".... made extensive attempts .... Two-way communications were briefly established ...."

[na grohmití]

Please Read the report. WHile the avionics does indicate the spot height, it did not indicate the correct terrain. The FLIR Operator warned the pilot before impact. Avionics gave the pilot an incorrect situational awareness.
Honeywell provided the specific avionics, which has geographic data provided by a third party (Unnamed in the report).
The Secondary, and to me more concerning aspect to the interim report was the apparent failure of the crew PLB due to the storage of the PLB antennae on Mk 44 Crewmans lifejacket.

ICAO Annex 13 requires that survival aspects of an aviation accident are considered as part of the Investigation. At this preliminary stage, the Investigation has not gathered all of the evidence and information required to deal with this matter comprehensively. However, the Investigation identified a matter of concern relating to the installation of the locator beacons in the lifejackets worn by the pilots. The installation appeared to be in accordance with a picture contained in a Service Bulletin issued by the lifejacket manufacturer showing the GPS antenna in the same pouch as the beacon. However, the beacon manufacturer’s publications recommend a minimum separation between beacon and GPS antenna of 30 centimetres (cm). In order to ensure that locator beacons in Mk 44 lifejackets function as expected a Safety Recommendation is issued to the manufacturer of the lifejacket

Should this be later identified as a failure, it could have serious consequences worldwide for the manufacturer. One could speculate that their failure to operate led to the loss of at least 1, if not 3 of the crew of R116.

[DeV]

Please Read the report. WHile the avionics does indicate the spot height, it did not indicate the correct terrain. The FLIR Operator warned the pilot before impact. Avionics gave the pilot an incorrect situational awareness.
Honeywell provided the specific avionics, which has geographic data provided by a third party (Unnamed in the report).
The Secondary, and to me more concerning aspect to the interim report was the apparent failure of the crew PLB due to the storage of the PLB antennae on Mk 44 Crewmans lifejacket.

Should this be later identified as a failure, it could have serious consequences worldwide for the manufacturer. One could speculate that their failure to operate led to the loss of at least 1, if not 3 of the crew of R116.

To use the holes in the cheese analogy

The crash shouldn't have happened in the first place, therefore the crew wouldn't have ended up in the water.

To me this preliminary report asks questions to the approach

[CTU]

To use the holes in the cheese analogy

The crash shouldn't have happened in the first place, therefore the crew wouldn't have ended up in the water.

To me this preliminary report asks questions to the approach

To me this "preliminary" report is notifying the wider aviation community that the aircraft did not have an engineering issue that requires urgent grounding of other aircraft, but has identified some safety issues that do require attention.

So lets just leave the investigation to the professionals and wait for the final report.

[DeV]

To me this "preliminary" report is notifying the wider aviation community that the aircraft did not have an engineering issue that requires urgent grounding of other aircraft, but has identified some safety issues that do require attention.

So lets just leave the investigation to the professionals and wait for the final report.

Plus note the 2 safety recommendations that have been issued - 1 to the aircraft operator

[CTU]

Plus note the 2 safety recommendations that have been issued - 1 to the aircraft operator

And the other to a manafacturer of safety equipment, and by putting it in a publicly available report they have also notified other organisations of these issues, who can then see if their equipment is up to standard. There are other things mentioned in this report other then the two recommondations that could also be key to the investigation, which is no where near finished.

[Orion]

I guess there are still a lot of questions to be considered ....

Is it not best to let the official process follow its course

[Sparky42]

Primetime is covering the Crash tonight, reporting that during testing of the 92's the lack of island was flagged 4 years ago.
On now.

[DeV]

Prime time are covering safety failings in CHC Ireland tonight

[GoneToTheCanner]

the IAA's charts were found to be seriously wanting. When you buy an IAA chart, they always ask you to review the chart and point out an errors, such as a failure to include a wind farm and so on. Now, you would have to fly the entire island to find all the faults unless you consult literally every pilot of every aircraft type on the island and that's not practical, so you depend on the OS, who drew up the original, to be accurate........apart from all that, why were the crew at 282 feet, facing inland, when the same quadrant on the chart has the mountains of Achill exceed 2000 feet. Normal instrument flight practise is to stay at least a thousand feet above the highest land mass or obstacle in the given quadrant at all times, unless you are actually "in" an approach procedure, ie conducting an ILS or VOR or NDB approach. To me, they appear to have believed that they were safely "in" the approach procedure but didn't grasp that they were too low and therefore not protected from terrain. It makes no sense to me to instigate an approach at only 282 feet, as it leaves little room for error.

[Orion]

.
https://www.irishexaminer.com/irelan...k-464278.html#

[DeV]

AAIU Interim Statement no 2
http://www.aaiu.ie/sites/default/fil...tatement_2.pdf