Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Military force structures in small states:

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Military force structures in small states:

    While doing research, I came across this doctoral thesis. Worth a read.

    Small states are perceived as lacking military power. Nevertheless, most maintain military forces. Given their shortfalls in power and capacity what choices do small states make about maintaining military forces and what utility do they gain from them? This issue is not well addressed in small state literature which considers the security of small states but focuses less on their defence planning or the military instruments they maintain. This thesis addresses that issue by examining how small states structure their military forces, why they do so, and whether they provide for relevant and credible military capabilities.  This is achieved by examining the structural balance of small state military forces; developing and applying a methodology to describe the process and priorities within the military systems of small states; and developing expectations for military forces in small states from small state literature and military theory as testable propositions to provide a basis for comparison of their military capabilities. The results of this comparison are then analysed with regard to the utility that small states may gain from their military forces and related to wider themes within the field of small state studies to ascertain the benefit that they may gain from them.  Four cases of small state military force structures are used. Ireland provides limited military capabilities to meet discrete tasks and roles within a benign strategic environment and its policy of military neutrality. New Zealand, like Ireland, does not face a direct military threat but it has a wide range of security interests. This is reflected in a broad force structure, albeit with modest capabilities based on utility and the benefits of its international partnerships. Norway, on the other hand, does perceive a direct military threat and functions within the NATO security alliance. It maintains forces that are able to operate throughout the conflict continuum as part of the NATO framework but, as a small member of the alliance, it faces the challenges of balancing defence concerns within the alliance framework. Singapore also perceives itself to be strategically and militarily vulnerable. However, unlike Norway, it does not participate in a military alliance and instead provides the most capable military forces of the four cases as it aims to be self-reliant in the face of perceived vulnerability.  The four cases possess markedly different military force structures as a result of their varying assessments of strategic discretion and differences in their approaches to the various security environments they encounter. All four face challenges with economies of scale, critical mass and fixed costs in providing for their military capabilities. However, the extent of these challenges differs between each of the four cases and they gain different utility and benefit from maintaining their military instruments. Hence while small states have some common military characteristics they cannot be considered as a homogenous group. This should affect the manner in which they, other states and international organisations perceive them.


    MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURES IN SMALL STATES: PROVIDING FOR RELEVANT AND CREDIBLE MILITARY CAPABILITY
    BY
    VERNON NOEL BENNETT

    A thesis submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree ofDoctor of Philosophy

    Victoria University of Wellington 2018

    ABSTRACT
    Small states are perceived as lacking military power. Nevertheless, most maintain military
    forces. Given their shortfalls in power and capacity what choices do small states make about
    maintaining military forces and what utility do they gain from them? This issue is not well
    addressed in small state literature which considers the security of small states but focuses less
    on their defence planning or the military instruments they maintain. This thesis addresses that
    issue by examining how small states structure their military forces, why they do so, and
    whether they provide for relevant and credible military capabilities.
    This is achieved by examining the structural balance of small state military forces;
    developing and applying a methodology to describe the process and priorities within the
    military systems of small states; and developing expectations for military forces in small
    states from small state literature and military theory as testable propositions to provide a basis
    for comparison of their military capabilities. The results of this comparison are then analysed
    with regard to the utility that small states may gain from their military forces and related to
    wider themes within the field of small state studies to ascertain the benefit that they may gain
    from them.
    Four cases of small state military force structures are used. Ireland provides limited military
    capabilities to meet discrete tasks and roles within a benign strategic environment and its
    policy of military neutrality.
    New Zealand, like Ireland, does not face a direct military threat
    but it has a wide range of security interests. This is reflected in a broad force structure, albeit
    with modest capabilities based on utility and the benefits of its international partnerships.
    Norway, on the other hand, does perceive a direct military threat and functions within the
    NATO security alliance. It maintains forces that are able to operate throughout the conflict
    continuum as part of the NATO framework but, as a small member of the alliance, it faces
    the challenges of balancing defence concerns within the alliance framework. Singapore also
    perceives itself to be strategically and militarily vulnerable. However, unlike Norway, it does
    not participate in a military alliance and instead provides the most capable military forces of
    the four cases as it aims to be self-reliant in the face of perceived vulnerability.
    The four cases possess markedly different military force structures as a result of their varying
    assessments of strategic discretion and differences in their approaches to the various security
    iv
    environments they encounter. All four face challenges with economies of scale, critical mass
    and fixed costs in providing for their military capabilities. However, the extent of these
    challenges differs between each of the four cases and they gain different utility and benefit
    from maintaining their military instruments. Hence while small states have some common
    military characteristics they cannot be considered as a homogenous group. This should affect
    the manner in which they, other states and international organisations perceive them.
    Chapter Three: Military Force Structures in Ireland – Limited
    Military Capabilities Within a Relatively Benign Strategic
    Environment
    Introduction 66
    Ireland’s Characteristics as a Small State 67
    Ireland’s Strategic Influences and Security Policy 69
    Ireland’s Military Capabilities 73
    Providing for Military Capabilities in Ireland 80
    Priorities within Ireland’s Military System 88
    Ireland’s Characteristics as a Small State Military Force 91
    Conclusion 93
    Last edited by TangoSierra; 9 December 2018, 22:02.

  • #2
    The author hits upon the glaring gaps in force capabilities relevant to the differing policy and strategic directions of Ireland and New Zealand.

    With respect to Ireland this was key takeaway:

    The Air Corps, however, is most affected by the lack of depth within its capabilities as it has few aircraft within each role and whilst some may be tasked to support other functions (such as the CN 235 providing air transport) this would be at the cost of their primary role.

    However, the main limitations appear to be the lack of size of the force (such as in maritime patrol aircraft and utility helicopters) and the lack of a strategic projection and sustainment capability (which limits the ability to support deployed forces by their own means or conduct short notice crisis management and humanitarian relief responses).


    With respect to the NZDF this was the key takeaway:

    New Zealand does not maintain the economy of scale and critical mass to provide for balanced force structures. Although the NZDF has capabilities that include a wide range of military functions this range is not complete (most notably lacking an air combat capability) and the force lacks depth and diversity within those functions.

    The NZDF is limited to one or two major force elements or equipment types within each of its structures (such as two frigates for naval combat or one multi role vessel for projection and sustainment). This provides a single dimension to many of the NZDF’s capabilities with the result that it cannot maintain continuous deployments of of naval platforms, army units or air task units.naval platforms, army units or air task units.

    I think that it is fair general assessment of their short comings.
    Last edited by Anzac; 10 December 2018, 11:16.

    Comment

    Working...
    X