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The help Ireland gave to the allies during WWII

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  • #46
    Originally posted by FMolloy
    The biggest area of co-operation was intelligence. Both Garda Special Branch and G2 provided MI5 with intellegence gathered from intercepted communications of Axis legations, notes on the movements of Axis nationals and details of the interrogations of captured agents. One such interrogation gave up vital information on German cyphers that proved very useful to the Allies towards the end of the war.*


    (*=private papers of Dr. Michael Hayes, National Library)

    Read the Code Book by Simon Singh. You will rapidly realise why the above is pure, unadulterated bullshit.

    Bletchley Park in England and Pearl Harbour were where pretty much all of the allied code-breaking was carried out. They had the best mathematicians in the world going through the German & Japanese codes and, as is now fairly common knowledge, it was far from unusual that allied intelligence officers would read deciphered messages before they had reached their intended recipients.

    The Enigma code was substantially broken before WW2 even began- by the Polish bureau of codebreaking on the basis of French intelligence. This was used for almost all communications. If there are private papers which indicate that Irish intelligence provided "vital information on German cyphers that proved very useful to the Allies towards the end of the war" it was because, and only because, the Allied didn't want anyone knowing the codes were well and truly smashed so they could continue reading Axis communications at will. And Allied for that matter- the UK sold war surplus Enigma machines to their allies until the 1960's (I believe) and read diplomatic, believed secure, communications sent using Enigma until that time.

    Just because it is written, doesn't make it so.
    Last edited by JAG; 2 June 2005, 12:31.
    Take these men and women for your example.
    Like them, remember that posterity can only
    be for the free; that freedom is the sure
    possession of those who have the
    courage to defend it.
    ***************
    Liberty is being free from the things we don't like in order to be slaves of the things we do like.
    ***************
    If you're not ready to die for it, put the word freedom out of your vocabulary.

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    • #47
      By that I take it you're assuming that all Axis legation comms were via Enigma or similar, and that Ireland hadn't the capability (Bletchley House) to decrypt such transmissions.

      Thats fine, except there's more than one way to skin a cat, e.g. traffic analysis, or the old fashioned human based methods of intelligence gathering - i.e. getting a source on the inside. It's furthermore very unlikely all comms would have been encrypted via enigma for that matter, e.g. lower priority stuff (still useful to intercept though), internal communications and so on, not to mention the fact that "Axis" includes other countries without the encryption abiliites of the Germans.

      This ignores for a minute the breathtaking arrogance to assume noone else posting on this thread has read "The Code Book".

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      • #48
        YJ, breathtaking arrogance is what I do best.

        And when you know the location, resources and condition of the enemy's forces better than the enemy's commanders, breaking "lower priority" and presumably less complex becomes, well, lower priority.

        General Tojo (I think) was assassinated by P38(??) Lightnings at the very edge of their range on the basis of an intercepted and decyrpted but assumed secure communication on his itinerary. The Japanese fleet was sunk on similar interceptions. Romnel was defeated in North Africa by the interruption of supply lines based on intercepted Enigma communications. The battle of the Atlantic and the rendering of the Wolf Packs ineffective, securing UK & allied lines of supply. These were war winning actions, based on interception and decyrption at will of Axis communications.

        Who, in all honesty, gives two shites about some Irish amateur codebreaker who broke a couple of low level codes on his own. And who cares about coast watchers, when your main problem is choosing which enemy vessels to sink as you know all their locations anyway.
        Take these men and women for your example.
        Like them, remember that posterity can only
        be for the free; that freedom is the sure
        possession of those who have the
        courage to defend it.
        ***************
        Liberty is being free from the things we don't like in order to be slaves of the things we do like.
        ***************
        If you're not ready to die for it, put the word freedom out of your vocabulary.

        Comment


        • #49
          Admiral Yamamoto is who youre thinking of
          "Gentlemen, you can’t fight in here...this is the War Room!"

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          • #50
            Who, in all honesty, gives two shites about some Irish amateur codebreaker who broke a couple of low level codes on his own. And who cares about coast watchers, when your main problem is choosing which enemy vessels to sink as you know all their locations anyway.
            You have to be joking. The whole point of intel is that nothing is insignificant, often more is found from "!ow level" sources because people tend to be less security aware at those levels. Neutral countries were always hotbeds of espionage activity because of the colocation of allied and Axis embassies etc. I'm sure for example the British weould have been very interested to know about IRA / German links, possible sabotage in NI etc etc etc.

            You're also vastly overstating the importance of Ultra, which was very handy when available, but for big chunks of the war it simply wasn't. Equally, correlation of Ultra information with other sources was always desirable.


            But then you've read "The Code Book" you must know all this already...

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            • #51
              JAG, as YJ states, the ultimate impact of Ultra is overstated. This is particularly so in the case of the Battle of the Atlantic, ultra was not the decisive element in the defeat of the U-Boats as you seem to imply.
              "Hello, Good Evening and Bollocks..."

              Roger Mellie

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              • #52
                My understanding of allied codebreaking efforts was that the vast majority of military communications were decrypted within a day.

                How could that be of anything other than massive importance in a war?
                Take these men and women for your example.
                Like them, remember that posterity can only
                be for the free; that freedom is the sure
                possession of those who have the
                courage to defend it.
                ***************
                Liberty is being free from the things we don't like in order to be slaves of the things we do like.
                ***************
                If you're not ready to die for it, put the word freedom out of your vocabulary.

                Comment


                • #53
                  for example

                  u boat x is given a message to head to y and be there by z.
                  One day later the allies find out, but its likely that uboat x has since moved on.
                  One day is a long time in war.
                  It is only by contemplation of the incompetent that we can appreciate the difficulties and accomplishments of the competent.

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                  • #54
                    My understanding....
                    Quite.

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                    • #55
                      Unlike the Brits and Americans the Germans who landed here had a bad habit of destroying their aircraft

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                      • #56
                        Originally posted by JAG
                        Who, in all honesty, gives two shites about some Irish amateur codebreaker who broke a couple of low level codes on his own. And who cares about coast watchers, when your main problem is choosing which enemy vessels to sink as you know all their locations anyway.
                        Cecil Liddell, the head of MI5's Irish section at the time, gave two shites. In a telegram to G2 in Jan 1944 he said:

                        'Page and self delighted to come over when you think suitable stage if interrogation reached... Information about cyphers and device of great interest. Your preliminary report on radio indicates it may be of type not hitherto known here.'

                        Denys Page was deputy head of the UK's code and cypher school and an expert on Abwehr cyphers. In the last year of the war the Germans brought in an entirely new system of 'substitution and transposition' cyphers. Dr. Hayes was subsequently told 'that this whole set of cyphers would never have been solved without this vital piece of information culled from (the captured agent)'s work.'

                        So, too, did the Admiralty. If they weren't interested in reports from the Irish coast they wouldn't have attempted to form their own clandestine coast watching network in 1939.
                        "The dolphins were monkeys that didn't like the land, walked back to the water, went back from the sand."

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                        • #57
                          One other area of "help" may have been in the matter of the minefields laid off the Western Approaches and perhaps close into the southern coast of Ireland . a three mile gap between land and the edge of the first minefield would seem an obvious weakness. Perhaps you naval types know something of this. When did the NS get the MTBs , how many and why?
                          Last edited by Gunner Who?; 3 June 2005, 08:57.

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                          • #58
                            Also, remember this: at the end of the war, a lot of documentation was shredded and destroyed as being deemed far to sensitive for the public EVER to know about it. One can argue that it was detailing info about the Nazi's, but more likely it was more information about assistance to the Allies.

                            As far as I know, some other stuff is still classified, we'll probably find out more when we're old old men.
                            Meh.

                            Comment


                            • #59
                              Yup, in about 2042.

                              Comment


                              • #60
                                MTBs

                                M1 - Built for Estonia, handed over to Marine Service 18/1/40, stuck in ice till 30/1, sailed the next day, sold in 1948

                                M2 - Built for Latvia, handed over to Marine Service 5/7/40, sold in 1948

                                M3 - Commissioned 26/7/40, bombed by German aircraft off Isle of Wight, subsequently fired on by Irish coastal battery, sold in 1948

                                M4 - Commissioned 3/12/42, sold in 1950

                                M5 - Commissioned 23/12/42, sold in 1950

                                M6 - Commissioned 24/1/43, sold in 1948

                                They were all based at Haulbowline for port defence

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