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Thread: Naval weaponry

  1. #226
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    The 48km horizon I choose to give an idea of how little time is available, even the 48km is being optimistic as the launcher could be closer especially if the ship is close to land!
    48km gives about 200sec warning time for a subsonic ASM and much less for a supersonic or hypersonic missile.
    With the advent of datalinks the launch platform can stay hidden from the target.

    As has been pointed out again here (and last time we discussed the item) the most likely attack will be a ATGW fired from a small vessel or something similar. If one looks at the development for AFVs there are currently a vast array of APS systems coming online. At the moment they only tackle ATGW but there are some moves to tackle KE weapons also. Although none would be directly suitable for naval applications due to the difference in the size of an AFV and a ship some of the technology will eventually find its way onto the naval market. When this happens it could mean the cost could be dramatically reduced. This is important as the cost, space requirement and weight of a system to provide all-round protection is currently well beyond the means of many.

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    [QUOTE=ancientmariner;465306]
    Air dropped anti ship missiles only become sea-skimmers within it's acquisition horizon, with clear view of the target. The ship needs to find the launching aircraft or ship prior to weapon launch and if possible intervene. QUOTE]

    The JSM (updated NSM) has a 185km range with a low-low-low flight profile.
    As the missile used Imaging Infrared homing coupled with GPS and INS it means that the launch aircraft never needs to show itself. And the missile never emits any RF signal that could be detected by ESM.

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  4. #228
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    [QUOTE=EUFighter;465323]
    Quote Originally Posted by ancientmariner View Post
    Air dropped anti ship missiles only become sea-skimmers within it's acquisition horizon, with clear view of the target. The ship needs to find the launching aircraft or ship prior to weapon launch and if possible intervene. QUOTE]

    The JSM (updated NSM) has a 185km range with a low-low-low flight profile.
    As the missile used Imaging Infrared homing coupled with GPS and INS it means that the launch aircraft never needs to show itself. And the missile never emits any RF signal that could be detected by ESM.
    The idea of sea skimming is to minimise the defending targets time to engage, however travelling at low altitudes is not without wipeout possibilities for the missiles , such as rogue waves or error bugs in the flight guidance system or target becoming obscured by land etc. The average threat to be dealt with is from about 20nm 0r 37km with 2.2 minutes reaction time by an auto CIWS system. It becomes really unequal if you have no response.

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  6. #229
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    [QUOTE=ancientmariner;465329]
    Quote Originally Posted by EUFighter View Post

    The idea of sea skimming is to minimise the defending targets time to engage, however travelling at low altitudes is not without wipeout possibilities for the missiles , such as rogue waves or error bugs in the flight guidance system or target becoming obscured by land etc. The average threat to be dealt with is from about 20nm 0r 37km with 2.2 minutes reaction time by an auto CIWS system. It becomes really unequal if you have no response.
    If I could add a personal view. Infra red targeting is only successful over short range as it must quickly find a temperature contrast. It can be put off by bright sun, strong glint, chaff IR. It would not be used over long range exclusively. I often planned myself that I would use a continuous prewetting seawater mist to bathe the ship with the ambient seawater temperature. Gps/Ins targeting is fine for static tragets eg. Harbours, installations, Towns, HQ's etc. Ships tend to be moving which requires their presence to be tracked and passed from launching agent, as a course correction, to the missile.This means the launcher must maintain altitude and heading until the missile hits. The alternative is fire and forget active homing and hope it selects the right target.

  7. #230
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    Surely most modern anti ship missiles are radar guided, not IR? The heat signature from any warship would most likely be based where a missile would punch straight through and out the other side... the funnel? Indeed the hottest part would be the air mass directly above the exhaust of a Gas Turbine powered ship. Any engine room generated heat would for the most part be below the surface and disspersed in the surrounding waters.


    ESM jamming + CHAFF + CIWS = mininimum adequate defence against missile attack, whether manpad or larger. Good intel on the local threat however is the best defence of all.
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  8. #231
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    Quote Originally Posted by na grohmití View Post
    Surely most modern anti ship missiles are radar guided, not IR? The heat signature from any warship would most likely be based where a missile would punch straight through and out the other side... the funnel? Indeed the hottest part would be the air mass directly above the exhaust of a Gas Turbine powered ship. Any engine room generated heat would for the most part be below the surface and disspersed in the surrounding waters.


    ESM jamming + CHAFF + CIWS = mininimum adequate defence against missile attack, whether manpad or larger. Good intel on the local threat however is the best defence of all.
    As far as I understand it, there have been major advances in IR over the last decade or so - modern IR seekers don't just try to hit a hot spot - it's a thermal video image and may also include a 3D image database, so while the initial lock may come from a hot spot like a funnel, the seeker will then guide the missile to hit a particular section of the vessel.

    I'm no expert in this area, but as far as I understand it - modern systems whether they have an active radar and/or passive IR seeker - can take guidance cues from multiple sources, not just limited to the launch aircraft, e.g. you could have a Marpat aircraft way outside the ships engagement zone, tracking the vessel from say 150 miles away that could provide mid course updates while the attacking aircraft has already turned for home.

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  10. #232
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    The advances in the past 30years of sensor technology has been just as fast of that of other electronic area. There is too much to write but I have found an article which covers pretty well the status:
    https://idstch.com/home5/internation...oving-targets/

    Both radar and IIR are used today, naturally the major advantage of an IIR is that it is passive and thus gives off no signature that can be detected.
    Although not as sophisticated as an ASM IIR seeker the seeker on the FGM-148 is an IIR seeker which uses the IR image of the target rather than a "hot-spot" to ensure a hit.
    Last edited by EUFighter; 13th January 2019 at 14:17.

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    [QUOTE=EUFighter;465348]The advances in the past 30years of sensor technology has been just as fast of that of other electronic area. There is too much to write but I have found an article which covers pretty well the status:
    https://idstch.com/home5/internation...oving-targets/

    Both radar and IIR are used today, naturally the major advantage of an IIR is that it is passive and thus gives off no signature that can be detected.
    Although not as sophisticated as an ASM IIR seeker the seeker on the FGM-148 is an IIR seeker which uses the IR image of the target rather than a "hot-spot" to ensure a hit.[/QUOTE

    The article you refer to is interesting and covers many of the developmental and aspirational future for various missile types. The most successful missile launches against aircraft have been the heat seeker types, even to this day, and as often seen on TV, the standard countermeasure is deployment of a broadside of hot flares. In the case of Falklands combat ship losses, the main culprit was the air launched Exocet Missile, with Inertial guidance and radar seeking scanning for the final strike phase. The countermeasure here if you werent asleep was CHAFF and a decent CIWS system.
    The point of the conversation is to awake an interest in the threats and to make some effort to be prepared, other than staying in harbour.

  12. #234
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    If the more likely/defendable threats are ATGW, then the defence against those threats are similar to those the ATGW is likely to face in its day job - laser detection systems, jamming and active systems like Israel's TROPHY - which is CWIS for tanks.

    The big hope of course is that an ATGW, which is designed to defeat tank armour, will go straight through a ship and detonate out the other side...

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    Quote Originally Posted by ropebag View Post
    If the more likely/defendable threats are ATGW, then the defence against those threats are similar to those the ATGW is likely to face in its day job - laser detection systems, jamming and active systems like Israel's TROPHY - which is CWIS for tanks.

    The big hope of course is that an ATGW, which is designed to defeat tank armour, will go straight through a ship and detonate out the other side...
    Doubtful, too many things to delay it on its way. Didn't an RN heli disable an Argentinian submarine using ATGW?
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  15. #236
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    Quote Originally Posted by na grohmití View Post
    Doubtful, too many things to delay it on its way. Didn't an RN heli disable an Argentinian submarine using ATGW?
    No, it was RM's with an 84mm, 7.62mm and a Corvette. It appears to have been almost unserviceable even before the RM's opened fire - all it's guns jammed of their own accord. The attack didn't disable it, but it made a mess. The sub, Santa Fe, was disabled by depth charges, hit on the surface by at least one AS12 Missile, and riddled with 7.62mm.

    One the RN ships hit by Exocet - can't remember which - was destroyed by fire alone: the warhead didn't detonate, but the the rocket engine and fuel on the missile turned out to be enough to start a big enough fire...

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    [QUOTE=ancientmariner;465352The point of the conversation is to awake an interest in the threats and to make some effort to be prepared, other than staying in harbour.[/QUOTE]

    I actually agree that much more needs to be done but that the situation is much more complicated than what was around 37 years ago in the Falklands. Even for inner defence the mix required is much more complex. Decoys need to be more than just chaff (which needs to be the correct length), systems such as the Rheinmetall MASS system cover the relevant wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum: ultraviolet, electro-optical, laser, infrared, and radar. But other soft-kill systems are available from Terma, BAe Systems, Leonardo...........

    The advantage of soft-kill is that they can be fully automatic thus reducing the reaction time. Hard kill fully automatic systems without a man in the loop can (if rare) engage non-targets. There are several cases of Phalanx systems engaging the tow aircraft rather than the target during training!

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  18. #238
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    Quote Originally Posted by ropebag View Post
    One the RN ships hit by Exocet - can't remember which - was destroyed by fire alone: the warhead didn't detonate, but the the rocket engine and fuel on the missile turned out to be enough to start a big enough fire...
    HMS Sheffield, she was the first RN warship lost in the conflict.

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    The problem with relying on soft kill is that, well, you're relying on it.

    A Milan ATGW - and we're talking about 60's tech here, will cover 2,000m in 10 seconds. You'd have to be a pretty brave Minister of Defence to write 'soft kill automatic systems only' on the ops order for a ship hovering off the coast of Libya, Lebanon or whatever IS franchise infested hell-bent is next on the menu...

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    Quote Originally Posted by ropebag View Post
    The problem with relying on soft kill is that, well, you're relying on it.

    A Milan ATGW - and we're talking about 60's tech here, will cover 2,000m in 10 seconds. You'd have to be a pretty brave Minister of Defence to write 'soft kill automatic systems only' on the ops order for a ship hovering off the coast of Libya, Lebanon or whatever IS franchise infested hell-bent is next on the menu...
    Or a pretty disinterested one I suppose... So that would be the majority of Irish Defence Ministers over the decades.

  22. #241
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    Quote Originally Posted by ropebag View Post
    The problem with relying on soft kill is that, well, you're relying on it.

    A Milan ATGW - and we're talking about 60's tech here, will cover 2,000m in 10 seconds. You'd have to be a pretty brave Minister of Defence to write 'soft kill automatic systems only' on the ops order for a ship hovering off the coast of Libya, Lebanon or whatever IS franchise infested hell-bent is next on the menu...
    The problem is that today there is neither soft or hard kill options on any NS vessel and no sensor system to give any warning. I would rather have a working soft-kill system rather than none at all!

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  24. #242
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    Quote Originally Posted by EUFighter View Post
    HMS Sheffield, she was the first RN warship lost in the conflict.
    Initially many concluded that the Exocet missile had exploded, however after much analysis it was concluded that the missile, having travelled
    some distance within the ship had not exploded but that the remaining propellant fuel had ignited setting off a chain of events, including an intense fire that was impossible to suppress due to loss of firefighting ability , principally mains water and the power to deliver it.
    In all six ships were casualties to Exocets and bombs. Some Exocets were successfully deflected by CHAFF.
    The Sheffield incident and the outcome was due to failure to DETECT, failure to ACT, failure to ENGAGE. It follows that lessons must be learned and NEVER underestimate an armed enemy.

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    We need to cover the defensive gap in the after arcs of our P60's to deal with Fast Boat and other attacks. I favour a stabilised weapon, say 30mm with FCS. I would exam the possibility of trialing the system of the Piranha MRV, provided it has a stabilised gun . Strap the vehicle on the after deck, transversely if need be, and carry out a shoot to establish engagement ranges.

  26. #244
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    Quote Originally Posted by ancientmariner View Post
    We need to cover the defensive gap in the after arcs of our P60's to deal with Fast Boat and other attacks. I favour a stabilised weapon, say 30mm with FCS. I would exam the possibility of trialing the system of the Piranha MRV, provided it has a stabilised gun . Strap the vehicle on the after deck, transversely if need be, and carry out a shoot to establish engagement ranges.
    Parking 1 or 2 Piranha MRV's on the afterdeck; seems the USMC are doing something similar.
    https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/new...ship-security/

    Still better would be following the Germans and replacing the Rhinos with MLG27s. While we are at it we could also stick a pair of Javelin on-board.
    Last edited by EUFighter; 14th January 2019 at 18:05.

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  28. #245
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    Quote Originally Posted by ancientmariner View Post
    Initially many concluded that the Exocet missile had exploded, however after much analysis it was concluded that the missile, having travelled
    some distance within the ship had not exploded but that the remaining propellant fuel had ignited setting off a chain of events, including an intense fire that was impossible to suppress due to loss of firefighting ability , principally mains water and the power to deliver it.
    In all six ships were casualties to Exocets and bombs. Some Exocets were successfully deflected by CHAFF.
    The Sheffield incident and the outcome was due to failure to DETECT, failure to ACT, failure to ENGAGE. It follows that lessons must be learned and NEVER underestimate an armed enemy.
    If I remember correctly the ANA only had 4 operational Super Etendards and a similar number of AM-39 missiles to go on them. Also they operated in pairs firing off 2 missiles each time. There were reports that the 2 AM-39s that hit the Atlantic Conveyer had been deflected by decoys from the escort ships!
    The Glamorgan was hit by a MM-38 taken off one of the destroyers and strapped to a make-shift trailer, they fired two missile one which failed to get a lock while the one that did lock onto Glamorgan was detected. This despite the fact the Glamorgan was a generation older that the Shieffield and equipped with older systems. But seamanship seems to have saved the day as the sharp turn she made presented her stern and the damage was much less even though there was an explosion.

    I am not aware of anyother AM-39 or MM-38 launches and do remember there was a rather bad relationship between France and the UK at the time. The UK suspected that the French were still shipping Exocets to Argentina by third countries as the more action they saw the more sales they could expect!

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  30. #246
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    [QUOTE=EUFighter;465382]If I remember correctly the ANA only had 4 operational Super Etendards and a similar number of AM-39 missiles to go on them. Also they operated in pairs firing off 2 missiles each time. There were reports that the 2 AM-39s that hit the Atlantic Conveyer had been deflected by decoys from the escort ships!
    The Glamorgan was hit by a MM-38 taken off one of the destroyers and strapped to a make-shift trailer, they fired two missile one which failed to get a lock while the one that did lock onto Glamorgan was detected. This despite the fact the Glamorgan was a generation older that the Shieffield and equipped with older systems. But seamanship seems to have saved the day as the sharp turn she made presented her stern and the damage was much less even though there was an explosion.

    I am not aware of anyother AM-39 or MM-38 launches and do remember there was a rather bad relationship between France and the UK at the time. The UK suspected that the French were still shipping Exocets to Argentina by third countries as the more action they saw the more sales they could expect![/QUOTE.

    You are right. There is record of 3 AM-39's 1 x sheffield, and 2 x Atlantic Conveyor. 2 MM. 38's were taken off ARA SEGUI and adapted for shore launch, eventually hitting Glamorgan. Most other casualties were from bombs, some exploded, and at least one exploded while attempts were being made to defuse.

  31. #247
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    Quote Originally Posted by EUFighter View Post
    There are several cases of Phalanx systems engaging the tow aircraft rather than the target during training!
    Agree entirely. Phalanx in particular, a weapons system designed for an end-of-days scenario in the Iceland gap, is entirely unsuited to any currently anticipated mission profile.

    Even the most capable CIWS systems is merely an expensive piece of ballast, if never armed, for fear that it might randomly vaporise a passing small craft.

    Is any suitable hard-kill system operable with a man in the loop, to produce fail-safe and fail-fire capability, in addition to automatic engagement?
    Semper et ubique Fidelis

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    The Exocet that missed "Glamorgan" flew across the flight deck and failed to explode.....the "argonaut" suffered fires from Bofors ammunition splitting open and igniting; stored Seacats igniitng and a diesel fire caused by welding sparks, as a result of the passage of one 1000 lb bomb. The after action reports of the Falklands ships are worth reading, if only from the perspective of keeping wounded ships afloat. There is also a report from the captain of that Argentinian corvette, which appears to have undergone a perfect storm of fire from the Marines. Essentially, by the time it reached its destination, to effect cover for a landing party, it's 100mm main gun was unfit despite strenuous efforts to keep it working, purely from the harsh environment. It would fire once, then fail to reload, have to be cleared manually and then reset and reloaded, to try again. The other guns were firing but the Marines kept up a steady fire at the gunposts and wounded many of the crew that tried to man them. They found out that even GPMG rounds penetrated the superstructure, ricochetting around inside and knocking out electrical systems, comms, damage control, wounded people and prompting the ship to have to retreat. It would make you wonder how much protection do modern ships give to their crew.

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  34. #249
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    Quote Originally Posted by GoneToTheCanner View Post
    The Exocet that missed "Glamorgan" flew across the flight deck and failed to explode.....the "argonaut" suffered fires from Bofors ammunition splitting open and igniting; stored Seacats igniitng and a diesel fire caused by welding sparks, as a result of the passage of one 1000 lb bomb. The after action reports of the Falklands ships are worth reading, if only from the perspective of keeping wounded ships afloat. There is also a report from the captain of that Argentinian corvette, which appears to have undergone a perfect storm of fire from the Marines. Essentially, by the time it reached its destination, to effect cover for a landing party, it's 100mm main gun was unfit despite strenuous efforts to keep it working, purely from the harsh environment. It would fire once, then fail to reload, have to be cleared manually and then reset and reloaded, to try again. The other guns were firing but the Marines kept up a steady fire at the gunposts and wounded many of the crew that tried to man them. They found out that even GPMG rounds penetrated the superstructure, ricochetting around inside and knocking out electrical systems, comms, damage control, wounded people and prompting the ship to have to retreat. It would make you wonder how much protection do modern ships give to their crew.
    Some can be seen here
    https://assets.publishing.service.go...eb_final-U.xls

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  36. #250
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    Quote Originally Posted by The Usual Suspect View Post
    Agree entirely. Phalanx in particular, a weapons system designed for an end-of-days scenario in the Iceland gap, is entirely unsuited to any currently anticipated mission profile.

    Even the most capable CIWS systems is merely an expensive piece of ballast, if never armed, for fear that it might randomly vaporise a passing small craft.

    Is any suitable hard-kill system operable with a man in the loop, to produce fail-safe and fail-fire capability, in addition to automatic engagement?
    If ships have a total Defence System and wish to achieve Quick Reaction Combat Capability, then individual ships need a Self Defence System made up of Air Search Radar--Surface search Radar--Electronic Warfare System--Identification Friend or Foe--RAM--CIWS-Decoy launch Systems. There is very little space for human intervention with subsonic threats, and none with positive Mach numbers. Human analysis of total picture has to be informed by the IFF and Defense communication inputs, mistakes can be made, but the main effort should be to remove threats before weapons are released at own ship.Stand alone systems require too much human intervention and can only deal with single threats. The Self Defence System is designed to provide an integrated response from detect to engage and from soft kill, to hard kill. The typical sequence is --Target detection/Tracking--Target Identification--Electronic countermeasures--Active hard kill action.
    On P31 when carrying out full Trials on the Aerial Target being towed by a Beech Baron we had good lock-on and positive results throughout.
    Finally all ships in Fleet configuration need to integrate systems for full dimensional Defence.

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