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  • #16
    PH,
    I don't disagree with you at all. No crew ever takes off with the intention of getting involved in an accident and without fail they always try their damnedest to get out of any dangerous situation. Unfortunately some crews are unable to. While a report is a good yard stick of an accident it cannot tell me the thought processes or intentions of a crew. Therefore while I can measure what I see in the report I am in no position to question the crews reasoning. Would I, in the same position make the same choices?

    However, as with every accident there is more then one reason. The Swiss cheese model. Arranged in a certain way you cannot see through it but line up the holes and the cheese becomes see through. Same with accidents, many layers, in all of which the holes must line up for the accident to occur.
    While I understand that you may feel that people commenting negatively on the Air Corps as an organisation in light of this and other accidents have an axe to grind or vested interests, and maybe some have, the simple fact is that the Air Corps alone and nobody else have put themselves yet again in a position where their safety is questioned.

    Yet what is truly astounding about the organisational aspects of this accident is that the Air Corps doesn't seem to have a 'corporate memory'. Where are the lessons learnt from the countless accidents and incidents in recent memory all to many of which have been fatal. Unfortunately its my impression that no matter what statistical yard stick you use; Crew fatalities as percentage of total; flight hrs per write off; write offs by fleet type; accidents training vs operations the Air Corps don't seem to have an enviable safety record.

    Comment


    • #17
      WTF..I was the second person to comment on the thread. All of a sudden there as a stack of posts on here posted prior to mine, but weren't visible at the time of my post, Had I seen any of these i would even want to be associated with the type of response its getting.

      I was of the opinion that posting should be limited as opposed to a secondary investigation.
      Covid 19 is not over ....it's still very real..Hand Hygiene, Social Distancing and Masks.. keep safe

      Comment


      • #18
        In any organisation there is a minimum capacity - be it headcount, missions executed, products produced - below which, if you fall under that level, the organisation becomes ineffective/dysfunctional. We've had many comments on related threads about work practices in the Don which undoubtably have a bearing on capability but you do have to ask whether the Air Corps has now fallen below critical mass. This is not a criticism of the organisation nor is it a plug for the ICG (which has the benefit of a major multinational corporate H/C operator to provide critical mass) - it is an observation based on 35 years seeing the A/C operate. The multi tasking of staff referred to above is not a choice - it's a function of trying to do too much with too few resources.
        “The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.”
        ― Thucydides

        Comment


        • #19
          The report alludes to the fact that the crew were unfortunately unable to get into a stable wings level situation before a low-level abort was carried out and a rolling pull may have exacerbated the critical situation.

          That's the real focus of the report for me and hopefully the AC.
          Sorry PH, but if that is the real focus for you and the AC as you put it, the bigger picture is being missed, and in my opinion we are going to be reading another accident report some where down the road. I really hope I will be proved wrong on that one.

          Comment


          • #20
            Unfortunately its my impression that no matter what statistical yard stick you use; Crew fatalities as percentage of total; flight hrs per write off; write offs by fleet type; accidents training vs operations the Air Corps don't seem to have an enviable safety record.
            Show me a military air arm that has hasn't such a record, by the nature of the people involved , given that occassionaly envelopes are pushed beyond those normally associated with civil ops there may be a higher attrition rate,sometimes the stast highlight the facts that accidents can happen with a higher frequencey with people and machinery who are not not living working or operating within some of the more mundane profiles in life.

            Both seemed quite competent, more than likely were and probably pushed the envelope at times.


            An accident with attributable causes that would have been negated if they had't been military pilots just going that little bit beyond because of the training process they had been through which indeed does train them to push on regardless.

            If military flying is like other aspects of the DF there is an andrenalin rush, fear and pressure often make you try things way outside the norm to make things work, if in the case of an aeroplane this is what people do to get situations to work when the chips may be down, thats a risk they take. I have no doubt that both knew there were acceptable risks in this situation, Up to 25 seconds before impact the trainee was fully participant, he had the option to opt out up to a couple of minutes before hand, the other side being up to that 25 seconds the captain had full faith in his trainee.

            Attribute blame......Orville and Wilbur Wright and generations after them......give young men fast machines, tell them they are bullet proof they will want to try it.

            neither man is at fault or the system wrong, the light that burns twice as bright only burns half as long.....Push it to far just once you may not get away with it.

            Last multiple deaths was on a helo again a scratch crew trying to push the envelope , albeit with an unsuitable machine.

            Risk taking, where the guys know what the potential is......
            Covid 19 is not over ....it's still very real..Hand Hygiene, Social Distancing and Masks.. keep safe

            Comment


            • #21
              Jesus HPT,
              Please never stand in my corner. While I know it's far from correct in the field of aviation you just made the AC look like uncontrolled cowboys.

              Comment


              • #22
                Sorry Tadpole, see your cheesy point alright but have to more or less disagree with you or your take on the accident. In this case there are no systemic causes identified and the only Contributary Factors are simply and clearly identified:

                1. Continued flight towards high terrain in deteriorating weather
                2. Very changeable weather conditions
                3. High speed in a high terrain area where visibility was reduced

                Unless I'm missing something they don't point to organisational issues! Yes it might have been better if the OC FTS was a PC9 pilot instead of an experienced Lear pilot but that IMO had no bearing whatsoever on the accident which was essentially a CFIT. Of course there are always points to be learned from any accident and the AC like any organisation will I hope seek to learn and move on. However the "countless accidents and incidents" you refer to "in recent memory" is misleading and a bit OTT don't you think!

                Comment


                • #23
                  Originally posted by hptmurphy View Post
                  Show me a military air arm that has hasn't such a record, by the nature of the people involved , given that occassionaly envelopes are pushed beyond those normally associated with civil ops there may be a higher attrition rate,sometimes the stast highlight the facts that accidents can happen with a higher frequencey with people and machinery who are not not living working or operating within some of the more mundane profiles in life.

                  Both seemed quite competent, more than likely were and probably pushed the envelope at times.
                  An accident with attributable causes that would have been negated if they had't been military pilots just going that little bit beyond because of the training process they had been through which indeed does train them to push on regardless.

                  If military flying is like other aspects of the DF there is an andrenalin rush, fear and pressure often make you try things
                  way outside the norm to make things work, if in the case of an aeroplane this is what people do to get situations to work when the chips may be down, thats a risk they take. I have no doubt that both knew there were acceptable risks in this situation, Up to 25 seconds before impact the trainee was fully participant, he had the option to opt out up to a couple of minutes before hand, the other side being up to that 25 seconds the captain had full faith in his training.

                  Attribute blame......Orville and Wilbur Wright and generations after them......give young men fast machines, tell them they are bullet proof they will want to try it.

                  neither man is at fault or the system wrong, the light that burns twice as bright only burns half as long.....Push it to far
                  just once you may not get away with it.

                  Last multiple deaths was on a helo again a scratch crew trying to push the envelope , albeit with an unsuitable machine.

                  Risk taking, where the guys know what the potential is......

                  Sorry hptm, but with respect could I ask you to clarify. Your third post to this thread was asking BB what he meant in his previous post (#2) in relation to another thread which is currently active on this board. Are you saying that pushing the envelope and risk taking ( which is a mindset) is the military way. If that is the case would you agree it has no place where civilians are concerned.

                  Comment


                  • #24
                    Did the aircraft have the instrumentation to fly it out of trouble without needing to look out the window.?

                    Comment


                    • #25
                      PH,
                      Cheesy as you may see it I do believe it is valid. The organisational issues that I see in the report include the following (Bear in mind I see these as organisational, not individual failings)
                      1. Poor over sight.
                      2. Lack of direction to crews on speed in poor weather.
                      3. Failings in the FSS and auditing system; despite being recommendations of a previous reports.
                      4. Lack of external auditing.
                      5. No in flight training for Low Level Aborts (Despite the AC manual stating you will 'maintain proficiency')
                      6. A bizarre line in the manual that instead of instilling the use of the Low Level Abort as an emergency situation requires basically seeds in a pilots head that if you do a Low Level Abort you have f@@ked up. '; if it is your only option, you should have taken a better course of action earlier'

                      Of course there are always points to be learned from any accident and the AC like any organisation will I hope seek to learn and move on
                      On this we agree. I just hope they are implemented and adhered to fully unlike what appears to have happen previous report findings.

                      However the "countless accidents and incidents" you refer to "in recent memory" is misleading and a bit OTT don't you think!
                      On this one I dont really know where to start. I dont know what age you are so our 'recent memory' may be a little different but lets keep it to current and previous fleet only. (open to correction on these by any spotters out there!)

                      SF260WE Fleet 8: At least 3 written off, 2 fatal. At least a further 3 substantially damaged (Gormo field, Upside down 29, off the east of 23)
                      Cessna 172 Fleet 8: At least 4? written off, 1 fatal. At least another seriously damaged (Wires Knock)
                      Casa Fleet 2 plus 250: 250 barely escaped with the lives of 6(8?) people on board after flying IMC through a tree.
                      King Air Fleet 3: Actually none that I know about.
                      Gazelle Fleet 2: 1 written off.
                      AIII Fleet 8: 1 written off.
                      Dauphin Fleet 5: 1 written off, 1 fatal. 1 substantially damaged (Hanger Inver)
                      EC135 fleet 2: Again none that I know of.
                      AW139 Fleet 6: Two serious incidents with potential for loss. 1 IMC loss of control on delivery flight. 1 almost contact with underslung load (PC9 wing) 2 days? after the PC9 crash, load dumped before contact with aircraft. Interestingly after the previous removal of a Piper aircraft from the Wicklow mountains the IAC banned the lifting of aerodynamic surfaces. (lessons learnt?)
                      GIV Fleet 1: None
                      Learjet Fleet 1: None
                      PC9 Fleet 8: 1 written off, 1 fatal. At least 1(?) sent back to Pilatus after the airframe was overstressed.

                      Total fleet in recent years 54. AC written off 11. Fleet percentage written of 20.4%, not including the 9 substantially damaged aircraft or very close calls.

                      The above are only the ones that I know about. As I say, I am happy to be corrected on any of them but averaging about 6000hrs per year, the above even over the span of these fleets, just doesn't look particularly good. It is also interesting to note that very few of the above incidents happened under flight parameters that are not carried out by civil organisations on a daily basis therefore I for one don't accept the Military flying is dangerous mantra.
                      Last edited by Tadpole; 27 January 2012, 01:56.

                      Comment


                      • #26
                        Originally posted by Pure Hover View Post
                        Like all accident reports it makes chilling and very sobering reading and for all those on the forum without an axe to grind or vested interest and who've actually taken the time to read the report in its entirity it forms the basis for comment and informed discussion on the inherent dangers and risks involved with aviation particularly in relation to SD and Somotogravic Illusion.
                        The research on the subject, well summarised in the report is extensive and grabs the attention. According to Newman (2007) in App D of the report "Spatial disorientation is a very common problem.....studies show that SD accounts for some 6 per cent to 32 per cent of major accidents and some 15 to 69 per cent of fatal accidents". He further asserts "It has been reported that for a given pilot, the career incidence of SD is in the order of 100 per cent....In other words, if a pilot flies long enough as a career or even a hobby there is almost no chance that he/she will escape experiencing at least one episode of SD. Looked at another way, pilots can be considered to be in one of two groups: those who have been disorientated, and those who will"

                        I'm certainly not in the category of those waiting to experience this phenomenon (SD) as I've experienced it already and for anyone else who's been there and got away with it, it can be quite an experience. Thankfully I wasn't in a high performance aircraft low to the ground like this crew who battled bravely all the way to save themselves and their aircraft. The report alludes to the fact that the crew were unfortunately unable to get into a stable wings level situation before a low-level abort was carried out and a rolling pull may have exacerbated the critical situation.

                        That's the real focus of the report for me and hopefully the AC.
                        CRM and accident investigation have developed over the last thirty years or so, we have for many years through the detailed work carried out by accident investigators been able to determine the exact actions by a crew that resulted in an accident, however the real advance has been in the examination of the processes and systems that resulted in that error.

                        I agree that the report is very well written and covers the physiological processes that can result in loss of SA. However I believe that is the result of a chain of events, let me give you an example.

                        A regional turboprop crash in the states, an inexperienced crew crashes an aircraft on a Dark and Snowy Night at a small regional airport. The accident report can explain in great detail the handling error made by the crew that resulted in the crash, they can identify which crew member manipulated which control which resulted in the crash, however this is only the first layer of investigation.
                        The more detailed modern view is to assess the chain of events that resulted in the crash.
                        In this case the Airline management spent as little money as possible on crew or crew training.
                        They paid very low salaries so only very inexperienced pilots were hired, they spent as little money as possible on training, so pilots received inadequate training and commanders were upgraded with minimal training and experience.
                        They would not invest in flight ops management so there was no oversight of crews and limited support to crews operating the flights.
                        And finally they based the inexperienced lowly paid pilots at far flung bases where they had to commute for duty on there own time, and then made them work long and difficult days in the poor weather of the northern US which led to chronic fatigue

                        The result was the pilots made an error which RESULTED in the crash, the fault lay with the Bean counters.
                        Of course the Bean Counters believe that Flight Safety is a given and would invest no money in that.

                        There is another accident closer to home that is scarily similar to the above.

                        I believe the same detailed examination should be applied to any Aviation accident and incident, I see that someone has detailed the AC accidents from the last 15-20 years, it fills me with no pride to see that listed nor do I feel any pride in the fact of knowing that it is the tip of the Iceberg. The near miss with the AW-139 within days of the PC-9 crash points to the AC’s stubborn self belief and naivety.

                        Flight Safety is not an Accident, I saw that on a poster many years ago, I think given my years of flying I finally understand the meaning of that poster

                        Comment


                        • #27
                          Originally posted by hptmurphy View Post
                          Show me a military air arm that has hasn't such a record, by the nature of the people involved , given that occassionaly envelopes are pushed beyond those normally associated with civil ops there may be a higher attrition rate,sometimes the stast highlight the facts that accidents can happen with a higher frequencey with people and machinery who are not not living working or operating within some of the more mundane profiles in life.

                          Both seemed quite competent, more than likely were and probably pushed the envelope at times.


                          An accident with attributable causes that would have been negated if they had't been military pilots just going that little bit beyond because of the training process they had been through which indeed does train them to push on regardless.

                          If military flying is like other aspects of the DF there is an andrenalin rush, fear and pressure often make you try things way outside the norm to make things work, if in the case of an aeroplane this is what people do to get situations to work when the chips may be down, thats a risk they take. I have no doubt that both knew there were acceptable risks in this situation, Up to 25 seconds before impact the trainee was fully participant, he had the option to opt out up to a couple of minutes before hand, the other side being up to that 25 seconds the captain had full faith in his trainee.

                          Attribute blame......Orville and Wilbur Wright and generations after them......give young men fast machines, tell them they are bullet proof they will want to try it.

                          neither man is at fault or the system wrong, the light that burns twice as bright only burns half as long.....Push it to far just once you may not get away with it.

                          Last multiple deaths was on a helo again a scratch crew trying to push the envelope , albeit with an unsuitable machine.

                          Risk taking, where the guys know what the potential is......
                          Seriously were you watching Topgun Again, "you can't think up there, if you think you die"
                          Last edited by Charlie252; 27 January 2012, 14:09.

                          Comment


                          • #28
                            I have to say, the last series of posts from TP AND 252, who seem to know what they are talking about have left me shocked. If it's the case that the series of incidents and accidents are fact, and I have no reason to think otherwise until someone counters with fact. In my opinion the IAC now have a duty of care to the public and to publish the reports mentioned that are still locked away somewhere gathering dust.
                            Last edited by Helihead; 27 January 2012, 18:18.

                            Comment


                            • #29
                              Hi all,

                              It was chilling reading this report, right down to the last transmission, and looking at the terrain.

                              My deepest sympathies to the family and friends, may no one else fall foul in future operations.

                              DITH
                              Hopefully the mayan's got it right and were all on a one way ticket outta here!!

                              Comment


                              • #30
                                Your third post to this thread was asking BB what he meant in his previous post (#2) in relation to another thread which is currently active on this board. Are you saying that pushing the envelope and risk taking ( which is a mindset) is the military way.

                                I'm posting in regard to this thread, no co relation should be taken from what is posted here. I could put down what I interpret from the report, I won't.I'm looking at it from a cultural overview as opposed to a specific incident.

                                The AAIU report has published its results,it is not for me to apportion blame, and I haven't.

                                While pushing the envelope and risk taking are often operational considerations to get the job done there are elements within the DF, all areas, who exceed the bounds of training in order to get the job done and reduce the safety margin at times.Again its a mindset often associated with younger people often given access to equipment, systems etc. that take very skilled operators to manage , exceed the bounds of safety and the outcome is often the result shown here.

                                Aviation is one of those fields where the results of some times exceeding the limits by the tiniest of fraction or overlooking something that may seem insignificant at the time, or even trying to test your self may turn fatal.

                                If that is the case would you agree it has no place where civilians are concerned.
                                I would whole heartedly agree this to be the case ,but the world of general aviation is not immune to characteristics often mis associated with military aviation,and the consequences are often the same, take your mind back to 1990 and an Accident in Cork involving two Cessna 152s where one hit the other,I knew the crews of both aircraft, this was an avoidable incident that happened in clear skies , there was blame attributable, these were guys trying to imitate what military fliers do.

                                Please never stand in my corner. While I know it's far from correct in the field of aviation you just made the AC look like uncontrolled cowboys.
                                This is not my intention, what should be taken from it that these are not sunday morning puddle jumpers piddling around at 100kts dropping in some where for a coffee along the way. This accident was due to a series of issues that escalated beyond reversal due to factors that had not either been given priority or due to the captain being of the belief that he was capable of dealing with them. 99 times in 100 they would have come out the right side of it,too many factors involved here and luck took a part.


                                Did the aircraft have the instrumentation to fly it out of trouble without needing to look out the window.?
                                Aircraft is IFR equipped,Training captain was qualified to do so but when the situation changes from VFR to IFR(IMC) so rapidly and the hand over of control only took place seconds before the crash there wasn't time enough to change the plan...the speed element and the height along with the terrain all become factors that have to be dealt with before you can establish an alternative.

                                Regarding the 'Top Gun' reference, doesn't come to mind.If you wish to suggest that my comments are based on how military pilots act on the big screen and that it influences how professional military pilots react, I refute that, but what I will say if you leave a man long enough in a room with a tea cosy, he will try it on.

                                It has to be remembered that if it was for the feats that often exceeded that expected of normal pilots, that general aviation pilots would not even consider, lives would have been lost as Aer Corps pilots showed bravery and professionalism of the highest order in carrying out life saving missions.Whether it be part of the mindset or aspects of training it certainly is that extra 10% that occassionaly makes the difference,
                                Last edited by hptmurphy; 27 January 2012, 20:18.
                                Covid 19 is not over ....it's still very real..Hand Hygiene, Social Distancing and Masks.. keep safe

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