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  • Originally posted by DeV View Post
    Don't know why but the backbone of JNCOs (and privates) in my coy left around 2000. Maybe it was just the natural wastage.

    Why did the 2005 reorg fail?
    Poor communication
    Didn't improve standards
    Didn't centralise training

    More to the point, the decisions taken in the puzzle palaces

    .
    The thing I found most frustrating, which hastened my departure after a total of 20 years, was the "Cliques" that were allowed develop after the 2005 Reorg.
    • Phase 1. The "List" where people were given the impression that their unit choice may have an impact on their final destination.
    • Phase 2. Useless PONTI commandants selecting their pets for officer appointments based on seniority alone and farming off the wasters to other units
    • Phase 3.Waster officers and commandant pets bin the list and give appointments to their equally useless, and in some case Non-Effective buddies who are NCOs
    • Phase 4. The younger, efficient, recently trained officers and NCOs get put on the dreaded SWA list. Here they have no input into training programs without stepping on the toes (and being quickly slapped down) by the appointment holder
    • Phase 5.Junior Officers and NCOs who no longer have any input into the unit activities stop turning up,
    • Phase 6, as the appointment holders have no idea what they are supposed to be doing, having never done it before, the remaining rank and file stop turning up. Except of course for the tea drinking club.

    Result, the organisation dies.
    Of course this was not the case in every unit. Those who avoided the above make up the units that remain for Reorg Mk2. I was delighted to see KPIs which will cull the last of the wasters from the organisation. Close scrutiny from our PDF colleagues should ensure the timewasters get no breathing space. This should have happened in 2005 instead of the parish pump politics geographic unit spread that we ended up with.
    I still insist that what should have happened then, and what I hope is happening now is that everyone who remains as a reservist in the Defence Forces must apply for their own job again.
    Earn it if you want it.
    For now, everything hangs on implementation of the CoDF report.

    Comment


    • There was plenty of messing around with appointments in the most recent RDF reorg, don't worry about that. Being mates with the person making the decision was a huge advantage, as was having been in the same subunit as that person before the reorg. The person who gave his mates the good jobs is still doing very well for himself too.....

      Comment


      • I think it's a crying shame that we're losing very talented volunteers at a time that they're needed most. All for the sake of some proper professional man management,and being given the respect such talent deserves in an organisation such as the RDF which already finds itself in dire circumstances.

        Comment


        • I've talked to a few, and I am hearing back from a lot of good and dedicated people that they are close to pulling the plug on their RDF careers. The drinking club mentality still exists in the RDF, I have witnessed it first hand, and the same people are behind it. The same bullshit persists, lazy attitudes, and the expectation that somebody else will do duties for you so your lads can go to the pub.

          The more I see, and the more I think about it, and seeing guys like Barry pack it in really make me wonder about packing it in. Watch this space.
          What are you cackling at, fatty? Too much pie, that's your problem.

          Comment


          • Originally posted by na grohmití View Post
            The thing I found most frustrating, which hastened my departure after a total of 20 years, was the "Cliques" that were allowed develop after the 2005 Reorg.
            • Phase 1. The "List" where people were given the impression that their unit choice may have an impact on their final destination.
            • Phase 2. Useless PONTI commandants selecting their pets for officer appointments based on seniority alone and farming off the wasters to other units
            • Phase 3.Waster officers and commandant pets bin the list and give appointments to their equally useless, and in some case Non-Effective buddies who are NCOs
            • Phase 4. The younger, efficient, recently trained officers and NCOs get put on the dreaded SWA list. Here they have no input into training programs without stepping on the toes (and being quickly slapped down) by the appointment holder
            • Phase 5.Junior Officers and NCOs who no longer have any input into the unit activities stop turning up,
            • Phase 6, as the appointment holders have no idea what they are supposed to be doing, having never done it before, the remaining rank and file stop turning up. Except of course for the tea drinking club.

            Result, the organisation dies.
            Of course this was not the case in every unit. Those who avoided the above make up the units that remain for Reorg Mk2. I was delighted to see KPIs which will cull the last of the wasters from the organisation. Close scrutiny from our PDF colleagues should ensure the timewasters get no breathing space. This should have happened in 2005 instead of the parish pump politics geographic unit spread that we ended up with.
            I still insist that what should have happened then, and what I hope is happening now is that everyone who remains as a reservist in the Defence Forces must apply for their own job again.
            Earn it if you want it.
            In my experience, the 2013 reorg was 1000% worse than the 2005 one. In my position I had a huge advantage over others (but not all rosey).

            For example, one brigade decided to appoint people to other brigades. What were the major problems ?:

            A SO in 1 brigade banning all training (rescinded too late)
            Much of AdminO written with PDF in mind
            VFM took x years to be written (and in some cases left out / ignored vital fact) but was implemented overnight
            No infrastructure to allow the changes (eg medicals)
            Far too many RDF SOs, in some cases the unit commander is a Comdt (PDF obviously) but there is an RDF SO!?

            Comment


            • The problem is that we lost a lot of excellent motivated people because they didn't want to put up with army BS any more, pushed from pillar to post, jump through hoops to get to a point only to have goalposts moved after the fact, indecision, hurry up and wait etc etc

              Comment


              • The re-org is still ongoing and will be all the way to 2016.. The 2013 reorg was a huge step-change for many and it has caused a huge balloon in certain ranks, which cannot be easily solved. For example there is a surfeit of Lt and Sgts at the moment with little chance of promotion from or to either rank. Yet there are almost zero commandants. I did feel that I had done my time in my own rank and was reminded strongly of the old maxim in 2013 "if you can't take a joke you shouldn't join" so that was me told. "Shut up and Soldier" ... so a year on there is work out the door for everyone's rank above Cpl , courses to support the unit in its own role . Is it perfect.... fk no ... I've heard "bagger" many a time in 2014 ( mainly from PDF officers outside our unit , mind you, not so much from the troops ) and there is a complete incomprehension about why anyone would want to come in on a weekend or an evening . But its a lot better than 2005 or before
                "Are they trying to shoot down the other drone? "

                "No, they're trying to fly the tank"

                Comment


                • Originally posted by trellheim View Post
                  The re-org is still ongoing and will be all the way to 2016.. The 2013 reorg was a huge step-change for many and it has caused a huge balloon in certain ranks, which cannot be easily solved. For example there is a surfeit of Lt and Sgts at the moment with little chance of promotion from or to either rank. Yet there are almost zero commandants. I did feel that I had done my time in my own rank and was reminded strongly of the old maxim in 2013 "if you can't take a joke you shouldn't join" so that was me told. "Shut up and Soldier" ... so a year on there is work out the door for everyone's rank above Cpl , courses to support the unit in its own role . Is it perfect.... fk no ... I've heard "bagger" many a time in 2014 ( mainly from PDF officers outside our unit , mind you, not so much from the troops ) and there is a complete incomprehension about why anyone would want to come in on a weekend or an evening . But its a lot better than 2005 or before
                  This.

                  As a rule I've only encountered hositility from bods in the PDF who have something to hide (like being bad at their job), a friend in the PDF has told me about some of his colleagues who are otherwise good people but were so badly burned by their first experience of the reserve in the 2006 reorg and the integration that they will never trust reservists again.

                  And still there are people who seem determined to poison the well from our side, a lot of the they should get rid of the PDF and fund the reserve type talkers (generally because they want the standards lowered to their level rather than to elevate themselves) are more vocal than ever, in complete defiance of reality.

                  They really should just leave.
                  "It is a general popular error to imagine that loudest complainers for the public to be the most anxious for it's welfare" Edmund Burke

                  Comment


                  • There are far too many captains and commandants appointments, we do need some (especially in some of the Directorates (to get a voice at the table (but again problem is during the week)).

                    Was the 3 or so Coys per inf bn a good idea or should they have tried to fully man 1/2?

                    Comment


                    • At ground level, the single force concept is being received well I think. The attitude among our PDF counterparts and leadership is that they want it to work, they can see the benefits but they don't think that we're practically capable of achieving our goals given all the handicaps we have. Where we have worked together, by and large there's been no big snags and we've managed to impress the PDF with our capabilities thus far.

                      For me, where the problem lies is in our own leadership not understanding what's expected of it nor exercising initiative, and the complete lack of higher level support from the DoD, Gov, and MA. There's too much reliance on the good will of individuals to manipulate their own lives to accommodate the demands of the DF. We're expected to operate as skilled professionals in fields of expertise unique to the military, on an almost completely voluntary basis. And even if you wanted to mobilise any unit in the RDF it would be like trying to herd cats because there isn't a common means of communication among troops. It'll take a myriad of calls, texts, emails, tweets, facebook posts and IMs to capture everyone's attention and even then, there's no guarantee that all are available.

                      If you can't guarantee the quality and availability of Reservists, then you don't have a viable Reserve.

                      Despite all the excess SOs and SNCOs in my unit, I can probably count on one hand the people in my unit who are putting the effort in to make this work. Guys who are juggling unit admin during their tea/lunch breaks, making calls and arrangements while trying to hide said activities from their employers. That includes myself, who's job it really isn't to be trying to administer a Coy.

                      Had we the appropriate leadership, then people could be tasked with jobs, made to follow through or GTFO. But we don't. And that's a big problem going forward. Instead, individuals acting out of rank are having to take it upon themselves to try to keep the show on the road while those in appointments do SFA.

                      Finally, I have a question. Has there been an official definition from the DoD outlining what the "Single Force Concept" is?

                      I noted in the 2013 review it mentions SFC in relation to the RDF only, and at no point does is define the concept. Have I missed it somewhere?

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by SwiftandSure View Post
                        At ground level, the single force concept is being received well I think. The attitude among our PDF counterparts and leadership is that they want it to work, they can see the benefits but they don't think that we're practically capable of achieving our goals given all the handicaps we have. Where we have worked together, by and large there's been no big snags and we've managed to impress the PDF with our capabilities thus far.

                        For me, where the problem lies is in our own leadership not understanding what's expected of it nor exercising initiative, and the complete lack of higher level support from the DoD, Gov, and MA. There's too much reliance on the good will of individuals to manipulate their own lives to accommodate the demands of the DF. We're expected to operate as skilled professionals in fields of expertise unique to the military, on an almost completely voluntary basis. And even if you wanted to mobilise any unit in the RDF it would be like trying to herd cats because there isn't a common means of communication among troops. It'll take a myriad of calls, texts, emails, tweets, facebook posts and IMs to capture everyone's attention and even then, there's no guarantee that all are available.

                        If you can't guarantee the quality and availability of Reservists, then you don't have a viable Reserve.

                        Despite all the excess SOs and SNCOs in my unit, I can probably count on one hand the people in my unit who are putting the effort in to make this work. Guys who are juggling unit admin during their tea/lunch breaks, making calls and arrangements while trying to hide said activities from their employers. That includes myself, who's job it really isn't to be trying to administer a Coy.

                        Had we the appropriate leadership, then people could be tasked with jobs, made to follow through or GTFO. But we don't. And that's a big problem going forward. Instead, individuals acting out of rank are having to take it upon themselves to try to keep the show on the road while those in appointments do SFA.

                        Finally, I have a question. Has there been an official definition from the DoD outlining what the "Single Force Concept" is?

                        I noted in the 2013 review it mentions SFC in relation to the RDF only, and at no point does is define the concept. Have I missed it somewhere?
                        +1

                        On the admin'ing a coy, that always happened in my former coy (in the main by 2 individuals)

                        The AdminO "defines" (but doesn't really) what the SFC is

                        One issue I think that requires attention is amendments to DFRs, Admin Instrs etc (and not just R5) to take account of the practicalities of the RDF. It isn't about a lower standard or make allowances, it is to make it work

                        Comment


                        • @S&S it's a little bit more complicated than that. While as I have also said there are certain individuals who are just not trying there is also a vast amount of organisational inertia with the reserve sub units particularly.

                          Much of this stems from a remarkably Arabic sub culture that builds up around the chief preventing the dissemination of knowledge as a means of solidifying their power base, I doubt most do this consciously but there is a tendency around senior pers to do everything themselves without delegating any significant responsibilities to the people that should be doing it, as such when people get asked to do things that should be in their ambit they have literally no idea how to go about it, and most people they reach out are tight lipped or more likely equally ignorant.

                          This was the position I was in until the last couple of years when the reorg put me in direct contact with non-cadre PDF pers who just tell you what you need to get the job done.

                          Another reason that turfing out anyone relatively senior (again possibly including myself) would have been a better way to go (albeit unjust for the hard working minority) is that this culture is the baby in that particular bathwater.
                          "It is a general popular error to imagine that loudest complainers for the public to be the most anxious for it's welfare" Edmund Burke

                          Comment


                          • My experience has been very positive. Initially there was a slow start while we both tried to work a system that will work, but now I feel I am very much part of the team, I am being extremely well utilized and challenged. I recognise that this has a lot to do with the people I am working with and not everyone in similar appointments have the same experience. Looking forward to the rest of the year.

                            Comment


                            • My frustration came about because of the attitudes that permeated the units after the units had amalgamated and some were treated like idiots despite being more highly qualified than some who were commanding.

                              OCs commanding couldn't command and became account holders but went on to the back foot as opposed to making choices that actually effected people. It became very obvious pretty fast that many of those who held command were not qualified to do so and didn't know how to delegate to those who could work through the problems. It almost became the PDF of 30 odd years ago where the OC were often autocrats who were hell bent on preserving their careers as opposed to developing their units.

                              Units stagnated, people could see no light in the future and made choices, which is more of a positive choice than some of their leaders made.

                              I'm truly sorry to see the likes of Kermit leave, again a waste of talent, things have to be seriously wrong when you see guys like Barry and Kermit walk.If Odin is walking then its all doomed.

                              I knew my contribution was finished and I was going to become a thorn is someones side and that would have been not a place I wanted to be. After witnessing what can only be described as injustices it was easier to walk away rather than be sidetracked and bored to death.

                              The people who have offered an opinion on the subject seem to have hit the key points.

                              So why did the 2005 reorg fail.

                              It created a 2 tier system and those who should have learned from who could commit to the higher level failed to do so and drove a wedge into the knowledge base.

                              How the integration model was run was always going to be a failure around issues that have been previously discussed primarily protection of employment.

                              I would have done the integration but couldn't because of my employment. I could have however as many more could have taken a unpiad leave of absence where the DF would have paid me for say six months to achieve that which integration took two years to achieve. It should have been an option. The country was awash with money and it would have upped the ante considerably.

                              Missed oppertunity.

                              Change the conditions for the grat,fcuk around with peoples income tax and people lose interest very fast and realise there are other options out there.

                              When I'm losing my annual leave and getting Sweet Fcuk All in return to go on badly run camps with units that have no bearing on what I'm doing... its time to go.

                              Back in 2002/03/04 the Southern Brigade did PSO type OPs and put in excess of 300 in Kilworth for weeks on end, there was a buzz around it, 2005 there was expectation, but by the time the camps came about in 2006 most realised it wasn't working.
                              Last edited by hptmurphy; 8 July 2014, 22:00.
                              Covid 19 is not over ....it's still very real..Hand Hygiene, Social Distancing and Masks.. keep safe

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by SwiftandSure View Post
                                Finally, I have a question. Has there been an official definition from the DoD outlining what the "Single Force Concept" is?

                                I noted in the 2013 review it mentions SFC in relation to the RDF only, and at no point does is define the concept. Have I missed it somewhere?
                                It never mentioned "Single Force Concept" in the 2013 Annual Report only "Single Force Structure".

                                The closest to an official definition is the repeated copy and paste replies by the former MfD to questions during Oireachtas debates.
                                A new "single force" concept will see PDF units having Reserve components, rather than a parallel Reserve as at present. Reserve units within barracks will be supported by their parent PDF unit and the 16 units outside of PDF installations will be supported by dedicated full-time PDF personnel. This concept offers significant potential advantages in terms of training and development of the Reserve.
                                With the DoD using the term Single Force Structure rather than Concept it should help remind certain individuals on here that the whole Single Force thing is simply organisational and not the Single Force Barrack Jacket Gucci Gear Concept they like to think it is.

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