General Sir Richard Dannatt, a former chief of the general staff, arrives to give evidence to the Iraq inquiry. Photograph: Oli Scarff/Getty Images
A former army chief said today that the British army came close to "seizing up" over Iraq because troops were "overstretched".
Giving evidence to the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war earlier today, General Sir Richard Dannatt told the panel that the decision by Tony Blair, the then prime minister, to commit British troops to Helmand at the same time as the force in Iraq was facing a growing insurgency presented a "perfect storm" for the army.
Dannatt, who succeeded General Sir Mike Jackson in August 2006, explained how a relatively benign situation in Iraq in 2003 began to worsen over the following two years. With a desire to commit more forces to Afghanistan, Dannatt told the inquiry: "We were caught on the horns of a dilemma."
He said the army was "running hot" at the end of 2006.
"You can run hot when you are in balance and there is enough oil sloshing around the engine to keep it going. When the oil is thin, or not in sufficient quantity, the engine runs the risk of seizing up," he told the inquiry.
"I think we were getting quite close to a seizing-up moment in 2006."
On the double demands of Iraq and Helmand, he said: "We could see that perfect storm coming to fruition in about the middle of 2006 and I would contend that it did."
Dannatt admitted that British forces may have looked "flat-footed" compared to the Americans, who radically changed their tactics as the war in Iraq went on.
He praised the way the American military under General David Petraeus turned around the Iraq campaign from 2007, while the British stuck to the previous policy, which was to hand over progressively to Iraqi control.
"Against that description of them adapting quickly, in Iraq we may have looked a bit flat-footed," said Dannatt.
"But I would maintain the circumstances were rather different. They were reinforcing their campaign. They were surging their troop numbers. They were spreading themselves in small bases throughout the population, getting among the people, whereas we were doing absolutely the opposite."
The provision of military equipment also came under scrutiny. Documents released today by the inquiry reveal how Dannatt's predecessor, Jackson, warned that the UK's helicopter fleet in Iraq was "creaking badly" and "inadequate" after visiting British forces in Iraq in late 2005. Jackson also told the head of the armed forces that air transport provision for getting troops and equipment to and from the Middle East was even worse.
Dannatt today strongly criticised the failure to find a replacement for the army's lightly-armoured Snatch Land Rovers, which proved highly vulnerable in Iraq.
Secret documents released today as part of the ongoing inquiry revealed that ministers were formally warned that the military needed an alternative to the Snatch Land Rover part-way through the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. A general told the government in July 2006 that frontline commanders wanted better-protected vehicles so they could carry out missions "without unnecessary casualties".
But British troops continued to be killed and injured in the lightly armoured Snatch, which is vulnerable to roadside bombs, for several more years.
Dannatt told the inquiry: "It remains unsatisfactory that it is only now that we have closed with the issue. We worked round the problem, we didn't actually confront the problem."
He also outlined to the inquiry how a programme to acquire a new family of armoured vehicles known as the Future Rapid Effects System (Fres) fell victim to "internal machinations" within the Ministry of Defence
for a more detailed blow by blow account of the testimony
A former army chief said today that the British army came close to "seizing up" over Iraq because troops were "overstretched".
Giving evidence to the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war earlier today, General Sir Richard Dannatt told the panel that the decision by Tony Blair, the then prime minister, to commit British troops to Helmand at the same time as the force in Iraq was facing a growing insurgency presented a "perfect storm" for the army.
Dannatt, who succeeded General Sir Mike Jackson in August 2006, explained how a relatively benign situation in Iraq in 2003 began to worsen over the following two years. With a desire to commit more forces to Afghanistan, Dannatt told the inquiry: "We were caught on the horns of a dilemma."
He said the army was "running hot" at the end of 2006.
"You can run hot when you are in balance and there is enough oil sloshing around the engine to keep it going. When the oil is thin, or not in sufficient quantity, the engine runs the risk of seizing up," he told the inquiry.
"I think we were getting quite close to a seizing-up moment in 2006."
On the double demands of Iraq and Helmand, he said: "We could see that perfect storm coming to fruition in about the middle of 2006 and I would contend that it did."
Dannatt admitted that British forces may have looked "flat-footed" compared to the Americans, who radically changed their tactics as the war in Iraq went on.
He praised the way the American military under General David Petraeus turned around the Iraq campaign from 2007, while the British stuck to the previous policy, which was to hand over progressively to Iraqi control.
"Against that description of them adapting quickly, in Iraq we may have looked a bit flat-footed," said Dannatt.
"But I would maintain the circumstances were rather different. They were reinforcing their campaign. They were surging their troop numbers. They were spreading themselves in small bases throughout the population, getting among the people, whereas we were doing absolutely the opposite."
The provision of military equipment also came under scrutiny. Documents released today by the inquiry reveal how Dannatt's predecessor, Jackson, warned that the UK's helicopter fleet in Iraq was "creaking badly" and "inadequate" after visiting British forces in Iraq in late 2005. Jackson also told the head of the armed forces that air transport provision for getting troops and equipment to and from the Middle East was even worse.
Dannatt today strongly criticised the failure to find a replacement for the army's lightly-armoured Snatch Land Rovers, which proved highly vulnerable in Iraq.
Secret documents released today as part of the ongoing inquiry revealed that ministers were formally warned that the military needed an alternative to the Snatch Land Rover part-way through the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. A general told the government in July 2006 that frontline commanders wanted better-protected vehicles so they could carry out missions "without unnecessary casualties".
But British troops continued to be killed and injured in the lightly armoured Snatch, which is vulnerable to roadside bombs, for several more years.
Dannatt told the inquiry: "It remains unsatisfactory that it is only now that we have closed with the issue. We worked round the problem, we didn't actually confront the problem."
He also outlined to the inquiry how a programme to acquire a new family of armoured vehicles known as the Future Rapid Effects System (Fres) fell victim to "internal machinations" within the Ministry of Defence
for a more detailed blow by blow account of the testimony
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