Panhard AML

[GoneToTheCanner]

Indeed, the first industry launched after sanctions were imposed was sanctions-busting.

[Come-quickly]

I can't let this thought go.

To my mind the MRV and CRW are medium range surveillance assets intended to
drive ahead on roads up to a vantage point and sensor/UAV the shizz out of the battlespace with the ability to defend themselves from targets outside of small arms fire range.
For this it seems like they cover the peek and shoot role of the AMLs.

But do we still have a need for screening (not by called fires alone), route security and escort vehicles? An MRV seems like a lot of treasure and sensors to tie up on convoy security.

On top of the training and maintenance apetitites of the PIIS and their eventual sucessors is there a case for adopting something relatively cheap and cheerful with a proven track record? The RG32 seems to be just as complicated and like it was a workaround to not taking up the rest of the options with MOWAG for specialist roles.


Is there something relatively cheap, simple to operate and ready off the shelf that could fill that gap?

Like the M1117 family? (TAPV fiasco aside) a relatively simple and reliable vehicle that's not a unique, Irish specific case and is widely distributed (thanks in part to the stocks being developed for the ANA now either in Talban hands or sold off to budget conscious allies).

It's not a multirole panacea, but it is effective at moving bods from place to place on roads and keeping them alive.

[DeV]

I can't let this thought go.

To my mind the MRV and CRW are medium range surveillance assets intended to
drive ahead on roads up to a vantage point and sensor/UAV the shizz out of the battlespace with the ability to defend themselves from targets outside of small arms fire range.
For this it seems like they cover the peek and shoot role of the AMLs.

But do we still have a need for screening (not by called fires alone), route security and escort vehicles? An MRV seems like a lot of treasure and sensors to tie up on convoy security.

On top of the training and maintenance apetitites of the PIIS and their eventual sucessors is there a case for adopting something relatively cheap and cheerful with a proven track record? The RG32 seems to be just as complicated and like it was a workaround to not taking up the rest of the options with MOWAG for specialist roles.


Is there something relatively cheap, simple to operate and ready off the shelf that could fill that gap?

Like the M1117 family? (TAPV fiasco aside) a relatively simple and reliable vehicle that's not a unique, Irish specific case and is widely distributed (thanks in part to the stocks being developed for the ANA now either in Talban hands or sold off to budget conscious allies).

It's not a multirole panacea, but it is effective at moving bods from place to place on roads and keeping them alive.

not forgetting the multi-role element in the back that comes down the ramp

the thing that most limits them is really the quantity purchased

[Come-quickly]

The cost per unit, maintenance specialisations and the training pinch points all have a fairly significant impact on the quantity employed.

The MRV/CRV is a lot of sensors to leave tied up on certain traditional fmn cav roles.

Or maybe we've given up on the idea of brigade cavalry taskings and just need ISTAR for Bn +/- groups

[na grohmiti]

I think the problem lies in the fact both the AML90 and AML60 had set roles in the Irish Cavalry troop. There was other recce tools supposed to be in the box also, but they never materialised, so we made do with Nissans for the dismounts. Primarily, 60s (later 20s) were support for the dismounts, like your infantry FSG. The AML90, in theory provided overwatch for the manoeuvre groups, covering their withdrawal from contact, dealing with any contact that may attempt to give chase. M3 were also included in the mix but I think only 1st armoured had them in their inventory, replaced by Timoney as the M3 went to infantry units on the Border.
Great in theory, in ideal open, desert terrain, where "Le auto", can part itself atop a conveniently placed hill, which both provided view of enemy while at the same time maintaining cover from view. All within range of its main gun of course. In reality, in "normal" terrain, your overwatch is rarely going to be where you want it most. So tactics have changed, and the dismounts now travel in the vehicle that does overwatch.
The logic of having an APC with an armament capable of stopping a tank (a-la the AML90, in the 1950s at least), is still being fought in military theory lectures around the world. Reality is, the first shot better count, and it needs to be fast enough to escape after, because tanks rarely travel solo any more.

The Recce element is the dismounts. get them forward, get them out to recce whatever the Infantry recce cannot do, then get them back under armour and bug out. If they come into contact, retrieve them while providing fire support. But route recce is still mostly Mk1 eyeball, and you can't do that buttoned up, so we are back to your nimble all terrain platform. Does it even need to be armoured? Surely mobility comes first, and an AGL or 50 cal on a ring is enough to keeps heads down while you retreat to where the armour is.
Pre Gulf War the US had a plan to put a Bushmaster cannon on the roof of a Humvee. It made it to test phase, but then they replaced them all with MRAPS and that idea died a death.
You have to strike a balance between having enough weaponry, in recce, to get you out of trouble, but not enough to tempt you to stay and get involved in a fight with a stronger enemy. It's not the job of Recce to do that.
British are, for units that used to operate from light armour, moving to a more agile unarmoured platform, such as Jakal or Coyote.
I guess it's all down to the threat environment. Do you expect to meet light armour or soft skin, will the route be mined?

[Come-quickly]

Screening and flank and route security without armour sounds like no fun at all.

The British wanted Ajax to replace the CVRT in these roles but Ajax is a basket case.

There's a lot more to light cav than recce.

As for taking on tanks ATGMs and called fires are king when it comes to non MBTs engaging tanks so guns in cav roles are only as good as their snap shooting.

[na grohmiti]

Fair to say the ATGM has removed the need for tank-killing gun on an AFV? Back in the day when panhard was new, ATGM were costly, clumsy unreliable and mostly wire guided. What better way to assist the enemy than sending out a long col of wire to point them to your position as the massive explosion followed by a slow moving projectile made its way to target. As for route security, as I say its all about the terrain and the risk. There is a certain school of thought that says it can also be done with off road motorcycles, and atvs carrying well armed soldiers, who would otherwise be burdened on foot by their equipment.

[DeV]

Personally I like the idea of Cav Sqns of MRVs, CRVs, LTAVs (one that works), and motorbikes.

it is an extremely flexible well armed force

Could be task org’ed into a ISTAR TF … if absolutely essential

[Come-quickly]

I mean I'm mostly taking the p!$$ but formation recce with no splinter protection or CBRN pressure seems like all romance, no splinter protection. Not every engagement is going to be Iraq or Afghanistan where the enemy can't operate artillery. Look at the value that vehicles like the M113 have for Ukraine simply for splinter protection.

It seems clear at this point that Ireland no longer even dreams of Bde operations and the focus is on being able to field task groups or BBGs at most and in that the Cav will continue to be a glorified recce platoon.

The MRV feels like the new MILAN or RBS70 in some aspects (ok we actually deploy them so that's different), a token capability for a token defence.

As for ATGMs they're great but they still can't snap shoot if you don't see the enemy coming. Before the MRV I don't know if we ever had that capability?

[Come-quickly]

Personally I like the idea of Cav Sqns of MRVs, CRVs, LTAVs (one that works), and motorbikes.

it is an extremely flexible well armed force

Could be task org’ed into a ISTAR TF … if absolutely essential

PS the M1117 is an LTAV that works... the Canadians issues with the TAPV seem to have come from increasing the weight dramatically

[DeV]

PS the M1117 is an LTAV that works... the Canadians issues with the TAPV seem to have come from increasing the weight dramatically

Also not insignificantly bigger in all dimensions and double the weight (depending on version)

straying into the Cav Orbat thread but personally:

Cav Sqn HQ & HQ Tp - motorbikes and something of CRV, LTAV, (And AUVs ?)

Recce Troops - ideally all MRVs (more likely to be mixture of MRVs and CRVs (2 of each))

Supp Troop - not sure MRVs, CRVs, APCs?

[Come-quickly]

Also not insignificantly bigger in all dimensions and double the weight (depending on version)

But is reliable. Lower maintenance can take a turret or am RWS and carries more dismounts than the RG32 or its direct analogues. Also Approx €800k per unit.

They even put 90mm LP guns on some of the ANA models ;p

[paul g]

A couple of points here

The gra that some have for the AMX-10RC is hard to understand, the last new build came off the production line around 1986, so they’re very long in the tooth. Add to that they fire a non standard 105mm shell that only the French make and probably won’t continue to manufacture much longer is another big problem. Think of the comet, the army bought them largely because the brits wouldn’t sell them centurions but after a couple of years ammunition was impossible to obtain, and made the department wary about buying anything with tracks for a long time to come.

Looking at future armour then we look at the political and military context and what we need, so lets look at the past and what they bought and why

1964, they wanted to provide a cavalry troop for a un battalion in Cyprus, they bought 16 AML-60 for a troop of eight cars overseas and eight cars at home for training said troop, in other words the absolute minimum

1972 bought 16 AML-90 16 more AML60’s and 60 Panhard m3. At the time the possibility of war on the island was a real possibility, so they bought the cars in an attempt to provide some sort of armour if there was a Rhodesia/UDI type state declared in the north, where the opponent would be RUC/UDR aided by rogue British volunteers and intervention on the border was necessary.

1978 the scorpions were ordered with the intention of developing an armoured regiment, despite the problems in the north there was the a recognition that the army might have in the future have to have some sort of commitment to European defence, which at the time meant mechanised warfare, plans to increase the states conventional military capability died during 1980’s recession.

1971-1980 Timoney various marks, the Timoney was designed more or less from the ground up as a APC suitable for urban guerrilla warfare, as there was the situation in the north and various governments felt that there might be a need for an intervention, and the attraction of a homegrown armoured car in that situation made sense; the mark V would have been ideal in Belfast’s shankhill. there was a requirement for 200, but only 10 were acquired, largely for economic reasons but also in case it inflamed the situation.

1995 -2008 Mowags/LTAV
The genesis for the mowag dates back to 1995, when the original board was convened. At the time, the IRA cease fire was in place, and there was growing realisations that the north was not going to play as great a role in irish defence planning in the future. The government had also been totally humiliated by their inability to commit troops to the crisis in the Balkans, and the whole peace keeping paradigm was changing so they didn’t;. want to be excluded. Furthermore the Balkans made them realise that Europe would have to do more on defence in the future, and they’d have to pitch in .

And its hard to believe when the first tender went out for the APCS it was one of the biggest contracts for new armoured vehicles in Europe for a decade, and had they acquired the original eighty cars they were planning on, they actually hoped for 120 eventually, they would have had the ability to deploy a full battlegroup that exceeded NATO expectations.

The only problem is that the recession of 2001 put paid to that and the failure to go ahead with the full buy caused problems especially as there were never enough ambulances or repair vehicles or indeed for training and attrition.

Also the plan for the full battalion got side-tracked by the EU battlegroup project and the need to provide an Istar company. That also got helped along with when the aml proved totally inadequate in Liberia so in 2004 they decided on the mowag mrv/crv, which made sense, the americans had introduced their reconnaissance version of their stryker and there were lots of manual and doctrine available. Again the problem was that they never got enough of them, or rather that the minister decided on only acquiring the absolute bare minimum to field one medium recce troop for the istar coy. If you look at an cosantoir from September 2012, the MRV/CRV and the LTAV purchase allowed them to deploy an istar company, if you read that article, (its online now) and you do a bit of maths, then you’ll work out why they converted 9 of the infantry care to CRV.

As for the lTAV they got sold a complete pup, but the intention at the time was actually good, the problem was that virtually every vehicle of this type and generation had problems.

Now if there is a board at the moment looking at AFV’s for later in the deecade one thing they’ll have to take into consideration is the war in the Ukraine. One way to judge its intensity is that since the 20^th of February more Russian and Ukrainian soldiers have been killed in action than the Americans have lost in all their wars since 1953, and that is a conservative estimate, (I suspect that Russian casualties might be significantly higher) Its only going to intensify, and it will drag us all in as it gets worse and in my opinion it will.

I’d argue that a board considering armour for the defence forces will have to assume that by the end of this decade there is the distinct possibility that an Irish battalion overseas will have engage and defeat a near peer opponent as part of an international coalition or at the very least engage in high intensity peace support operations at a higher tempo and greater threat environment than we have experienced before.

Secondly, that the possibility of small scale commando raids by a overseas power to destroy critical infrastructure can no longer be discounted as a fantasy.

Thirdly that the war in the Ukraine has proven is that vehicles that were designed for the cold war battlefield are too lightly armoured for the modern battlefield, and that technology is rapidly changing the battlefield. Go on telegram and you’ll see videos of commercial drones that were bought for a few hundred destroying main battle tanks worth millions with home made hand grenades down hatches etc. Look at the number of tank destroyed by loitering munitions especially the switchblade 600, which has the same warhead as a javelin missile but is actually a tenth of the price. Weapons are being used in the /ukraine that were unthinkable to the lads who were on the original mowag board , after all in 1995 hardly anybody used the internet. Thus a board will have to recognise that any future Armoured vehicle will have to acquire sufficient variants of a type that and will have to be future proofed to adapt to emerging technology.

[DeV]

1964, they wanted to provide a cavalry troop for a un battalion in Cyprus, they bought 16 AML-60 for a troop of eight cars overseas and eight cars at home for training said troop, in other words the absolute minimum

A troop is 4 vehicles generally

that isn’t the bear minimum for training (as we see with MRV & CRV

And its hard to believe when the first tender went out for the APCS it was one of the biggest contracts for new armoured vehicles in Europe for a decade, and had they acquired the original eighty cars they were planning on, they actually hoped for 120 eventually, they would have had the ability to deploy a full battlegroup that exceeded NATO expectations.

Wasn’t it 40 with options for another 40 ?
at the time the biggest ever DF equipment contract?

The only problem is that the recession of 2001 put paid to that and the failure to go ahead with the full buy caused problems especially as there were never enough ambulances or repair vehicles or indeed for training and attrition.

recession was 2007
also insufficient spares

Also the plan for the full battalion got side-tracked by the EU battlegroup project and the need to provide an Istar company. That also got helped along with when the aml proved totally inadequate in Liberia so in 2004 they decided on the mowag mrv/crv, which made sense, the americans had introduced their reconnaissance version of their stryker and there were lots of manual and doctrine available. Again the problem was that they never got enough of them, or rather that the minister decided on only acquiring the absolute bare minimum to field one medium recce troop for the istar coy. If you look at an cosantoir from September 2012, the MRV/CRV and the LTAV purchase allowed them to deploy an istar company, if you read that article, (its online now) and you do a bit of maths, then you’ll work out why they converted 9 of the infantry care to CRV.

problem being we now of even less of our critical enabler…. APCs…. Which we didn’t have enough of in the first place

the MRVs & CRVs we’re actually the last of the MOWAG “options”

As for the lTAV they got sold a complete pup, but the intention at the time was actually good, the problem was that virtually every vehicle of this type and generation had problems.

at our insistence due to desired specs that no existing vehicle fitted

I’d argue that a board considering armour for the defence forces will have to assume that by the end of this decade there is the distinct possibility that an Irish battalion overseas will have engage and defeat a near peer opponent as part of an international coalition or at the very least engage in high intensity peace support operations at a higher tempo and greater threat environment than we have experienced before.

Secondly, that the possibility of small scale commando raids by a overseas power to destroy critical infrastructure can no longer be discounted as a fantasy.

Thirdly that the war in the Ukraine has proven is that vehicles that were designed for the cold war battlefield are too lightly armoured for the modern battlefield, and that technology is rapidly changing the battlefield. Go on telegram and you’ll see videos of commercial drones that were bought for a few hundred destroying main battle tanks worth millions with home made hand grenades down hatches etc. Look at the number of tank destroyed by loitering munitions especially the switchblade 600, which has the same warhead as a javelin missile but is actually a tenth of the price. Weapons are being used in the /ukraine that were unthinkable to the lads who were on the original mowag board , after all in 1995 hardly anybody used the internet. Thus a board will have to recognise that any future Armoured vehicle will have to acquire sufficient variants of a type that and will have to be future proofed to adapt to emerging technology.

+1

[CTU]

recession was 2007

While technically there wasn't a recession in 2001, there was a slowdown in economic growth in the aftermath of Foot & Mouth (spring/summer 01) and 9/11 that lasted until 2003.