Rethinking the 'Rifle' Platoon
Reorganize the platoon around crew-served weapons
by Capt Phillip K.S. Sprincin - published April 2007, US Marine Corps Gazette
Ever since the German Army developed storm troop tactics in World War I (WWI), the effects and employment of crew-served weapons (CSWs) have dominated infantry combat. A distinguishing feature has been the migration of these weapons to smaller and smaller units. Most armies started WWI with machineguns (MGs) as a regimental-level asset, but by WWII automatic weapons were being used as the nucleus of squads and even fire teams. The Marine Corps was a pioneer in this area when it reorganized the infantry squad into fire teams built around an automatic weapon-the Browning automatic rifle. However, today CSWs do not penetrate in a meaningful way below the company level, potentially leaving Marine units dangerously short of firepower in a future high-intensity conflict. This article proposes reorganizing the rifle squad and rifle platoon into infantry squad and infantry platoon and providing each with organic CSWs.
Integration of CSWs and their use in combined arms is a basic principle of current infantry doctrine. Infantry units have three types of CSWs: MGs that provide a high volume of fire to suppress targets, indirect fire weapons that provide extended range and the ability to engage targets in defilade, and assault/antiarmor weapons (rockets and missiles) that provide destructive high-explosive force against point targets. Organizationally the pattern is for three maneuver units to be paired with a weapons unit containing each of these three weapon types. Thus the company weapons platoon has M240G general-purpose MGs (GPMGs), M224 60mm mortars, and Mk153 shoulder-launched multipurpose weapons (SMAWs) while the battalion weapons company has M2 .50 caliber and Mk19 heavy MGs (HMGs), M242 81 mm mortars, and TOW and Javelin antitank guided missiles. Combined arms integration is also advertised as belonging to the infantry squad-and even fire teams-using the M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW), the M203 grenade launcher, and M136 AT-4 rockets.
There is, however, a significant gap in this pattern. The rifle platoon and squad possess no organic CSW assets. The trend for the last 100 years has been for combat to become more decentralized and for CSWs to be used by smaller units. Today the focus is on operations conducted by platoon- and squadsized units, yet there are no CSWs to pair with them. In some ways this makes us less tactically/organizationally advanced than the Wehrmacht of WWII who built their squads around a full-sized GPMG, the excellent MG38/42. As a practical matter, many company commanders resolve this issue by attaching MGs, particularly SMAWs, from their weapons platoon to their rifle platoons. This strategy, however, robs the company commander of weapons with which he can influence his fight and does nothing to increase the number of CSWs or trained operators. Also, the probable replacement of the M249 SAW by an "infantry automatic rifle" (IAR) (with reduced sustained fire ability due to a smaller 100-round magazine and no belt feed, no specified quick change barrel, and no requirement to mount on a tripod) will only serve to reduce further the organic firepower of the platoon.
The Infantry Platoon
The recommended solution is to reorganize the rifle platoon into an infantry platoon. Each rifle squad would become an infantry squad with a rifle team, an MG team, and a rocket team. Additionally, a mortar team would be attached to the platoon headquarters. The result would be a balanced combined arms team at the levels in which we currently operate the most-the squad and platoon. The following organization assumes that the IAR replaces the SAW and that the M4 is available for issue as an individual weapon......
(see the whole article at
http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/j...le_platoon.asp)
Reorganize the platoon around crew-served weapons
by Capt Phillip K.S. Sprincin - published April 2007, US Marine Corps Gazette
Ever since the German Army developed storm troop tactics in World War I (WWI), the effects and employment of crew-served weapons (CSWs) have dominated infantry combat. A distinguishing feature has been the migration of these weapons to smaller and smaller units. Most armies started WWI with machineguns (MGs) as a regimental-level asset, but by WWII automatic weapons were being used as the nucleus of squads and even fire teams. The Marine Corps was a pioneer in this area when it reorganized the infantry squad into fire teams built around an automatic weapon-the Browning automatic rifle. However, today CSWs do not penetrate in a meaningful way below the company level, potentially leaving Marine units dangerously short of firepower in a future high-intensity conflict. This article proposes reorganizing the rifle squad and rifle platoon into infantry squad and infantry platoon and providing each with organic CSWs.
Integration of CSWs and their use in combined arms is a basic principle of current infantry doctrine. Infantry units have three types of CSWs: MGs that provide a high volume of fire to suppress targets, indirect fire weapons that provide extended range and the ability to engage targets in defilade, and assault/antiarmor weapons (rockets and missiles) that provide destructive high-explosive force against point targets. Organizationally the pattern is for three maneuver units to be paired with a weapons unit containing each of these three weapon types. Thus the company weapons platoon has M240G general-purpose MGs (GPMGs), M224 60mm mortars, and Mk153 shoulder-launched multipurpose weapons (SMAWs) while the battalion weapons company has M2 .50 caliber and Mk19 heavy MGs (HMGs), M242 81 mm mortars, and TOW and Javelin antitank guided missiles. Combined arms integration is also advertised as belonging to the infantry squad-and even fire teams-using the M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW), the M203 grenade launcher, and M136 AT-4 rockets.
There is, however, a significant gap in this pattern. The rifle platoon and squad possess no organic CSW assets. The trend for the last 100 years has been for combat to become more decentralized and for CSWs to be used by smaller units. Today the focus is on operations conducted by platoon- and squadsized units, yet there are no CSWs to pair with them. In some ways this makes us less tactically/organizationally advanced than the Wehrmacht of WWII who built their squads around a full-sized GPMG, the excellent MG38/42. As a practical matter, many company commanders resolve this issue by attaching MGs, particularly SMAWs, from their weapons platoon to their rifle platoons. This strategy, however, robs the company commander of weapons with which he can influence his fight and does nothing to increase the number of CSWs or trained operators. Also, the probable replacement of the M249 SAW by an "infantry automatic rifle" (IAR) (with reduced sustained fire ability due to a smaller 100-round magazine and no belt feed, no specified quick change barrel, and no requirement to mount on a tripod) will only serve to reduce further the organic firepower of the platoon.
The Infantry Platoon
The recommended solution is to reorganize the rifle platoon into an infantry platoon. Each rifle squad would become an infantry squad with a rifle team, an MG team, and a rocket team. Additionally, a mortar team would be attached to the platoon headquarters. The result would be a balanced combined arms team at the levels in which we currently operate the most-the squad and platoon. The following organization assumes that the IAR replaces the SAW and that the M4 is available for issue as an individual weapon......
(see the whole article at
http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/j...le_platoon.asp)
Comment