Not relevant to the "Where after Chad?" thread in Overseas

[Jessup]

anyhow - please explain "We all know about the Royal Green Jackets role as the 'penal regiment'" - because as a Rifleman in that battalion (and not the only one on this Forum) who knew Ford, Fowler and Pernell personally, drank with them often and served with them in the Falklands before we returned to Cyprus and they killed Louise Jensen - this 'penal regiment' role is new to me. maybe that is also because i am brainwashed with Red, Black and Green but who is the 'all' in 'we all know'?!

I understand that the Royal Green Jackets was a designated penal regiment in the days of the empire when 'problem children' were posted to whatever far flung place the regiment was; India or whatever? The tradition persisted in an informal way as the regiment apparently had specific competencies in dealing with problem children.

The most recent time I heard of it was ex Captain Tim Rodber at a rugby/executive training thing where he recounted his horror at opening the envelope for his first posting to see what he thought was the 'Royal Green Jackets' only to discover it was the 'Green Howards'.

I remember the Cyprus incident a quite clearly as I was in the DF at the time. A number of the Officers and NCOs in the Depot had been on various courses in Warminster etc. and the talk among them and the media was that it wasn't exactly 'bolt out of the blue behaviour' for that regiment?

[Jungle]

Timhorgan sounds like a guy who failed selection for a SOF unit and therefore hates "elitism"... I know the type.

After the Somalia incident the Canadians to their credit had an Inquiry and addressed some of the matters relating to an Army within society in general-I have tagged the report below which makes interesting reading. My own preference is still for the Swiss model which Michael Collins favoured- a proper Citizen Army with professional pride in itself but with no airs and graces.

http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/somaliae.htm

The top man at the time in Canada who was severely reprimanded happened to be a certain General Jean de Chastelain.

Get your facts straight; De Chastelain was never reprimanded, and did not deserve to be. When the CAR was disbanded, he was against the MND's decision and offered to resign.
The guy you are talking about is Jean Boyle; he was CDS during the Somalia inquiry, and resigned his command in disgrace.
You express opinions on things you know nothing about, and your credibility is suffering...

When I talk about "Peacekeeping gigs" or "UN war tourism" I am not slagging the Troops; Soldiers (that includes me) will do what they are told. I call them that because of my own experience, and that of other Canadians. I prefer, as most of my Brothers in Arms, to be in a coalition environment that will provide all the combat support and assets needed, including robust ROEs, to actually make a difference, not encourage a stalemate.
Ops like UNFICYP are a testament to that: the mission has been ongoing since 1964 with no resolution in sight. (I served 2 tours with UNFICYP)

No need to mention Rwanda... but BTW, Gen Dallaire in 1994 requested the deployment of the CAR to give himself the tools to deal with the situation there, but it was refused by the UNHQ. I was with the CAR during those days; in fact, I spent most of the period between 1985 and 1995 with the CAR, as a member of 1 Commando.

East Timor is another example, where a coalition intervened and set the conditions for the success of the UN mission; without the robust intervention by INTERFET, I suspect the UN would have failed miserably there. I was there for the INTERFET mission, and I was not wearing a blue hat... I was wearing a maroon beret, as the Army element deployed there was the R22eR Para Coy, consisting of a large number of ex- 1 CDO guys.

Frankly, you come across as an armchair general, never having served a day in the Military; service in the reserves of a para-military police organisation that calls itself "The Regiment" does not count as Military Service. You did prove that you can search the internet though, but even in doing that you are not very effective...

Oh, and it's John De Chastelain.

You should stay in your lane.

[DeV]

On the other hand some appointments in UNIFIL were designated 'Irish Only' by the IDF (not the UN) as they weren't prepared to deal with muppets from some of the other third world contingents. If it was up to the UN there would be an almost quota system where each country would get their turn regardless of ability.

Israeli Defence Forces or (Irish) Defence Force ???

[DeV]

There is a peace process ongoing in Cyprus and I'd say the military forces could well be withdrawn in the next few years and just the UNMOs and UNCIVPOL retained.

[Jungle]

There is a peace process ongoing in Cyprus and I'd say the military forces could well be withdrawn in the next few years and just the UNMOs and UNCIVPOL retained.

There has been a peace process in Cyprus since it became independent !!

They told us the same thing during my first tour there, 25 years ago:

[spider]

Loathe as I am to get involved in this debate, heres my contribution -

(1) Re the Para's being uneducated knuckle draggers. That is very untrue. A lot of Private soldiers in that Regiment are very well educated, and come from good backgrounds. They join the Para's because they want to be in what is touted as the best regiment in the British Army. A good example is a young lad I got chatting to about 8 or 9 years ago. He had just finished his 'A' levels when he joined up. His reason - he wanted to do something interesting before he went to University. He was a fluent French and German speaker. Many of them join for adventure - simple as that. He wasn't going to get that in the Adjutant Generals Corps.

(2) Bloody Sunday happened against a background of very extreme times. It was very unfortunate. After the UK general election, the Saville report will be published, and the truth as best can be established 40 years later will come out. Villifying an entire Regiment, which no longer has any soldiers serving in it who were involved on that day is unhelpful to say the least.

(3) The Royal Marines are not part of the British Army. They are part of the Royal Navy. I have a relative who was in the Royal Marines - and he certainly isn't someone I would describe as being more than averagely intelligent. Hard, I'll grant him that, but not the cleverest.

(4) Re the 8%. Take a 16 year old boy who is seeking his place in life, introduce him to the regimental life, with good pay, travel, adventure, promotion prospects. Expose him to operations over and over again (look at the chests full of medals the current generation of soldiers have), where he will have experiences he may struggle with. Then, after 24 years, at age 40, dump him into civvy street, to survive, on his own, without the regiment, or the support network of the Army. Some will be able to re-adjust, others won't. Some will begin to drink heavily, show symptoms of PTSD, and get into trouble with the Police because they are angry about things they have experienced in their time. Little wonder many end up in jail. Someone should compare how many ex McDonald's burger flippers from council estates end up in jail - an awful lot less I'll wager. And for your info - I know an ex Infantry Officer, from a middle class background who most of the above happened to.

(5) Re the Green Jackets being bad boys. They were no more bad boys than any other regiment in the BA. I think I'm right in saying that 2 Royal Irish were posted to the Falkland Islands in 1982 as a block for their atrocious off duty behaviour in Dover around that time (including the killing of two Police dogs in a bar fight). Every regiment has its bad boys, I'm sure its the same in every army around the World. As for the RIFLES, well their performance in taking the fight to the Taliban in Afghanistan speaks for itself. Anyone who suggests they are anything but professional, competent and brave soldiers is talking shit. Which is easy to do from your living room.

(6) Re the 'Bubble -Butts' in the British Army. I think I'm right in saying that a lot of them will be getting the road. People are lining up at the recruiting offices to join, so the wasters are going to get cut loose.

[FoxtrotRK]

(2) Bloody Sunday happened against a background of very extreme times. It was very unfortunate. After the UK general election, the Saville report will be published, and the truth as best can be established 40 years later will come out. Villifying an entire Regiment, which no longer has any soldiers serving in it who were involved on that day is unhelpful to say the least.

I have to partially disagree with that. RGJ has spoken at length about how proud he is of the regimental battle honours system, and rightly so. Unfortunately you can't cherry pick aspects of your units past.

[Vanguard]

I have to partially disagree with that. RGJ has spoken at length about how proud he is of the regimental battle honours system, and rightly so. Unfortunately you can't cherry pick aspects of your units past.

If you want to do that, what about Ballyseedy and civil war alleged attrocities of the Irish army ? Anyone can bring up past events.

[timhorgan]

Bon Jour, Jungle,
Below is a copy of the official Somalia Inquiry Report as it applies to Gen. de Chastelain - it seems to me that you are the one who does not know what you are talking about.

Yes, I did fail selection course for a particular Police Unit- the first time- but I re-took it and passed a few months later. At the end of the ceasefire exercise in Zimbabwe I was invited by one of the CMF commanders- a former SAS Colonel - and introduced to the Governor, Lord Soames, and the CO of the CMF, Gen.Ackland and thanked for my individual contribution. The Governor and Gen.Ackland were also told that our unit was the most professional of all the Rhodesian Forces.

Jungle, Vous-etes scraping the barrel,chere amie.

Tim Horgan


THE SOMALIA INQUIRY KEY POINTS re:

GENERAL JOHN DE CHASTELAIN

We advised Gen John de Chastelain that we would consider allegations that he exercised poor and inappropriate leadership by failing:

Accordingly, although Gen de Chastelain is ultimately responsible for the failures that occurred below him, he is also responsible for what he did or did not do in allowing the failing to occur. In this respect, Gen de Chastelain's primary failure may be characterized as one of nonexistent control and indifferent supervision. Quite simply, at many points in his testimony, Gen (ret) de Chastelain appeared quite prepared to assume that all would have worked out if only because of the successes of his previous achievements and because of the trust he placed in the quality of those selected as his subordinates. This benign neglect, or unquestioning reliance, became so common under Gen de Chastelain's command that it became everyday practice throughout the chain of command below him.

Gen de Chastelain's non-existent control and indifferent supervision created an atmosphere that fostered more failings among his subordinates. Time and time again we heard evidence suggesting the relinquishment of active control and supervision throughout the chain of command. It seems to us that where the top commander within a command chain fails in important respects, those failures will inevitably trickle down. A weakness at the top can thereby easily find expression throughout.

As CDS, Gen de Chastelain shouldered ultimate responsibility for the command, control, and administration of the CF. Accordingly, he ought to have known of any significant leadership and discipline problems that may have affected deployment for Operation Deliverance. From his position of authority, he ought to have required of his subordinates that they adequately supervise units under their command, that they report to him in a timely, accurate and comprehensive manner, and that they intervene to provide advice, guidance, and remedial action when the circumstances dictated. None of this occurred.
With regard to the removal of LCol Morneault, Gen de Chastelain did not know that concerns about LCol Morneault had been expressed by some senior leaders prior to his appointment as Commanding officer (CO).

With his limited knowledge came a failure to act, to direct, and to command. Furthermore, his minimal inquiries encouraged subordinates to copy his uncritical faith in subordinates, to remain passive in their approach to supervision and reporting, and to rely on a custom of reactive intervention.

In this, Gen de Chastelain failed to discharge his responsibilities as CDS. He could have brought to bear through his personal presence and example the considerable weight of his experience and high office in order to directly impress upon his troops the standards of discipline, conduct, and professionalism which he expected of them. He could have done so, but he did not.

Failure to properly oversee the planning and preparation of Operation Deliverance by allowing the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group to deploy:

with significant discipline and leadership problems of which he was aware, or ought to have been aware;
without making provisions for the troops to be trained or tested on the newly developed Rules of Engagement;
with Rules of Engagement which were confusing, inadequate, and lacking in definition;
without an adequate Military Police contingent;
without a specific mission; and
without adequately assessing the impact the manning ceiling of 900 land (army)personnel would have on the mission.
Gen de Chastelain was unaware, but should have known, of the serious leadership and discipline problems plaguing the CAR up until the time of its deployment. Gen de Chastelain knew that the Rules of Engagement (ROE) were rushed to completion on December 11th,14 and should have known that this late timing left inadequate time for proper training on the ROE, but was nonetheless unconcerned.15 He was similarly unconcerned that the Canadian troops had trained on ROE promulgated for the Yugoslavia mission, even though that mission differed in significant respects from what could be expected of Operation Deliverance.16 Gen de Chastelain had read the Operation Deliverance ROE very carefully, line by line, before approving them, and he should have known that the wording left an undesirable degree of uncertainty, especially with regard to the interpretation of "hostile intent" and the proportionate use of force in the context of property theft.17
Gen de Chastelain knew that the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG) was deployed with two Military Police and believed that this number was acceptable, but he should have known at the planning stage, especially with the prospect of significant numbers of detainees, that it was not.18 Gen de Chastelain knew the CAR was deployed without an adequate mission definition, but should have known that such a deficiency violated basic precepts of military planning. Gen de Chastelain knew of the manning ceiling and was instrumental in deciding upon it, yet took the position that the limit was satisfactory unless informed that there were "show-stoppers".19 This shows his indifference to the placing of a ceiling on the mission and its impact on the proper planning of the mission.

We find that Gen de Chastelain bore a primary responsibility to ensure that planning and preparations for Operation Deliverance were driven by military imperatives, were properly prioritized, and were carried out in a professional and competent manner. This he did not do. He allowed monetary and political considerations to motivate important decisions regarding the Canadian contingent.
Failure to put in place an adequate reporting system dealing with operational readiness and effectiveness in the Canadian Forces.
Gen de Chastelain should also have ensured that an adequate operational readiness reporting system was in place at the time of planning Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance. As CDS, he did not have time to inspect every unit in the CF personally and, therefore, depended on an operational readiness reporting system or reports from his subordinate commanders. Though he knew that the system for determining operational readiness had for a long time been considered inadequate, he held no meetings with his commanders to formally assess the operational readiness of the CF or Land Force Command (LFC) at any time during the planning phase or before deployment to Somalia. Gen de Chastelain chose instead to rely passively on a flawed system. He accepted the operational readiness declaration for Operation Cordon at face value, and stated that there was no reason for him to inquire about it "unless I didn't have confidence in the commanders to tell me what I needed to know or not unless I happened to know something that they may have missed, and neither of them was the case."20 He similiarly accepted the operational declaration for Operation Deliverance at face value. He should have resolved this systemic problem, which relied on declarations about operational readiness without an established standard of measurement and methods of reporting. Again, Gen de Chastelain failed to adequately ensure that subordinates at LFC would put in place effective systems to monitor operational readiness.
Failure to ensure that all members of the Canadian Joint Force Somalia were adequately trained and tested in the Law of War or the Law of Armed Conflict including the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of victims of armed conflict.
As the CDS, Gen de Chastelain ought to have ensured that all members of the Canadian Joint Force Somalia (CJFS) were adequately trained and tested in the Law of Armed Conflict before they deployed to Somalia, and with enough time for adequate training in them. He did not do this. We know that the Canadian troops received inadequate training in the Law of Armed Conflict, that the soldiers received no written materials on the subject, and that they were generally unprepared in theatre for situations about which they ought to have been knowledgeable. We therefore find that Gen de Chastelain did not adequately ensure that direction, supervision, and instruction regarding training in the Law of Armed Conflict for peace support operations were provided, or that all members of the CJFS were adequately trained.
Failure in his duty as Commander as defined by analogy to Queen's Regulations and Orders art. 4.20 and in military custom.
[
U]Given our findings above concerning the leadership failures of Gen de Chastelain, and in view of the importance of control and supervision within the chain of command, we conclude that Gen de Chastelain failed as a commander. [/U]




Gen.de Chastelain failed a a Commander- as your present CDS is now doing.

A Bientot, Ma Chere Amie.
Tim Horgan

[FoxtrotRK]

If you want to do that, what about Ballyseedy and civil war alleged attrocities of the Irish army ? Anyone can bring up past events.

What about them? You're aware the unit involved was disbanded after the Civil War?

[timhorgan]

[

Vanguard QUOTE]Its not about claiming the BA is superior, its role is totally different from the defence forces, the complexity of its operations in fast changing theatres means sometimes things will go wrong. You cant seriously compare Irish army 1 battalion UN ops with conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan, your agenda is simply to denigrade the rep of the BA, partly I suspect due to the fact the Irish army never sees combat, hence the need to big it up by slagging the Brits.

[/QUOTE][/QUOTE]

Vanguard,

I predict dark and difficult days ahead for the BA and fear that the rot will only be stopped when there is a radical change at the top with the introduction of some fighters who will deliver the country's defence needs and demand the resources to do so.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that real businessmen would do a better job running the BA. The present self-publicists are neither soldiers nor businessmen. These staff pigeons even have their own language that charts the budgetary structure and inhibits innovative thinking.

There is a need for a merciless cull at the highest levels to cut out the destructive deadwood that is stifling initiative, pandering to the civil service and failing above all else to give any leadership whatsoever.

The crisis is so real that it is an obvious threat to the security of the nation. The senior military officers who have allowed and in some cases conspired in this failure are culpable and must be held to account. Better still, retire the whole generation of failing senior officers and avoid the looming disaster.


Tim Horgan
PS Vanguard: See the tag for the Somalia Inquiry by Canada and you will see that much of the failings described there apply to the present BA.

[Jungle]

Bon Jour, Jungle,
Below is a copy of the official Somalia Inquiry Report as it applies to Gen. de Chastelain - it seems to me that you are the one who does not know what you are talking about.

Dude, I did not say he was white as snow, I said he was never reprimanded... the period surrounding the mission to Somalia was a dark one for us, with governments who did not care about the CF and a bunch of carreerists running the Military. Everybody in the upper C of C had some blame in this. The liberal government of the time shut the inquiry down when they began to feel the heat. The guy who fell on his sword regarding the Somalia inquiry was (CDS) Jean Boyle, De Chastelain's successor, for altering documents that pertained to the Somalia affair and embarrassing the MND.

The CF (like the Irish DF today) had been in peacekeeping mode for decades when Somalia came up, and we were not ready, as an Armed Forces and as a country, for the type of robust mission that was being sent to that country. Despite all this, the CAR was commended on numerous occasions for the excellent work they did in the Belet Huen area.
No Armed Forces is immune to this kind of event happening, especially when going through a change in the type of missions they are conducting, going from decades of relatively stable peacekeeping missions to taking part in hostilities.

Now you can keep posting references to the Somalia Affair and inquiry all you want; I never read the entire thing but I lived through that period, met the players (including Gen De Chastelain and Judge Létourneau) and put all this behind me a long time ago.

Gen.de Chastelain failed a a Commander- as your present CDS is now doing.

A Bientot, Ma Chere Amie.
Tim Horgan

Hahaha !!! You're taking yourself too seriously... !!

D'après ce que je lis sur ce forum, tu sembles seul dans ton opinion du Canada; tu peux continuer à faire le guignol, mais je vais désormais t'ignorer.

[CS Gass]

Having looked into this 'Somalia Affair' its seems mad that an entire unit was disbanded over this one incident. off topic i know, but still how on Earth did the Canadian Government even arrive at a point where they thought that was a solution

[Jungle]

Having looked into this 'Somalia Affair' its seems mad that an entire unit was disbanded over this one incident. off topic i know, but still how on Earth did the Canadian Government even arrive at a point where they thought that was a solution

CS, there are a number of reasons for this: the government of that period was looking at cutting defence spending, and the Cdn Airborne Regt was disliked by a number of senior staff. The CAR was largely populated by "hard chargers", but it had a small number of idiots, like every Military unit in the world. It was not a "permanent" unit like our normal Regts, in the sense that people were posted to the CAR for a period, then returned to their parent regt. Disbanding one of the 3 permanent regts would have caused a shit storm of monumental proportions.
After Somalia and the hazing videos, the CAR became an easy target for the politicians, and they ordered it disbanded. It was a useless action, and caused a lot of harm to the CF.

This created the illusion of the govt taking action, but as mentionned earlier the members of the CAR returned to their parent Regt and continued their career. The newest SOF org in Canada (created in 2006) is heavily populated by ex-CAR members, especially in the senior NCO positions.

Since disbandment, former members of the CAR have served in Bosnia, Croatia, East Timor, Afghanistan (Kabul and Kandahar) and Haiti (UN in the late 90s and humanitarian in 2010).

[RoyalGreenJacket]

Loathe as I am to get involved in this debate, heres my contribution -

(1) Re the Para's being uneducated knuckle draggers. That is very untrue. A lot of Private soldiers in that Regiment are very well educated, and come from good backgrounds. They join the Para's because they want to be in what is touted as the best regiment in the British Army. A good example is a young lad I got chatting to about 8 or 9 years ago. He had just finished his 'A' levels when he joined up. His reason - he wanted to do something interesting before he went to University. He was a fluent French and German speaker. Many of them join for adventure - simple as that. He wasn't going to get that in the Adjutant Generals Corps.

(2) Bloody Sunday happened against a background of very extreme times. It was very unfortunate. After the UK general election, the Saville report will be published, and the truth as best can be established 40 years later will come out. Villifying an entire Regiment, which no longer has any soldiers serving in it who were involved on that day is unhelpful to say the least.

(3) The Royal Marines are not part of the British Army. They are part of the Royal Navy. I have a relative who was in the Royal Marines - and he certainly isn't someone I would describe as being more than averagely intelligent. Hard, I'll grant him that, but not the cleverest.

(4) Re the 8%. Take a 16 year old boy who is seeking his place in life, introduce him to the regimental life, with good pay, travel, adventure, promotion prospects. Expose him to operations over and over again (look at the chests full of medals the current generation of soldiers have), where he will have experiences he may struggle with. Then, after 24 years, at age 40, dump him into civvy street, to survive, on his own, without the regiment, or the support network of the Army. Some will be able to re-adjust, others won't. Some will begin to drink heavily, show symptoms of PTSD, and get into trouble with the Police because they are angry about things they have experienced in their time. Little wonder many end up in jail. Someone should compare how many ex McDonald's burger flippers from council estates end up in jail - an awful lot less I'll wager. And for your info - I know an ex Infantry Officer, from a middle class background who most of the above happened to.

(5) Re the Green Jackets being bad boys. They were no more bad boys than any other regiment in the BA. I think I'm right in saying that 2 Royal Irish were posted to the Falkland Islands in 1982 as a block for their atrocious off duty behaviour in Dover around that time (including the killing of two Police dogs in a bar fight). Every regiment has its bad boys, I'm sure its the same in every army around the World. As for the RIFLES, well their performance in taking the fight to the Taliban in Afghanistan speaks for itself. Anyone who suggests they are anything but professional, competent and brave soldiers is talking shit. Which is easy to do from your living room.

(6) Re the 'Bubble -Butts' in the British Army. I think I'm right in saying that a lot of them will be getting the road. People are lining up at the recruiting offices to join, so the wasters are going to get cut loose.

outstanding post Spider, obviously i am biased but you summed it up here:

"As for the RIFLES, well their performance in taking the fight to the Taliban in Afghanistan speaks for itself. Anyone who suggests they are anything but professional, competent and brave soldiers is talking shit."

respect