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  • #31
    Canterbury Report - Part 2

    Continuation of Report Part 2

    Under the terms of the contract Tenix agreed to deliver a sea keeping
    performance for the MRV, and its ship to shore transfer system, considerably in
    excess of that specified in the FPS. The company, in its response to the RFP,
    submitted an analysis of sea keeping performance based upon frequency domain strip
    theory. While such analysis is reasonably accurate in predicting sea keeping
    performance up to sea state 6, it may not be relied on as an indicator of performance
    at higher sea states. The ability of the contractor to deliver such enhanced
    performance levels, could only have been challenged by the project team had it been
    equipped or had access to a high level of domain knowledge. In the event, the scale
    of the limitations of the Tenix design in relation to the contract, while recognised by the
    RNZN at the time of contract suspension, only became clear with the completion of a
    more sophisticated analysis using time domain strip theory – undertaken by AMOG -
    and confirmed by the MARIN tank tests.

    The MARIN tests may have deepened understanding of how the MRV
    would perform in higher sea states but they could do nothing to change that
    performance. The performance of the ship was pre-determined by the design offered
    by Tenix and the ship was effectively completed while the MARIN issues were being
    extensively debated. We doubt whether the MARIN tests were really necessary since
    they merely confirmed the AMOG results. Had action been taken to address sea
    keeping at the time of the AMOG simulations, greater progress would have been
    made in addressing performance issues that currently confront HMNZS

    We conclude that insufficient technical understanding was brought to
    bear from the outset of the programme. That this was not recognised suggests that
    there was insufficient technical expertise in the project team to fully comprehend some
    key design issues and, therefore, the ability to articulate concerns and seek guidance.
    Furthermore, there was an absence outside the project of technical governance on
    key issues such as sea keeping, or, as identified later, the challenges of safety in the
    context of meeting SOLAS and other statutory requirements, and the limitations of
    Lloyd’s Register’s certification on a commercial Ro-Ro design incorporating significant military features.

    A Programme managed to achieve the earliest delivery, characterised by wishful

    All programmes should be managed to achieve their performance, cost
    and time objectives. While we understand the desire, emanating from very senior
    levels, to reduce the time from the frigate Canterbury paying off and to the delivery of
    the MRV, we have found a relentless determination to deliver to time, across both the
    MoD and NZDF, despite evidence of likely performance shortfalls e.g.

    a) At the outset of Project Protector, the stated intention was to employ a
    sequential approach to design, before freezing the design that would be
    produced. This is not what happened - production got ahead of design from an
    early stage. Steel was cut in mid-April 05 - probably because of production
    pressures in Merwede - during the period of contract suspension. The decision
    to lift the contract suspension in May 05, despite unresolved issues on the
    MRV’s sea keeping characteristics, was critical in enabling production to
    continue. With hindsight, contract suspension should have been the time to
    extract firm performance guarantees from Tenix or to negotiate relaxations.

    b) The MARIN Tank tests were undertaken in November 05 and the report issued
    in February 06. The protracted resolution of the issues arising from the MARIN
    test results, lasting some 15 months were completed only a matter of a few
    weeks before the acceptance of the ship. This meant that little or nothing could
    be done to address these issues during manufacture. The MoD’s agreement to
    conduct the MARIN tests effectively let Tenix off the hook of addressing sea
    keeping performance before ship construction was too far advanced

    c) The ship set sail from Rotterdam in August 06 before planned acceptance had
    taken place of all essential seagoing functions and the material configuration,
    functionality and condition of the ship.

    d) Incidents, noted in the Canterbury Engineering Master Log, during the journey
    from the Netherlands to Australia were warning signs of sea keeping difficulties
    to come e.g. bow slamming (12 Sept 06) and the swamping of the starboard
    RHIB with green water and the opening of the starboard alcove door (22 Sept


    • #32
      Canterbury Report - Part 3

      Continuation of Report Part 3

      Design Responsibility

      We also found that responsibility for design throughout the life of HMNZS CANTERBURY had not been defined. We had expected to find a clear statement in the contract and elsewhere specifying the Design Authority (DA). We would expect the Design Authority to be the lead technical authority responsible for providing advice on the coherence of the system at all stages of its life. 32) Understanding and defining the DA role becomes particularly important for maintaining configuration control of equipment once in service. Usually the DA would be the body that designed and built the equipment. In the absence of a DA for HMNZS CANTERBURY, the design authority de facto now rests with the Navy.

      Deliverables under design such as documentation and initial outfit of spares were significantly deficient as high lighted in the Report on Material State on Acceptance. We were advised that the situation had improved significantly during the following 12 months. A number of issues remain outstanding and the provision of low value spares from the original Eastern European suppliers make for a long supply chain. As the Project Protector team has no enduring responsibility for the ship, even routine warranty items frequently fall to the ship to raise. Under the MRV contract neither Tenix nor equipment suppliers were contracted for any enduring technical bsupport either at the equipment level or for any subsequent design integration task.

      Safety and Functionality

      In this part of the report, we address the safety and functionality of
      HMNZS CANTERBURY. HMNZS CANTERBURY is intrinsically safe although some
      essential remedial work will be required to demonstrate safety, in particular for
      undertaking some military tasks. Sea keeping performance, however, is likely to be
      poor in higher sea states. As regards functionality, some operating limitations may
      have to be accepted but these are not inconsistent with the requirements of the
      Functional Performance Specification. Some requirements that should have been
      delivered under the contract may not be deliverable at all. We expand on these views

      The design of the MRV is based on the hull form and associated main
      machinery of a commercial Ro-Ro design. Both the MRV and Ben my Chree were
      designed by Merwede in the Netherlands. These ships were subjected to the same
      certification process for both design and construction - indeed both ships have almost
      identical Lloyd’s Register classification. The MRV incorporates a number of specific
      military features and where such features are outside the formal certification process,
      (and most are), they are approved or certified by the either the Flag State Authority or
      the RNZN acting for the project team.


      Under more extreme weather conditions – above Beaufort scale 9
      (mean wind speed 45 knots and wave height of 7-10 metres), ferry operators
      generally seek shelter or delay sailing – principally to avoid damage to the
      cargo and passenger discomfort. In the case of the MRV, while operating in
      higher sea states (greater than Beaufort scale 8) and dependent upon speed
      and heading, extreme pitching and heeling will occur, leading to partial or
      complete propeller emergence in excess of recognised (NATO) standards. In
      such circumstances one or both main engines could trip and depending on
      generator configuration, electrical power could be lost at the same time, and
      hence potentially cause broaching8. While the standards to which the MRV and
      its machinery systems have been designed and materially assured are identical
      to that for a commercial ferry, the risks of loss of electrical and propulsive
      power when operating in more extreme weather conditions should have been
      formally assessed by the ship designers. We believe that Tenix should be
      formally requested to provide comprehensive advice on issues such as
      preferred headings/speed combinations or machinery state/line
      up/modifications, when operating in adverse weather conditions.


      Given that HMNZS CANTERBURY has been certified by Lloyd’s
      Register, has waivers granted by the Naval Authority, approved safe operating
      procedures and adequately trained personnel (noting that technical training was
      provided by the contractor), the ship can be considered as safe and seaworthy as any
      other vessel in her class. The ship is safe to operate in the same manner as the Ben
      my Chree i.e. as if it were a commercial Ro-Ro Ferry. Subject to the comments on the
      provision of suitable sea boats, the ship is materially safe to operate now within say
      150-200 miles of land. Sea keeping performance in the higher sea states is, however,
      likely to be poor. It would be prudent to seek shelter and/or change course in the
      higher sea states and avoid Beaufort scale 9 and above entirely.
      On receipt of advice from the ship designer on the propulsion chain,
      configuration/changes and heading/speed combinations for higher sea states could be
      considered without the need to seek shelter – but we would strongly recommend that
      the ship should be ballasted, as outlined below, when planning operational patrols
      where such conditions might be encountered.

      Safety as a Military Vessel

      To undertake military functions in a safe manner, some key issues remain to be resolved. These are principally associated with equipment performance and sea keeping, and, in particular, the limitations of the ship to shore transfer system.

      The safe operation of the military functions is an indirect responsibility of Tenix or
      Merwede but the operating authority – the RNZN - is the responsible authority for the
      safe operation of each subsystem and where appropriate for systems operating
      simultaneously. We have commented below on safe procedures for the key issues
      and sub systems.

      The Rear Door.

      The rear door/stern ramp of a ferry or the MRV serves both as a watertight barrier and a ramp across which cargo may be loaded or unloaded. For a ferry, such operations are undertaken whilst the ship is berthed with the ramp accurately positioned onto a firmly secured pontoon. For the MRV, the rear door also acts as watertight barrier but for unloading or loading operations, in the absence of fixed shore facilities, it will be open while the ship is underway.

      The ship to shore transfer system requires the Landing Craft (Medium) (LCM)
      to lower its bow ramp on to the lowered rear door - forming a continuous
      roadway permitting cargo to be transferred from the MRV to the LCM while
      underway. There will be unpredictable dynamic movement of the two hulls
      dependant on the sea state and changes in the displacement of the LCM as it
      is progressively loaded.

      The loads on the MRV ramp are more variable than for a conventional ferry and
      there is also the risk of mishaps in aligning and positioning of the LCM ramp.
      While the strength of the rear door (ramp) was examined at an earlier stage,
      two concerns must be addressed before this system is used operationally – the
      loads that could be experienced on the MRV’s rear door during operations
      should be re-examined and accepted (including LCM berthing accidents) and
      the operational conditions and procedures under which the rear door may be
      open at sea must present risks that are ALARP – as low as reasonably
      practicable. We advise that operational procedure should be critically reexamined
      as the consequences of inadvertently flooding the cargo deck are
      potentially disastrous.

      The Ship to Shore Transfer System.

      Based on our observation of the ship to shore transfer system, it has yet to be demonstrated to be “a safe system”. Control of any lateral movement of the LCM, once suspended on the crane hook, is practically zero.

      The proximity of a swinging crane hook to the coxswain’s wheel house is
      potentially dangerous, as is manual engagement of lifting strops to the crane
      hook. During our observations of the transfer system, the MRV was at anchor
      and yawed significantly even in moderate winds, making alignment of the LCM
      and lowering of the rear door, virtually impossible. Transfer of loads could not
      be demonstrated. During re-hoisting, the LCM presented the same hazards
      and an LCM damaged its seating during re-embarkation.

      We doubt that it would possible to operate the current ship to shore transfer
      system much beyond sea state 2. Considerable limitations will need to apply
      for safe operation of the Ship to Shore Transfer system relative to the contract
      requirements. We also are aware that there are some outstanding issues on
      the certification of the LCM and some cracking of seam welds in the aluminium

      Sea Boats for Boarding.

      The provision of satisfactory sea boats together with their lowering and hoisting gear is a necessary condition for conducting boarding operations. We would expect this to be addressed as part of the Court of Inquiry’s recommendations (see para 7 e above).


      The operation of helicopters has already been partially demonstrated but, the assessment of the operation of two helicopters simultaneously must await the planned First of Class Flying Trials. We note that the inability to track helicopters on radar at the required range and height is a warranty claim item.

      Gunnery and Ordnance Safety.

      For the primary armament, the magazine
      arrangements have been adequately addressed by the Naval Authorities and
      can therefore be considered safe, as has the stowage of ordnance in
      containers within the cargo space. We note the warranty claim on the
      alignment of the gun and the searchlight.


      • #33
        Canterbury Report - Part 4

        Continuation of Report Part 4

        Certification for operating in Global Seas.

        The Lloyd’s Register’s certification of the MRV is for unrestricted operations in Global Seas. Such certification is based on the understanding that the MRV does not operate in a particular sea area for a disproportionate amount of time, and that the vessel is operated in a prudent manner – minimising slamming loads, propeller emergence and the
        effects of green seas on the exposed equipments. Lloyd’s Register would need
        to provide advice to NZ MoD once the operating pattern for the ship has been
        established to ensure the Certification in Global Seas has not been compromised by the proposed operational profile. We do not believe this to be a serious issue.
        k) Additional Ballasting. The vertical accelerations experienced by the Ben my
        Chree following delivery were of such a magnitude that its owners located
        permanent ballast high up to raise the centre of gravity that in turn attenuates
        such motions. Similar action for HMNZS CANTERBURY would reduce vertical
        acceleration and improve crew comfort and the ability to operate helicopters in
        all sea states.

        For much of the ship’s operational time it will be “lightly loaded” i.e. the cargo
        load will be small. In such a configuration, the ship will experience more
        extreme motions in all sea states. Such conditions would be reduced if the ship
        were ballasted to the design draught. In this configuration the ship’s roll
        damping system should perform in a satisfactory manner – in the lightly loaded
        condition it is practically ineffective.

        Such changes are indirectly related to safety as they would improve the
        effectiveness of the ship’s company and the embarked civilian or military staff.
        For the RNZN, a more user-friendly ship is likely to be beneficial in view of its
        planned use for training.

        Replenishment at Sea.

        We understand that a safe operation to act as both a receiving and donor ship has yet to be demonstrated. The location of the fluid RAS point well aft will be challenging and require the development of appropriate procedures.


        The MRV’s functionality as required by the NZDF and other government
        agencies is detailed in the Functional and Performance Specification. HMNZS
        CANTERBURY was not contracted or built to the FPS, but to the Contract between
        MoD and Tenix. We had expected the NZDF to have conducted a formal review of
        actual performance against the FPS as opposed to compliance against the contract
        deliverables – but were advised this had not been undertaken. Theoretically, the
        contract should mirror the FPS but, as reported below, this is not always the case. In
        the absence of such a review, this task was undertaken under the direction of the
        Review Team by staff seconded from the NZDF. The compliance of the ship’s performance against the FPS (which should be regarded as preliminary) has been forwarded to AC Dev who should now see the process through to its formal conclusion.

        This report identified about 600 clauses containing a capability requirement for
        the MRV expressed as mandatory (shall) non-binding (should) or permissive
        (desirable). Of these about 71% of the functionality has been achieved, 9%
        partially achieved, about 10% not achieved, and 9% not yet demonstrated; the
        remainder do not have an identifiable deliverable.

        Of the 9% partially achieved some cannot yet be fully evaluated, others are
        none binding or permissive requirements, others will be resolved following
        installation of sea boats or resolution of warranty issues. The very small
        number of failing mandatory requirements is not judged to be significant (bar
        one) in the overall context of the MRV’s functional capability. The significant
        requirement that appears not to have been met is the strength of the
        accommodation ladder to permit a fully laden soldier to embark from the shore.
        It is not clear if this remains a current requirement or not. Of the 10% that have “not been achieved” practically all are covered by warranty claims, or should be achieved once the necessary changes detailed elsewhere in this review are completed (boat alcoves, sea boats and hoisting/lowering gear, machinery/changes etc). There are a few items where the functionality required by the FPS is also a deliverable under the contract but has not been delivered. For reasons that are not entirely clear, the project team has accepted a lesser capability as a contract deliverable. A huge number of contract deliverables associated with verification were accepted without the full rigour necessary just prior to formal acceptance. It is probable that some specific requirements may have been
        inadvertently overlooked in the run up to formal acceptance off contract.

        About 9% of the required functionality has yet to be demonstrated – largely due
        to warranty items not being resolved or HMNZS CANTERBURY not yet having
        undertaken sufficient operational proving. We would expect such functionality
        to be achieved. Compliance of contract deliverables should have ensured compliance with the FPS. However the acceptance of contract deliverables was prescribed by the
        verification and acceptance plan that defined the acceptance methodology to
        be adopted for each deliverable – some by analysis, others by testing. From an
        examination of this matrix, it is evident the vast majority of deliverables were
        finally agreed post acceptance. As previously mentioned, the Verification and
        Acceptance component of the project team was considerably over-stretched.


        • #34
          Canterbury Report - Part 5

          Continuation of Report Part 5
          Key Not Achieved Items
          Key mandatory items that do not achieve the mandatory FPS requirement are as follows:

          a). The ship has not been effectively demonstrated to be capable of sustained patrol in seas and winds associated with the top of sea state 7. The MARIN photographs show clear propeller and rudder emergence combined with excessive roll and the flooding of the RHIB alcoves. Refer to FPS (mandatory).

          b) While the anchors can achieve the requirement that the to holding the MRV by the bow in up to 50 metres of water, with a sand and shale sea bottom, with 35 knots of wind and 4 knots of current or tidal stream and with 90% of the fitted cable deployed, there are warranty related issues with the anchoring system, specifically the winches. Furthermore the it is not uncommon for the ship to swing through large arcs (up to 140°) while at anchor. Refer to FPS clause (mandatory).

          c) The MRV is not fitted with sufficient provisions store rooms for the total number of persons in the vessel to the limit of the vessels endurance. This applies to freezer and dry store capability in particular. To achieve the required endurance of frozen goods necessitates the use of a reefer container thereby reducing refrigerated cargo capacity. Refer to FPS clause (mandatory).

          d) The ship does not comply with the requirements SOLAS chapter III, particularly the International Life Saving Code due to the ongoing issues surrounding certification and fitness for purpose of the RHIBs. Refer to FPS clause 7.20.1 (mandatory).

          e) Inability to automatically track and control aircraft by day and night due at ranges up 40 miles and altitudes of 10 000 feet due to inadequate radar performance. Refer to FPS clause (mandatory).

          f) Inability of the ships sewage treatment plant to achieve a discharge that complies with MARPOL. Refer to FPS clause (mandatory).

          g) The communications and radar direction finding equipment failed contractor sea trials and is not for purpose. This is reflected in the VRTM at Ref D. Refer to FPS clause (mandatory).

          h) The forward looking obstacle avoidance sonar is unfit for purpose. Refer to FPS clause (mandatory). It is a warranty item

          i) The ship’s staff advice is the primary Armament cannot be accurately trained, elevated and fired utilising the current configuration of EOSS and searchlights. Refer to FPS clause (mandatory). It is a warranty item.

          j) The ship has not been effectively designed to enable the safe launch and recovery of sea boats in seas and winds associated with the top of sea state 4. This is reflected in the risks associated with alcove flooding and the certification issues surrounding the RHIBs and lifting gear. Refer to FPS clause (mandatory).

          k) The ship has not been effectively designed to transfer or recover by sea personnel, cargo and transportable equipment from the MRV to shore. The inability to operate the LCM’s due to bow ramp design and hinge cracking precludes this capability. Refer FPS clause 21.1.1 (mandatory)

          The items below provide a selection of ‘non-binding’ items contained within the FPS that have not been achieved. Furthermore, with the exception of paragraph 16.a. these requirements were expressed as a mandatory requirement in the Contract Specification. The following list provides typical example of ‘non-binding’ items contained within the FPS that have not been achieved:

          a) The ship has not been effectively designed to provide directional stability +/-2° of a desired heading, including with following seas to the top of sea state 6. The MARIN data indicates ship performance fails to achieve this requirement. Refer to FPS clause (non binding).

          b) The ship has not been effectively designed to be capable of surviving and continuing with its mission after exposure to seas and winds associated with the top of sea state 9 Refer to FPS clause (non binding).

          c) The MRV is not designed, constructed and fitted out such that the vessel is able to sustain a peak operations requirement of 35 days with the Core Complement plus trainees plus 185 soldiers embarked. Specifically this refers to the lack of installed freezer capability volume of the Dry Store. Additional freezer capability is achieved through the use of ISO reefer containers thereby reducing refrigerated cargo capacity. Refer to FPS clause (non binding).

          d) The MRV’s sea-boats have not been designed, constructed and fitted out such that each sea-boat is self-righting. This was revealed during the RHIB accident. Refer to FPS clause (non binding).

          e) Sea-boats cannot be launched while fully loaded due to the interference from the stropping arrangement. Refer to FPS clause (non binding).

          The non binding FPS clauses listed above were mandatory requirements upon transfer to the Contract Specification.
          FPS vs Contract

          The results of the data matching between the FPS and the Contract Specification achieved by utilising Ref D reveal the FPS is directly liked to 918 contract clauses or sub clauses are:

          a) 44% of Contract Specification compliance wording exceed the FPS requirement (e.g. contract = shall: FPS = should; and equivalent derivations).

          b) 53% of Contract Specification compliance wording meet the FPS requirement (e.g. contract = shall: FPS = shall; and equivalent derivations).

          c) 2.5% of Contract Specification compliance wording fail to meet the FPS requirement (e.g. contract = should: FPS = shall: and equivalent derivations).

          FPS clauses do not appear to have direct linkage to a Contract Specification clause. How or why this occurred has not been determined. In summary:

          a) 11 of the clauses, not transferred to the Contract Specification, have been achieved.

          b) 3 of the clauses, not transferred to the Contract Specification, have been partially achieved.

          c) 9 of the clauses not transferred to the Contract Specification have not been delivered.

          Overall the Contract Specification compliance requirement (should, shall, desirable) either meets or exceeds the FPS in all but 2.5% of situations where the FPS is referenced in the Contract Specification. Note: This comparison does not reflect Contract Specification clauses where the contracted performance criteria have changed. Accordingly it is possible for a Contract Specification requirement to meet the FPS requirement when in fact the performance requirements stated in the contract differ from that originally appearing in the FPS.


          • #35
            Finally the Last One - Sorry about the length Guys!


            In broad terms the ship has delivered the capabilities required in the FPS. There are a number of capabilities which have not been achieved and when compared to the FPS may not have been required to be achieved, but the delivery of which, could enable or enhance the delivery of subordinate capabilities. For example sea keeping requirements have effects to boat, aviation and patrol operations.

            It is arguable whether CANTERBURY can achieve the sea keeping performance requirements sought in the FPS and Contract Specification. This requirement is expressed as a preference (should) in the FPS and mandatory (shall) in the contract.

            From observation and discussion many of the ships features show signs of poor design, although are technically compliant with the FPS. Opportunities to identify areas of poor design have been hampered by the ships restricted operating programme.

            The restrictions imposed on the ship, either since delivery or the RHIB accident, has limited the ability to prove capability or highlight further areas of concern. It is only through the practical employment of the vessel that many of the unintended impacts, good and bad, will become apparent.

            Overall, HMNZS CANTERBURY broadly achieves the majority of mandatory FPS requirements. In a number of areas the ship partially achieves the sought after capabilities, yet fails to follow through on the full delivery of the sought capability. The results show a trend, and given the ‘pragmatic’ approach to determining FPS compliance, should be interpreted holistically.

            This is an absolutely dreadful state of affairs.


            • #36
              The words "lemon", "white elephant" and "dead duck" come to mind. This is a disasterous report. By all accounts, all the RNZN got in canterbury was a ferry, painted grey, rather than a true Multi Role warship.

              Is it too late to return it to the seller and demand a refund?

              The Key cause, from reading that report(thanks Te Kaha) was the eagerness of the builder to deliver the Vessel on time and On Budget, no doubt encouraged to do so under pressure from outside Government influences.

              The Lesson should be foremost in the mind of those in this Isle embarking on a similar vessel replacement program here.
              Goldie fish
              Tim Horgan
              Last edited by Goldie fish; 13 September 2008, 10:49.

              Catch-22 says they have a right to do anything we can't stop them from doing.


              • #37
                I did edited out the section about the disfunctional relationships, poor systems management etc... The big driver of getting this disaster through on time was political. That is where the first blame should be targeted. There is a General Election here early November - it looks like the socialist peaceniks currently in power will be gone. The RNZN only managed 100 designated EZZ Patrol Days last year most of that was having to use the Survey Ship and the MCM Ship. It looks as if that will be the same state of affairs next year. This is not the Navies fault (well a little bit here and there but not that much) - I mean obviously if you want a Naval Ship you would want to listen to the navy now wouldn't you. You would want to actually ask in Naval Architects and experienced Frigate Captains about building a seaworthy ship. Here the rub - word has it the the OPV's are just as bad.


                • #38
                  Originally posted by paul g View Post
                  The government here tends to be pretty savvy when it comes to procurement on large scale projects, hiring consultants for example on the OPV project, which saves money over time.
                  I hope the Government isn't hoping that the consultants come back & say they aren't required or the MRV option isn't required
                  Sometimes, firms will tell you that they simply can't believe how naive government procurement agencies can be, the british for example spent 512 million on a computer system for the probation and prison services, and then found out that it simply didn't work.


                  • #39
                    Originally posted by DeV View Post
                    Second hand purchase for NS?
                    After reading some of that report I'd like to retract that question!


                    • #40
                      I hope our NS are reading the reports and taking some advisment on board from both types of ship.

                      The whole reports stinks of political interference, something which the DF here have been plagued with in the past.

                      A very expensive lesson for the RNZN, but hopefully lessons learned.
                      Covid 19 is not over's still very real..Hand Hygiene, Social Distancing and Masks.. keep safe


                      • #41

                        All the relevant documents can be found at the above link.

                        Catch-22 says they have a right to do anything we can't stop them from doing.


                        • #42
                          Originally posted by DeV View Post
                          I hope the Government isn't hoping that the consultants come back & say they aren't required or the MRV option isn't required
                          The consultants are naval architects, experts in ship design.


                          • #43
                            NZ$20m(€9.4m) will be spent on HMNZS Canterbury's "get well programme" just 16 months after she entered service.
                            And thats before any of the OPVs enter service.

                            Catch-22 says they have a right to do anything we can't stop them from doing.


                            • #44
                              I have read the Coles report, and am somewhat shocked. The MOD really botched the entire program, from a lack of oversight to genuine leadership. An understaffed ministry obviously took on too much. While the Coles report mostly deals with the MRVs shortcomings, all of them were repeated with the others, the OPVs and IPVs. Simply put, the nation of New Zealand had never built a ship recently before, and Te Kaha is correct, really don't have a clue today.

                              First: A qualified sea farer should have been appointed to lead the MOD team, anyone who knows something about ships and ship building.
                              Second: While problems came up during sea trials and building, there were no leadership to correct problems in a positive way. The MOD was concerned only with costs and on time delivery.
                              Third: Communication and quarterly reports detailng building of the ships did not exist, therefore no information reached higher levels of the government leadership, both civilian and military.

                              No wonder they bought a ship designed for coastal operations, a ferry, instead of a ocean going amphibious vessel. They bought RHIBs designed for occasional operation rather than RHIBs designed for multiple daily operations, including their davits. The RHIBs alcoves were poorly designed, an alert sea farer would have asked questions. The RHIBs should have been moved either upward or a door installed before acceptance.

                              The wrong insulation was also purchased and had to be replaced with the OPVs and IPVs. Quality control sucked. Insufficient fire fighting equipment were installed which didn't meet code. No wonder Lloyds won't certify the ships.

                              After the recent election and change of government, the new minister has discovered within a week that the OPVs are 100 tons overweight. The hull design didn't have the weight for the MRU and the helicopter hangar. While many first of class ships are overweight, its silly to build a second ship before sea trials and acceptance of the first ship.

                              It does appear that when the new RHIBs finally arrive along with their davits the IPVs will be sufficient for their planned duties. The OPVs are overweight, and won't be usable for Ross Sea patrols, nor the MRV.

                              While the MRV will have ballast added forward and above the water line, she won't be useful for amphibious operations except in pristine conditions. She will be useful for carrying cargo to a dock. If she had a well dock, she would be more useful for amphibious operations in higher sea states.

                              Three choices for ships, three lemons. ADI's offer for ships should have been accepted several years ago. In hindsight, their designs were better. When you buy cheap, don't be surprised you get cheap.

                              As the opposition party said over and over, New Zealand should buy tried and tested ships. New Zealand government doesn't have the wherewithal to build new ships. While the ships existed in the civilian world and elsewhere, Kiwi-izing the ships was a mistake.

                              New Zealand has learned that housing a helicopter requires a longer ship, the old sea salts prefer around 100 meters, not 85. One should not buy a ship designed for coastal operations for ocean going operations. One should watch QC standards, and buy accordingly. Unfortuanately, without a sea farer at the helm, the Kiwis bought cheap.

                              Bottom line: None of these ships are useful for Ross Sea EEZ patrols. Both the MRV and OPVs will have to do more patrols further north, something the IPVs were bought for. Why are the ships one year late from planned delivery? Leading the list is poor management.
                              Sea Toby
                              Private 3*
                              Last edited by Sea Toby; 27 November 2008, 11:39.