Canterbury Report - Part 2
Continuation of Report Part 2
Under the terms of the contract Tenix agreed to deliver a sea keeping
performance for the MRV, and its ship to shore transfer system, considerably in
excess of that specified in the FPS. The company, in its response to the RFP,
submitted an analysis of sea keeping performance based upon frequency domain strip
theory. While such analysis is reasonably accurate in predicting sea keeping
performance up to sea state 6, it may not be relied on as an indicator of performance
at higher sea states. The ability of the contractor to deliver such enhanced
performance levels, could only have been challenged by the project team had it been
equipped or had access to a high level of domain knowledge. In the event, the scale
of the limitations of the Tenix design in relation to the contract, while recognised by the
RNZN at the time of contract suspension, only became clear with the completion of a
more sophisticated analysis using time domain strip theory – undertaken by AMOG -
and confirmed by the MARIN tank tests.
The MARIN tests may have deepened understanding of how the MRV
would perform in higher sea states but they could do nothing to change that
performance. The performance of the ship was pre-determined by the design offered
by Tenix and the ship was effectively completed while the MARIN issues were being
extensively debated. We doubt whether the MARIN tests were really necessary since
they merely confirmed the AMOG results. Had action been taken to address sea
keeping at the time of the AMOG simulations, greater progress would have been
made in addressing performance issues that currently confront HMNZS
CANTERBURY.
We conclude that insufficient technical understanding was brought to
bear from the outset of the programme. That this was not recognised suggests that
there was insufficient technical expertise in the project team to fully comprehend some
key design issues and, therefore, the ability to articulate concerns and seek guidance.
Furthermore, there was an absence outside the project of technical governance on
key issues such as sea keeping, or, as identified later, the challenges of safety in the
context of meeting SOLAS and other statutory requirements, and the limitations of
Lloyd’s Register’s certification on a commercial Ro-Ro design incorporating significant military features.
A Programme managed to achieve the earliest delivery, characterised by wishful
thinking
All programmes should be managed to achieve their performance, cost
and time objectives. While we understand the desire, emanating from very senior
levels, to reduce the time from the frigate Canterbury paying off and to the delivery of
the MRV, we have found a relentless determination to deliver to time, across both the
MoD and NZDF, despite evidence of likely performance shortfalls e.g.
a) At the outset of Project Protector, the stated intention was to employ a
sequential approach to design, before freezing the design that would be
produced. This is not what happened - production got ahead of design from an
early stage. Steel was cut in mid-April 05 - probably because of production
pressures in Merwede - during the period of contract suspension. The decision
to lift the contract suspension in May 05, despite unresolved issues on the
MRV’s sea keeping characteristics, was critical in enabling production to
continue. With hindsight, contract suspension should have been the time to
extract firm performance guarantees from Tenix or to negotiate relaxations.
b) The MARIN Tank tests were undertaken in November 05 and the report issued
in February 06. The protracted resolution of the issues arising from the MARIN
test results, lasting some 15 months were completed only a matter of a few
weeks before the acceptance of the ship. This meant that little or nothing could
be done to address these issues during manufacture. The MoD’s agreement to
conduct the MARIN tests effectively let Tenix off the hook of addressing sea
keeping performance before ship construction was too far advanced
c) The ship set sail from Rotterdam in August 06 before planned acceptance had
taken place of all essential seagoing functions and the material configuration,
functionality and condition of the ship.
d) Incidents, noted in the Canterbury Engineering Master Log, during the journey
from the Netherlands to Australia were warning signs of sea keeping difficulties
to come e.g. bow slamming (12 Sept 06) and the swamping of the starboard
RHIB with green water and the opening of the starboard alcove door (22 Sept
06).
Continuation of Report Part 2
Under the terms of the contract Tenix agreed to deliver a sea keeping
performance for the MRV, and its ship to shore transfer system, considerably in
excess of that specified in the FPS. The company, in its response to the RFP,
submitted an analysis of sea keeping performance based upon frequency domain strip
theory. While such analysis is reasonably accurate in predicting sea keeping
performance up to sea state 6, it may not be relied on as an indicator of performance
at higher sea states. The ability of the contractor to deliver such enhanced
performance levels, could only have been challenged by the project team had it been
equipped or had access to a high level of domain knowledge. In the event, the scale
of the limitations of the Tenix design in relation to the contract, while recognised by the
RNZN at the time of contract suspension, only became clear with the completion of a
more sophisticated analysis using time domain strip theory – undertaken by AMOG -
and confirmed by the MARIN tank tests.
The MARIN tests may have deepened understanding of how the MRV
would perform in higher sea states but they could do nothing to change that
performance. The performance of the ship was pre-determined by the design offered
by Tenix and the ship was effectively completed while the MARIN issues were being
extensively debated. We doubt whether the MARIN tests were really necessary since
they merely confirmed the AMOG results. Had action been taken to address sea
keeping at the time of the AMOG simulations, greater progress would have been
made in addressing performance issues that currently confront HMNZS
CANTERBURY.
We conclude that insufficient technical understanding was brought to
bear from the outset of the programme. That this was not recognised suggests that
there was insufficient technical expertise in the project team to fully comprehend some
key design issues and, therefore, the ability to articulate concerns and seek guidance.
Furthermore, there was an absence outside the project of technical governance on
key issues such as sea keeping, or, as identified later, the challenges of safety in the
context of meeting SOLAS and other statutory requirements, and the limitations of
Lloyd’s Register’s certification on a commercial Ro-Ro design incorporating significant military features.
A Programme managed to achieve the earliest delivery, characterised by wishful
thinking
All programmes should be managed to achieve their performance, cost
and time objectives. While we understand the desire, emanating from very senior
levels, to reduce the time from the frigate Canterbury paying off and to the delivery of
the MRV, we have found a relentless determination to deliver to time, across both the
MoD and NZDF, despite evidence of likely performance shortfalls e.g.
a) At the outset of Project Protector, the stated intention was to employ a
sequential approach to design, before freezing the design that would be
produced. This is not what happened - production got ahead of design from an
early stage. Steel was cut in mid-April 05 - probably because of production
pressures in Merwede - during the period of contract suspension. The decision
to lift the contract suspension in May 05, despite unresolved issues on the
MRV’s sea keeping characteristics, was critical in enabling production to
continue. With hindsight, contract suspension should have been the time to
extract firm performance guarantees from Tenix or to negotiate relaxations.
b) The MARIN Tank tests were undertaken in November 05 and the report issued
in February 06. The protracted resolution of the issues arising from the MARIN
test results, lasting some 15 months were completed only a matter of a few
weeks before the acceptance of the ship. This meant that little or nothing could
be done to address these issues during manufacture. The MoD’s agreement to
conduct the MARIN tests effectively let Tenix off the hook of addressing sea
keeping performance before ship construction was too far advanced
c) The ship set sail from Rotterdam in August 06 before planned acceptance had
taken place of all essential seagoing functions and the material configuration,
functionality and condition of the ship.
d) Incidents, noted in the Canterbury Engineering Master Log, during the journey
from the Netherlands to Australia were warning signs of sea keeping difficulties
to come e.g. bow slamming (12 Sept 06) and the swamping of the starboard
RHIB with green water and the opening of the starboard alcove door (22 Sept
06).
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