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Naval air ops no more?

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  • Murph, would you really put an untrained, non-sailor on a watch? To do what??!
    not specific to the AC, anyone not standing watches including dusty's , stewards and the like were graded as passengers with unmerciful pisstaking.

    Its a different world, you only gain acceptability when you stand your watches,even the officers were acceptable as they stood watches.

    Must have sickened the AC officers to find out that NS enlisted had double the normal annual leave entitlement while posted to a ship, not that you could ever get leave!
    Covid 19 is not over's still very real..Hand Hygiene, Social Distancing and Masks.. keep safe


    • leadership effects on operational potential

      Originally posted by X-RayOne View Post
      Interesting point about comparing NS productivity, resourcefulness and VFM to that of AC.

      Seems to be a common point that is raising across a number of threads on the forum at the minute, and one which I've commented on in a thread myself.

      Seems to be the AC is more and more looking like the weak link in any of the services moving forward with any type of combined ops.
      Units that do things with a variety of high cost equipments, eg., Ships, Airplanes, Artillery, Armour, High-Tech Communications etc. need to have an ambitious drive to get involved and keep demanding and seeking ways of being relevant to the battlefield or theater. It all stems from slightly naive leaders who see no obstacles and keep banging on the door with plans and proposals. They then must put what they have acquired to good and constant use. With ships dispatched on 21/28 day Sailing Orders, the crew are on their own, and set out to make themselves relevant to the task. If there is a possibility to have a multi-detention of illegal vessels then they go for it even though it is going to be of some inconvenience for boarding teams. WHO DARES WINS. Sit on your bum and you get fat!!


      • With regard to Naval Air Ops, sometimes even those doing it daily for years get it terribly wrong.

        The instructions given ship handlers were inadequate and even hazardous, said a former Navy official with direct knowledge of the investigation, who spoke on condition of not being named. The body of evidence points to the repeated warnings from pilots about low-freeboard flight decks, he noted.

        "We have been flying helos in all conditions and in all speeds and areas of the world, and this is first time there was a fatal accident, and the CO of the ship is supposed to know, somehow, that maybe NATOPS is wrong?" the official said. "If a unit does what big Navy tells them to do, to the letter, and bad things happen, then someone beside the unit following lawful and legal orders and procedures needs to step up."

        The safety investigation report found a systemic failure, concluding that aviators were allowed to fly with conditions that many had warned against and urged to be changed.

        "HAZREPs and [safety investigation reports] dating as far back as 1985 recognize and document conditions that cause deck wetness, damage to FD nets and ocean waves/swells impacting aircraft on the FDs of low-freeboard DDGs and FFGs," the mishap board ruled.

        Between 1983 and the Lawrence incident, at least 13 HAZREPs were reported to the brass about waves damaging helos and flight deck nets aboard destroyers and frigates
        If the USN can't get it right...
        The aircrew was working to stow the Seahawk in the hangar, but the South China Sea wasn't cooperating.

        Nine-foot-high waves were sending the destroyer Lassen rocking from side to side, 13 degrees to starboard, then 13 degrees to port, making the task of straightening the MH-60R to pull it into the hangar that much more dangerous. The destroyer settled on a new course that reduced the rolls to 6 degrees, within the guidance for straightening operations, which includes using chains and flight systems to get the shutdown helo in line for the hangar.

        But as the crew worked, the rolls picked up. The landing safety officer ordered the helo immediately chained down. No sooner had it been secured than a wave broke over the flight deck, damaging the safety nets and the helo's tail rotor.
        Makes for shocking reading.


        • US Navy experimental MALE UAV


          • See: Future Common Helicopter Fleet AC/CG/NS/Ambulance/Garda

            Over on: Defence Forces > Air Corps > Future Common Helicopter Fleet AC/CG/NS/Ambulance/Garda


            • no.

              Just no.