Tweet
It's all good if this is online we would have a method of detecting, however the advisory would also know that we don't have an asw deterrent
-
"Why am I using a new putter? Because the last one didn't float too well." -Craig Stadler
-
I very much doubt if anything was detected (say even when the Nordstream incident happened) that an ASW weapon would be fired.Originally posted by gaff85 View Post
it is a deterrent yes but unlikely to be allowed for the West to escalate
the first point of call would probably be to call out the country identified as being guiltyComment
-
For now, everything hangs on implementation of the CoDF report.Comment
-
And also in the IT
:quality(70)/cloudfront-eu-central-1.images.arcpublishing.com/irishtimes/FK2JPRQCMAIBORD6IZAHUPILBM.jpg)
So how soon will we have RBB and Pop up Paul screaming their heads off?Comment
-
-
NATO stands up undersea infrastructure coordination cell
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/n...ectedLocale=en
Comment
-
Handbook on maritime hybrid threats: 15 scenarios and legal scans
from Hybrid COE (which we are a member of)
Comment
-
-
Photo from Twitter. Some Navy folk out in Greece.
For now, everything hangs on implementation of the CoDF report.Comment
-
Are the days of the opv with current kit numbered? Need we look at something more advanced so as we can protect/detect above and below"Why am I using a new putter? Because the last one didn't float too well." -Craig StadlerComment
-
Those NS personnel it is reported brought a NS REMUS 100 with them.
Not aware of any issues that would prevent the use of a UUVs (or ROV) from especially the P60s (with room for 3 x TEU), not sure about P50s (with room for 2 x TEU).
They are probably too small to operate USVs (which are capable of deploying TAS or UUVs). But would they necessarily have to be deployed from offshore?
Personally, I hold a believe there is thinks we could buy and deploy within the existing NS fleet. Is it ideally? no. Are they perfect solutions? No.
of course that is just to monitor…. Being able to take let’s say enforcement action in the subsurface domain would definitely require new ships and aircraft.Comment
-
P50 only has spots for 1 TEU at present.
The trend with OPV is towards "mission bays" which can accommodate a range ot TEU, Rhibs, USV etc.
The P50 provided no new capability from the P20s apart from heavier main gun and improved crew accom.
The P60 is a better platform with great scope to upgrade sensor and equipment fit.For now, everything hangs on implementation of the CoDF report.Comment
-
-
Originally posted by na grohmiti View PostPhoto from Twitter. Some Navy folk out in Greece.
with REMUS 100Comment
-
Irregular Warfare: March 19, 2023 by Walker D. Mills
The September 2022 attacks on the Nordstream 1 and 2 pipelines convinced many in Europe that malign actors have the capability and intent to attack critical undersea infrastructure. While the attacks targeted gas pipelines, equally vulnerable is the vast system of fiber-optic and data cables that underpin the global exchange of information, including transatlantic financial transactions.
The Nordstream attacks occurred on a section of the pipeline located just outside Swedish and Danish territorial waters. Attackers damaged the pipelines in a series of explosions that left gas bubbling up from the bottom of the Baltic Sea for days—an act of energy and environmental sabotage. Multiple investigations into the attacks are ongoing. Moscow was identified as the key suspect in the immediate aftermath, but new reporting has revealed that some Western intelligence officials believe that a pro-Ukrainian group may be responsible. Both Russian and Ukrainian governments have denied any responsibility or prior knowledge of the attacks. But at the same time, Moscow has shown no shame in continuing its campaign of terror against Ukrainian critical infrastructure and has also been fingered in a string of security incidents around critical infrastructure in Europe, including German trains, Norwegian oil platforms, a Polish port, and Dutch offshore wind farms.
As the war in Ukraine stretches into a second year, Europe has awoken to the reality that maritime infrastructure is vulnerable and that NATO states need to prioritize the security of the critical infrastructure on which their economies depend. In a recent commentary, Alessio Patalano of King’s College London described undersea infrastructure as the “lifelines of modern prosperity” and a critical arena where adversaries can challenge European security. Because much of the critical maritime infrastructure in Europe is inherently multinational, and the key capabilities are expensive, the alliance has a natural role to play in organizing the defense of maritime infrastructure and helping governments pool their resources.
Underwater but Indispensable
European undersea infrastructure crisscrosses the North Sea, the Baltic, the English Channel, and the Mediterranean, underpinning vast swaths of the European economy. Pipelines that carry gas from Norway to the United Kingdom and continental Europe, or from North Africa to Europe, are just as important as the Nordstream pipelines—more so now that European imports of Russian gas have fallen precipitously. Liquified natural gas terminals in Europe are also now more important than ever as the continent tries to diversify its energy suppliers. Offshore electricity generation by wind farms or tidal generation systems may also be vulnerable.
In addition to gas pipelines, European consumers receive electricity via subsea cables. Last year a new cable capable of carrying up to 1,400 megawatts of electricity from Norway to the United Kingdom began operation. Another cable is planned to link wind farms in Morocco with British consumers. In the Mediterranean, Egypt recently announced a plan to deliver as much as 3,000 megawatts of electricity to Greece via a subsea cable.
And submarine cables don’t just carry electricity; they also carry data. As much as 99 percent of all global data traffic—from video calls to online purchases and music streaming—flows through cables that travel along the bottom of the sea. These submarine cables carry $10 trillion of financial transactions daily, underpinning the global economy. They also carry sensitive diplomatic and military communications, including the bandwidth the US military uses for drone operations. The world’s reliance on submarine cables will only increase in the coming years. The proliferation of 5G networks might double the bandwidth demand on submarine cables every two years for the foreseeable future.
Neglected Vulnerabilities
Even if Moscow is not responsible for the Nordstream attacks, Russia has a history of sabotaging undersea infrastructure. In 1959, during the Cold War, a Soviet trawler damaged subsea cables off the coast of Newfoundland. In 2014, when Russia invaded Crimea, one of its first moves was to cut communications cables with the mainland, though they were above ground. Russian forces have maintained a steady stream of attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure since their 2022 invasion. Russia was suspected of being at fault when the cables linking Norway to the island of Svalbard were mysteriously severed in 2021. Then, in early 2022, Russian Navy exercises over cables that connect Ireland and the United Kingdom were interpreted as an implicit threat of action against the cables. In October, Norway reported unidentified drones flying near its oil platforms offshore, and officials worried Russian agents were responsible. In January, Polish police discovered a trio of divers suspected of carrying out underwater reconnaissance near the port of Gdansk who claimed they were diving for amber—in the middle of the night. In February, Dutch military intelligence publicly accused a Russian ship of attempting to map out energy infrastructure in the North Sea, specifically offshore wind farms. The Russian Navy is also one of only a few navies that operate vessels capable of severing or otherwise damaging submarine cables at depth, though it is relatively straightforward to damage pipelines or cables with divers, mines, or remote vehicles as they pass through shallow water. It should not come as a surprise if Russia continues to target undersea infrastructure for intelligence gathering or sabotage.
[Article Continues..]Last edited by The Usual Suspect; 23 March 2023, 12:59.Comment
Comment