OP.Banner 1969-2006 MOD Paper.

[timhorgan]

Below is an interesting review of NI Ops. from the British perspective as found on Wikileaks. I cannot see it elsewhere on IMO but I could be wrong.



http://file.wikileaks.org/file/uk-op...anner-2006.pdf




TH

[pmtts]

Below is an interesting review of NI Ops. from the British perspective as found on Wikileaks. I cannot see it elsewhere on IMO but I could be wrong.



http://file.wikileaks.org/file/uk-op...anner-2006.pdf




TH

I don't know why it's on wikileaks, most of the information in the pdf has been in the public domain for quite sometime. You will no doubt find more of it on the MOD's freedom of information section of their website.

The image on the first page looks like the battle of Leeson Street, 1971

[rod and serpent]

I don't know why it's on wikileaks, most of the information in the pdf has been in the public domain for quite sometime. You will no doubt find more of it on the MOD's freedom of information section of their website.

The image on the first page looks like the battle of Leeson Street, 1971

I`ve seen it before its part of British Army Review publication.

[Flamingo]

The image on the first page looks like the battle of Leeson Street, 1971

I know some of the clubs can be a bit hairy at kicking out time, but I never remember it being that bad?


















Is that my taxi?

[Flamingo]

Seriously, it's interesting to compare the numbers with the numbers deployed in Afgan today. I know that some of the kit available today will compensate for numbers on the ground, but it still is a huge discrepancy -

There were only three battalions of
infantry in Northern Ireland in late 1969, but at the peak of the campaign in the
summer of 1972 28,000 soldiers were deployed. Well over 250,000 members of the
Regular Army served there during the campaign, as well as many tens of thousands
in the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) and its successor, the Royal Irish Regiment
Home Service Force (HSF).2 ... It was fairly common for over 10,000 soldiers to be
deployed on the streets.

Compare this with (Daily Telegraph, 20/11/09)

n a detailed Commons statement, Mr Brown confirmed that all the conditions had been met to allow an extra 500 troops to be deployed in December - taking the force level to 9,500.

But he also disclosed that when special forces were included, the "total military effort" in Afghanistan will be in excess of 10,000 troops.

To some extent, it shows how seriously the British Govt took the NI situation.

[Kieran Marum]

The entry on the Irish Defence Forces is a little below the belt



on page 3-7


316. The Irish Army was, by British standards, very small and not well equipped. For
much of the campaign it had at most two infantry battalions in the North/Border area,
and these were not deployed full-time on operations. In fact such operations were
quite rare, and the Irish Army always operated in support of the Garda. Cooperation
with the British Army was developed slowly and indirectly by measures such as
inviting the attendance of students at the British Army Staff College or at the School
of Infantry. However, joint Irish-British military operations along the Border, which
might have done much to deny PIRA its safe havens in the Republic, were never
conducted.

[CS Gass]

The entry on the Irish Defence Forces is a little below the belt



on page 3-7


316. The Irish Army was, by British standards, very small and not well equipped. For
much of the campaign it had at most two infantry battalions in the North/Border area,
and these were not deployed full-time on operations. In fact such operations were
quite rare, and the Irish Army always operated in support of the Garda. Cooperation
with the British Army was developed slowly and indirectly by measures such as
inviting the attendance of students at the British Army Staff College or at the School
of Infantry. However, joint Irish-British military operations along the Border, which
might have done much to deny PIRA its safe havens in the Republic, were never
conducted.

They're viewing our actions through the lens of their own participation in the troubles, its not right but its fairly normal, I doubt there was any hostility or anger towards the Irish on the part of the authors

[GoneToTheCanner]

Hi there,
The DF and the British have co-operated on training for decades, especially given all of the equipment bought by us from the UK over the years. The biggest restraint on the DF being pro-active against the IRA was the Irish Government.
regards
GttC

[Goldie fish]

It is a fair representation of the reality at the time.

It is only in the last 10 years that there has been official co-ordination of policing efforts on the border. When you have a situation where incursions by British Army engaged in patrolling the unmarked border were met with arrest and court appearances by Authorities in the south, you can see the level of frustration that may have ensued. It took quite a while for the Irish Government to realise the enemy was not the British Army, but the PIRA etc.

[paul g]

Its a fair assessment of the DF

but the one thing that the british never really got was that the irish government was intrested in defending the position of the irish state, and ensuring that the troubles never spread south.

As a result cross border operations were politically unacceptable, as they might have led to direct attacks in the South.

And face facts there was no place easier for the PIRA to operate than South Armagh and parts of Fermanagh/South Tyrone, a lot of emphasis was placed on the fact that the border was porous at the time by the british, but largely as an excuse.

[timhorgan]

I know some of the clubs can be a bit hairy at kicking out time, but I never remember it being that bad?

The painting is by Terence Cuneo and is called "The Tragedy of Ulster". Cuneo was famous for his military and railway paintings and there is a statue of him at Waterloo Station.

Paul G,
An interesting aspect of the painting is that the soldier kneeling on the corner is making the classic mistake of "flagging" - his rifle is protruding which is a very elementary mistake in a potentially sniper-rich environment.


















Is that my taxi?

[Flamingo]

Rather than opening a new thread, here is an interesting analysis of the Warrenpoint attack and it's implications:

http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/m...eland-conflict

It's conclusions are:

Key points summary:

- PIRA's transition to an insurgency was born of paramilitary 'necessity'; Op MOTORMAN denied it urban safe havens and freedom of movement (July 1972);
- PIRA decentralised command via localised Active Service Units (ASUs);
- South Armagh Brigade's long standing 'ruralised' ORBAT was a model for localised, cell-based insurgent ops
- PIRA learned from its failures so it was able to execute the Warrenpoint ambush
- COIN necessitated localised and cross-border security co-operation
- The devolution of policing post ambush continued under the ongoing narrative of Northern Ireland "police primacy" ('Ulsterisation');
- British security preconditions affected true N.I police autonomy
- Post Warrenpoint, co-operation between the UK and the Republic of Ireland led to a role for the Eire government in Northern Ireland within the Anglo-Irish agreement.
- The conflict was a political problem; it required a political solution.

[spider]

Tim Horgan.

Was that really ten years ago

[Flamingo]

Tim Horgan.

Was that really ten years ago

Time flies when you’re having fun
I have to admit, I just did a search for Banner, I didn’t look at the date.

[na grohmiti]

Tim Horgan.

Was that really ten years ago

I wonder is he dead yet?