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  • OP.Banner 1969-2006 MOD Paper.

    Below is an interesting review of NI Ops. from the British perspective as found on Wikileaks. I cannot see it elsewhere on IMO but I could be wrong.



    http://file.wikileaks.org/file/uk-op...anner-2006.pdf




    TH
    Last edited by timhorgan; 23 May 2010, 10:09.

  • #2
    Originally posted by timhorgan View Post
    Below is an interesting review of NI Ops. from the British perspective as found on Wikileaks. I cannot see it elsewhere on IMO but I could be wrong.



    http://file.wikileaks.org/file/uk-op...anner-2006.pdf




    TH
    I don't know why it's on wikileaks, most of the information in the pdf has been in the public domain for quite sometime. You will no doubt find more of it on the MOD's freedom of information section of their website.

    The image on the first page looks like the battle of Leeson Street, 1971

    Comment


    • #3
      Originally posted by pmtts View Post
      I don't know why it's on wikileaks, most of the information in the pdf has been in the public domain for quite sometime. You will no doubt find more of it on the MOD's freedom of information section of their website.

      The image on the first page looks like the battle of Leeson Street, 1971

      I`ve seen it before its part of British Army Review publication.

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by pmtts View Post
        The image on the first page looks like the battle of Leeson Street, 1971
        I know some of the clubs can be a bit hairy at kicking out time, but I never remember it being that bad?


















        Is that my taxi?
        'He died who loved to live,' they'll say,
        'Unselfishly so we might have today!'
        Like hell! He fought because he had to fight;
        He died that's all. It was his unlucky night.
        http://www.salamanderoasis.org/poems...nnis/luck.html

        Comment


        • #5
          Seriously, it's interesting to compare the numbers with the numbers deployed in Afgan today. I know that some of the kit available today will compensate for numbers on the ground, but it still is a huge discrepancy -
          There were only three battalions of
          infantry in Northern Ireland in late 1969, but at the peak of the campaign in the
          summer of 1972 28,000 soldiers were deployed. Well over 250,000 members of the
          Regular Army served there during the campaign, as well as many tens of thousands
          in the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) and its successor, the Royal Irish Regiment
          Home Service Force (HSF).2 ... It was fairly common for over 10,000 soldiers to be
          deployed on the streets.
          Compare this with (Daily Telegraph, 20/11/09)
          n a detailed Commons statement, Mr Brown confirmed that all the conditions had been met to allow an extra 500 troops to be deployed in December - taking the force level to 9,500.

          But he also disclosed that when special forces were included, the "total military effort" in Afghanistan will be in excess of 10,000 troops.
          To some extent, it shows how seriously the British Govt took the NI situation.
          'He died who loved to live,' they'll say,
          'Unselfishly so we might have today!'
          Like hell! He fought because he had to fight;
          He died that's all. It was his unlucky night.
          http://www.salamanderoasis.org/poems...nnis/luck.html

          Comment


          • #6
            The entry on the Irish Defence Forces is a little below the belt



            on page 3-7


            316. The Irish Army was, by British standards, very small and not well equipped. For
            much of the campaign it had at most two infantry battalions in the North/Border area,
            and these were not deployed full-time on operations. In fact such operations were
            quite rare, and the Irish Army always operated in support of the Garda. Cooperation
            with the British Army was developed slowly and indirectly by measures such as
            inviting the attendance of students at the British Army Staff College or at the School
            of Infantry. However, joint Irish-British military operations along the Border, which
            might have done much to deny PIRA its safe havens in the Republic, were never
            conducted.

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by Kieran Marum View Post
              The entry on the Irish Defence Forces is a little below the belt



              on page 3-7


              316. The Irish Army was, by British standards, very small and not well equipped. For
              much of the campaign it had at most two infantry battalions in the North/Border area,
              and these were not deployed full-time on operations. In fact such operations were
              quite rare, and the Irish Army always operated in support of the Garda. Cooperation
              with the British Army was developed slowly and indirectly by measures such as
              inviting the attendance of students at the British Army Staff College or at the School
              of Infantry. However, joint Irish-British military operations along the Border, which
              might have done much to deny PIRA its safe havens in the Republic, were never
              conducted.
              They're viewing our actions through the lens of their own participation in the troubles, its not right but its fairly normal, I doubt there was any hostility or anger towards the Irish on the part of the authors

              Comment


              • #8
                Hi there,
                The DF and the British have co-operated on training for decades, especially given all of the equipment bought by us from the UK over the years. The biggest restraint on the DF being pro-active against the IRA was the Irish Government.
                regards
                GttC

                Comment


                • #9
                  It is a fair representation of the reality at the time.

                  It is only in the last 10 years that there has been official co-ordination of policing efforts on the border. When you have a situation where incursions by British Army engaged in patrolling the unmarked border were met with arrest and court appearances by Authorities in the south, you can see the level of frustration that may have ensued. It took quite a while for the Irish Government to realise the enemy was not the British Army, but the PIRA etc.


                  Catch-22 says they have a right to do anything we can't stop them from doing.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Its a fair assessment of the DF

                    but the one thing that the british never really got was that the irish government was intrested in defending the position of the irish state, and ensuring that the troubles never spread south.

                    As a result cross border operations were politically unacceptable, as they might have led to direct attacks in the South.

                    And face facts there was no place easier for the PIRA to operate than South Armagh and parts of Fermanagh/South Tyrone, a lot of emphasis was placed on the fact that the border was porous at the time by the british, but largely as an excuse.
                    Last edited by paul g; 24 May 2010, 17:46.

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by Flamingo View Post
                      I know some of the clubs can be a bit hairy at kicking out time, but I never remember it being that bad?
                      The painting is by Terence Cuneo and is called "The Tragedy of Ulster". Cuneo was famous for his military and railway paintings and there is a statue of him at Waterloo Station.

                      Paul G,
                      An interesting aspect of the painting is that the soldier kneeling on the corner is making the classic mistake of "flagging" - his rifle is protruding which is a very elementary mistake in a potentially sniper-rich environment.


















                      Is that my taxi?
                      Last edited by Vickers; 25 May 2010, 09:52. Reason: To fix quote

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Rather than opening a new thread, here is an interesting analysis of the Warrenpoint attack and it's implications:

                        http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/m...eland-conflict

                        It's conclusions are:

                        Key points summary:

                        - PIRA's transition to an insurgency was born of paramilitary 'necessity'; Op MOTORMAN denied it urban safe havens and freedom of movement (July 1972);
                        - PIRA decentralised command via localised Active Service Units (ASUs);
                        - South Armagh Brigade's long standing 'ruralised' ORBAT was a model for localised, cell-based insurgent ops
                        - PIRA learned from its failures so it was able to execute the Warrenpoint ambush
                        - COIN necessitated localised and cross-border security co-operation
                        - The devolution of policing post ambush continued under the ongoing narrative of Northern Ireland "police primacy" ('Ulsterisation');
                        - British security preconditions affected true N.I police autonomy
                        - Post Warrenpoint, co-operation between the UK and the Republic of Ireland led to a role for the Eire government in Northern Ireland within the Anglo-Irish agreement.
                        - The conflict was a political problem; it required a political solution.
                        'He died who loved to live,' they'll say,
                        'Unselfishly so we might have today!'
                        Like hell! He fought because he had to fight;
                        He died that's all. It was his unlucky night.
                        http://www.salamanderoasis.org/poems...nnis/luck.html

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Tim Horgan.

                          Was that really ten years ago
                          'History is a vast early warning system'. Norman Cousins

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by spider View Post
                            Tim Horgan.

                            Was that really ten years ago
                            Time flies when you’re having fun
                            I have to admit, I just did a search for Banner, I didn’t look at the date.
                            'He died who loved to live,' they'll say,
                            'Unselfishly so we might have today!'
                            Like hell! He fought because he had to fight;
                            He died that's all. It was his unlucky night.
                            http://www.salamanderoasis.org/poems...nnis/luck.html

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by spider View Post
                              Tim Horgan.

                              Was that really ten years ago
                              I wonder is he dead yet?

                              Comment

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