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Considering that incident was concluded successfully through a combination of Coastguard coordination, RNLI response and a Waterford harbour tug, all within 4 hours, when the nearest naval asset was 10 hours away, I'm intrigues to know what alternative you propose, other than one of exorbitant cost.
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Originally posted by Egbeygia View PostConsidering that incident was concluded successfully through a combination of Coastguard coordination, RNLI response and a Waterford harbour tug, all within 4 hours, when the nearest naval asset was 10 hours away, I'm intrigues to know what alternative you propose, other than one of exorbitant cost.
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Originally posted by Egbeygia View PostConsidering that incident was concluded successfully through a combination of Coastguard coordination, RNLI response and a Waterford harbour tug, all within 4 hours, when the nearest naval asset was 10 hours away, I'm intrigues to know what alternative you propose, other than one of exorbitant cost.It was the year of fire...the year of destruction...the year we took back what was ours.
It was the year of rebirth...the year of great sadness...the year of pain...and the year of joy.
It was a new age...It was the end of history.
It was the year everything changed.
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Originally posted by CTU View PostMaybe you should look up the story of the Penlee Lifeboat Disaster to see what could happen if the situation was in less then ideal weather conditions.For now, everything hangs on implementation of the CoDF report.
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Originally posted by CTU View PostMaybe you should look up the story of the Penlee Lifeboat Disaster to see what could happen if the situation was in less then ideal weather conditions.
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Originally posted by ancientmariner View PostThe rescue was provided by the direct intervention of 3 RNLI ocean lifeboats that used their combined pulling power to hold the 4000 tonner until the tug could connect a tow. Rescues at sea of this nature require the vessel in trouble, or potential trouble, to contact national agencies , over stipulated channels, and ask for the required assistance. In a case where channels are NOT used, and other means of communications come into play, then the State should be operating a VTS system, with a tracking capability, to monitor the passage of vessels around our coasts. If vessels deviate from prescribed routes in the English Channel, they can be called by name or even overflown by French or British aircraft. Our Coast Guard should have a Surface picture.
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Originally posted by na grohmiti View Post39th anniversary only around the corner. Blink of an eye. Still ashamed I ever worked for UT, knowing their policies after the disaster.Last edited by ancientmariner; 9 November 2020, 10:23.
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Originally posted by ancientmariner View PostBrand new ship with an unfamiliar " run " crew sailing into a major storm , is an undertaken that needs some thought. The consequences were severe with the loss of two vessels and all crews. I know the enquiry mentioned contaminated fuel but high on the list, to be considered, is displacement of lube oil levels in a gearbox, in a heavy roll, that can cause a loss of lube oil indication, and an automatic shut down blowing compressed air through fuel lines. It would take a day of stripping and bleeding oil to get such an incidence rectified and the engine restarted. In the SAR task there is a point when an extreme amount of courage and luck will be needed for a positive outcome. Occasionally it can be one chance to none as in this case. RIP. From experience we added slightly higher levels of gear box oil , after discussion with the box manufacturers, to mitigate engine shut downs, rolls of more than 23% degrees used to prompt alarms in monitoring systems.
Having sailed on a sister ship less than 10 years later (a ship which had also lost its entire bridge due to being beam on to a large wave) it would not take much to put the engine out of action. The sound of the engine alarm going off during a rough passage still lives with my memories. UT (a Flag of Convenience company, based in Kent) had a woeful safety record, in the 4 months I was aboard they lost 6 crew due to accidents aboard ship. My own maritime career was cut short due to burns received while cargo handling. Thankfully they are no more.For now, everything hangs on implementation of the CoDF report.
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Originally posted by ancientmariner View PostThis week from Nautical journals "Future Mine hunting system comes to CLYDE". It is a GRP style half decker which is equipped with side scan sonar and other tracking sensors to allow it map an area and detect the presence of UW ordnance or hazards. Although developmental with ATLAS Electronik on board it has reached Initial Operating Cabability ( IOC ) at HMNB CLYDE. It operates Crew on Board, Crew Ashore, or Autonomously. The boat is named RNMB HARRIER-Google for more information. The benefits might be many more units deployable for harbour, estuarine, river, or canal areas. Ships with ROV's and target destruction means may be still relevant for routes at sea.
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Originally posted by ancientmariner View PostAn attempt to future proof Defence and Security systems is discussed and outlined in General Nick Carter's paper on "The Integrated Operating Concept " and is worth a read. In future, and current, Naval developments we need to minimise illegal Cyper attacks on the ships overall operating system. Most modern ships now have an Integrated Bridge System, Integrated navigation system, and Integrated Combat System. These systems talk to each other and receive information over the ether by " widecast" routes. The systems so updated and informed is vulnerable to deliberate contamination of the overall system by strategic attacks on Satellite, electronic, and internet routes. Currently WINDOWS systems are deemed vulnerable. A review group has proposed that information needs to be protected by codes and dedicated passwords. All up and downloads to ships should be similar in routine to transactions on line to your bank. Carter feels the leaders in attacks within all ether space is the PLA. In the current climate of on-going under the counter global warefare we need to take guidance from allies and follow best practice now and in the future.
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Originally posted by ancientmariner View PostIn the second line above please delete Cyper and substitute CYBER. The overall problem is the constant change in the pipeline and the growing number of actors and providers. There is estimated to be 25 or so different systems outfits available to ships. An analysis of our security is apt at this time.
When the Sincgars was introduced, we knew from the outset that the only ones who could listen in were, those on the same net, or the US military, who had permitted us to use certain features of their equipment.
From a cyber point of view, as always, once you isolate software from external networks, you maintain some level of security. However software updates and upgrades necessitate connecting to the mother ship, electronically. This leaves all other connected systems also open to eavesdropping.
And then to top it off, you have crew members using social media, which 30 years ago was the dream of intel gatherers. Storis of US servicemen using Garmin watches to map their runs, within area 51, generating fantasting up to date maps for those who wanted them.
During the Falklands Conflict almost 40 years ago, the RN headed south more or less in Radio Silence. Comms to Whitehall came via telex. Ship to ship signalling was done by VS only. And this was before the days of electronic snooping. The only way you could intercept a VS message was if you were standing between sender and receiver.For now, everything hangs on implementation of the CoDF report.
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The think about Cyber is it doesn’t have to be a sophisticated NSA, Cyber Force, etc etc State actor that causes the compromise. It could be a white hat (someone who does no harm but penetrates the system just so that they can do it (to them self or others) or a black hat (intend on harm). It could be a group of hackers, a lone wolf or a disgruntled employee (either in the software provider or your own company/force).
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Originally posted by DeV View PostThe think about Cyber is it doesn’t have to be a sophisticated NSA, Cyber Force, etc etc State actor that causes the compromise. It could be a white hat (someone who does no harm but penetrates the system just so that they can do it (to them self or others) or a black hat (intend on harm). It could be a group of hackers, a lone wolf or a disgruntled employee (either in the software provider or your own company/force).
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