manning levels, the future.

[ancientmariner]

The Norwegian (relatively inexperienced) OOW was also supervising 2 trainees as well

The OOW or one of the bridge trainees was a USN exchange officer and the AIS was passive.

[na grohmiti]

The helmsman, a conscript, was the only one to see the approach, but assumed the OOW was aware, and it wasn't his place to question the officer.

[hptmurphy]

A more experienced OOW would have seen the object misidentified as a refinery jetty, maintaining a constant bearing, something stationary objects only do if you are heading towards them, not passing them.

Conjecture... a more experience OOW isn't infallible and can also makes mistakes

The helmsman, a conscript, was the only one to see the approach, but assumed the OOW was aware, and it wasn't his place to question the officer.

He qualified as a helms man regardless of conscript status and as a watch keeper on the bridge he has a responsibility to report anything he sees, its then up to the officer to make a decision.

Whatever happens make a decision..... right one... all goes smoothly, Wrong one we'll learn from it and won't do it again, don't make one at all and the possibilities are endless.

I've seen the helmsman 'advise' the OOW, no OOW worth his salt would not at least investigate what the helms man offers.

Its all the helms mans fault... he could have had a voice but chose not to.

[na grohmiti]

The AIBN’s investigation reported that the situation in the Hjeltefjord was made possible by a number of operational, technical, organisational and systemic factors:

As a consequence of the clearance process, the career ladder for fleet officers in the Navy and the shortage of qualified navigators to man the frigates, officers of the watch had been granted clearance sooner, had a lower level of experience and had less time as officer of the watch than used to be the case. This had also resulted in inexperienced officers of the watch being assigned responsibility for training. Furthermore, several aspects of the bridge service were not adequately described or standardised. The night of the accident, it turned out, among other things, that the bridge team on HNoMS Helge Ingstad did not manage to utilise the team’s human and technical resources to detect, while there was still time, that what they thought was a stationary object giving off the strong lights, in fact was a vessel on collision course. Organisation, leadership and teamwork on the bridge were not expedient during the period leading up to the collision. In combination with the officer of the watch’s limited experience, the training being conducted for two watchstanding functions on the bridge reduced the bridge team’s capacity to address the overall traffic situation. Based on a firmly lodged situational awareness that the ‘object’ was stationary and that the passage was under control, little use was made of the radar and AIS to monitor the fairway.
[When Sola TS set out on its northbound passage with the forward-pointing deck lights turned on, it was difficult for the frigate’s bridge team to see the tanker’s navigation lights and the flashing of the Aldis lamp, and thereby identify the ‘object’ as a vessel. The shipping company Tsakos Columbia Shipmanagement SA had not established compensatory safety measures with regards to the reduction of the visibility of the navigation lights due to deck lighting. Furthermore, radar plotting and communication on the bridge did not sufficiently ensure the effect of active teamwork to build a common situational awareness. This could have increased the time window for identification and warning of the frigate.The Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) had not established human, technical and organisational barriers to ensure adequate traffic monitoring. The functionality of the monitoring system with regards to automatic plotting, warning and alarm functions, was not sufficiently adapted to the execution of the vessel traffic service. Lack of monitoring meant that the VTS operator’s situational awareness and overview of the VTS area were inadequate. Hence, Fedje VTS did not provide the vessels involved with relevant and timely information and did not organise the traffic to ensure the tanker’s safe departure from the Sture Terminal.On the southbound voyage, HNoMS Helge Ingstad sailed with AIS in passive mode. This meant that the frigate could not be immediately identified on the screens at Fedje VTS or Sola TS. None of the parties involved made sufficient use of available technical aids. It was a challenge for maritime safety that the Navy could operate without AIS transmission and without compensatory safety measures within a traffic system where the other players largely used AIS as their primary (and to some extent only) source of information.

Could easily see it happening here. I often see visiting naval vessels arrive on AIS, completely invisible, except for the attached tugs.
Watch keeping experience too is a concern. Those commanding our flotilla today were cadets 10 to 15 years ago, and have spent half of the years in between holding shore appointments.

[ancientmariner]

Could easily see it happening here. I often see visiting naval vessels arrive on AIS, completely invisible, except for the attached tugs.
Watch keeping experience too is a concern. Those commanding our flotilla today were cadets 10 to 15 years ago, and have spent half of the years in between holding shore appointments.

Overall I would not be too gloomy of a Navy that have honed skills of tracking and acquisition in eyeball Fishery protection. We are heavy into fixing target positions. Young men, when I was there, have later found their way to circumnavigate South America and do a round trip out to Far East. As regards TS Sola forward Deck arc lamps would create a blinding or blanking effect on her navigation lights. VTS should have had both vessels under controlled passage and the frigate should have known the tanker was underweigh. The whole story for safe navigation is situational awareness and complete surface picture.

[hptmurphy]

Those commanding our flotilla today were cadets 10 to 15 years ago, and have spent half of the years in between holding shore appointments.

But if you look at the training and the availability of various aids they are closer to astronauts than there forebears...and we had our fair share of space cadets as well!

[ancientmariner]

But if you look at the training and the availability of various aids they are closer to astronauts than there forebears...and we had our fair share of space cadets as well!

you have put your finger on the modern cause of loss of situational awareness. Too many screens to be tended, on consoles that are too high, and eyes looking inwards and not scanning the sea enough in close traffic.

[na grohmiti]

I'm sure sir, you remember a time when screens on the bridge were behind a dark curtain, so as not to interfere with night vision. Nowadays, the opposite is the case, those on the bridge are peering over the blue lit screens to the dark outside, and few seem to be keen to use the screens in night mode.
When I had cause to drive for work by night, we had an unwritten rule that no passenger would use the screen on the phone while the vehicle is in motion. The effect is akin to shining a torch in the drivers field of view it reflects on all internal glass and can obscure lights beyond.
Car satnavs.come with a night mode for the same reason.
Put lookouts in front of the screens, keep screens behind curtains, available to operate when required.

[Ex-Boeing Driver]

As a Retired Ex-BA Short Haul Pilot we constantly dealt with changing light conditions both within and without the flight deck.It takes the Mark 1 Human Eyeball 45mins to adjust to Full Night Vision .....in a fully fit and healthy individual ......however this is not a precise science .....technology adds to the issue of " Lack of Situational Awareness"of the Operator ...be he or she a Pilot/Navigator/Astronaut/Driver etc etc ...due to its focusing the user to use his/her spare brain capacity in interpretating what info the system(s) is presenting to him/her.............ie .....simply ...What the F##K is going on here/now ? .....Too much info for the Human Brain ...something will give .......Management of how to cope in these modern Bridge/Flight Deck Environments to deal with the correct human interface with technology is i believe the key...........Very simply ...."What are we looking at ??" ...and "What do I do Correctly Now " ....

[ancientmariner]

I'm sure sir, you remember a time when screens on the bridge were behind a dark curtain, so as not to interfere with night vision. Nowadays, the opposite is the case, those on the bridge are peering over the blue lit screens to the dark outside, and few seem to be keen to use the screens in night mode.
When I had cause to drive for work by night, we had an unwritten rule that no passenger would use the screen on the phone while the vehicle is in motion. The effect is akin to shining a torch in the drivers field of view it reflects on all internal glass and can obscure lights beyond.
Car satnavs.come with a night mode for the same reason.
Put lookouts in front of the screens, keep screens behind curtains, available to operate when required.

Better we keep curtains off the bridge as they can impede in their own way. The Australians have done a study on the use of ECDIS and its general effects on night mode and night vision. Even mariners trained in the use of ECDIS Screens revert to using Day mode, albeit turned down luminence, at night or dusk. Reasons for doing so is to retain the familiar yellow/blue of the paper navigation chart or that the ambient light on the bridge is too bright for night mode. The practice is believed dangerous as a range of symbols on the screen fade into the background as you darken the Day screen at night.
Perhaps like my 191 car there should be a sensor, when selected, that will select the correct screen for a given ambient luminence. Read the Australian report. Just Google it.

[Sluggie]

https://www.rte.ie/news/2019/1118/10...al-tax-credit/

[na grohmiti]

Is it backdated though?

[DeV]

Ok NS has had at least 2 classes of direct entry L/ERA’s and direct entry watchkeepers (I think there was engineering officers as well)

Now direct entry A/Cooks

https://www.military.ie/en/careers/c...-nov-19-1-.pdf

[Fantasia]

https://www.rte.ie/news/2019/1118/10...al-tax-credit/

That was released by RACO yesterday.

Glad to see some recognition for the NS for the role they perform

[na grohmiti]

Its merely granting a credit that already existed for other seafarers. It's being sold to the DF as a lotto win.

[hptmurphy]

Funny thing it was mooted here some time back, but some said it couldn't be done...where there's a will ,there's a way

see post #127.... October 2018.. only took the Department 12 months to catch up.

[Laners]

Ok NS has had at least 2 classes of direct entry L/ERA’s and direct entry watchkeepers (I think there was engineering officers as well)

Now direct entry A/Cooks

https://www.military.ie/en/careers/c...-nov-19-1-.pdf

Shortage of Chefs in civvie street as well , some changes made to visa requirements a while back to allow qualified Chefs from outside the EU to come to Ireland to work . So I doubt if this is going to work out .

[DeV]

Its merely granting a credit that already existed for other seafarers. It's being sold to the DF as a lotto win.

Ever little helps!

And it isn’t coming out of the Defence budget

[na grohmiti]

They should have been given the full seafarers. There are plenty on the NS at sea outside the 12 mile for 161 days or more.
€1270 per year or, €25 per week.

[DeV]

Seafarers Tax credit is € 6,350 annually
https://www.revenue.ie/en/personal-t...allowance.aspx

The Fishers Tax Credit is € 1,270 annually

https://www.revenue.ie/en/personal-t...ax-credit.aspx

[na grohmiti]

You'll be hard pressed to find any fishy man on PAYE. Most are sharefishermen.
It's an insult.

[TangoSierra]

https://www.kildarestreet.com/wrans/...&s=Naval#g77.q

KildareStreet.com
Written answers
Thursday, 7 November 2019

Department of Defence
Defence Forces Strength

Photo of Bernard DurkanBernard Durkan (Kildare North, Fine Gael)
Link to this: Individually | In context
36. To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence the extent to which the numbers in the Defence Forces have fluctuated in the past three years; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [45991/19]
Photo of Bernard DurkanBernard Durkan (Kildare North, Fine Gael)
Link to this: Individually | In context
37. To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence the degree to which membership of the Air Corps has fluctuated in the past three years to date; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [45992/19]
Photo of Bernard DurkanBernard Durkan (Kildare North, Fine Gael)
Link to this: Individually | In context
38. To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence the degree to which membership of the Naval Service has fluctuated in the past three years to date; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [45993/19]
Photo of Paul KehoePaul Kehoe (Wexford, Fine Gael)
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I propose to take Questions Nos. 36 to 38, inclusive, together.
The table below illustrates the extent to which the numbers in the Defence Forces have fluctuated in the past three years:
Year Army Air Corps Naval Service Total PDF Strength (WTE) Army Reserve Naval Reserve Total AR and NSR Strength (Effective)
2017 7,386 734 1,053 9,173 1,732 124 1,856
2018 7,243 725 989 8,957 1,666 133 1,799
2019* 6,983 720 951 8,654 1,548 148 1,696
*as at 30th September 2019, the latest date for which such data is available.
Recruitment and inductions will continue throughout 2019 to ensure the Defence Forces retain the capacity to operate effectively across all roles.

[batterysgt]

Continues to drop in all but one.

[DeV]

The only element of the DF that have gained any personnel is the NSR

[trellheim]

if anyone is interested some years back on this forum I plotted AR strength back to the 1960s off of oireachtas debates down the years