The advantage of the State/DoD building housing is that the site cost doesn’t apply, where as a housing association would have to buy land and build the housing
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Originally posted by TangoSierra View PostThe advantage of the State/DoD building housing is that the site cost doesn’t apply, where as a housing association would have to buy land and build the housing
After that it would likely be self-funding (as someone already noted above).
That's not to say it isn't an interesting idea, it may be more realistic for such an Approved Housing Body to be set up with the cogs turning and housing built, before the powers that be ever issue a tender..... (or identify a solution)
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Originally posted by TangoSierra View PostThe advantage of the State/DoD building housing is that the site cost doesn’t apply, where as a housing association would have to buy land and build the housing
The Navy itself may be about to suffer from a similar bout of finality to cure a shortage of manpower problem. There is no shame in a Department that would allow or condone any part of a Defence organisation to become the butt of media ridicule. If ships are to be deleted by retirement then hopefully they will taken out and disposed of by sinkex at a common spot where they can be honoured annually.
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Originally posted by DeV View PostWe can’t do it for homeless people
Originally posted by Flamingo View PostIt would be much easier to deal with serving troops than homeless. None of the issues around mental health / addiction / unemployment / low income associated with some homeless, rent taken at source, disciplinary action can be taken over damage to property by occupants, hygiene and cleanliness standards can be enforced..."Well, stone me! We've had cocaine, bribery and Arsenal scoring two goals at home. But just when you thought there were truly no surprises left in football, Vinnie Jones turns out to be an international player!" (Jimmy Greaves)!"
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Originally posted by ancientmariner View PostIn the 1948/1952 period when NATO was at it's productive best groups of about 10 tenants, all with grants approved, had blocks of 10 houses built, at about £1200 each and ground rent of about £10/£12 per year. It seemed easy peasy at the time with effort centered around Clontarf, Glasnevin, Killester for private housing. The Department of Defence owned huge tracts of land including the Southern and western side of Cork Harbour and many other areas including Barrack areas in Dublin. Many were squandered to expediency of unknown worth.
The Navy itself may be about to suffer from a similar bout of finality to cure a shortage of manpower problem. There is no shame in a Department that would allow or condone any part of a Defence organisation to become the butt of media ridicule. If ships are to be deleted by retirement then hopefully they will taken out and disposed of by sinkex at a common spot where they can be honoured annually.
The Americans are getting about E9m a year in rentals while we are being flushed down the pan by bad decisions of senior Civil Servants.
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The department sold the site for €25.4 m in 2003. Kennedy Wilson paid €80m for the site and 420 apartments. The Clancy sale was one of the few sites sold at a reasonable price. In 2016 a 0.66 acre site was sold across the road for €1.3M. The site in Clancy is 13.6 acres, at the 2016 price that would equate to €27m.
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Originally posted by Bravo20 View PostThe department sold the site for €25.4 m in 2003. Kennedy Wilson paid €80m for the site and 420 apartments. The Clancy sale was one of the few sites sold at a reasonable price. In 2016 a 0.66 acre site was sold across the road for €1.3M. The site in Clancy is 13.6 acres, at the 2016 price that would equate to €27m.
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An interesting aside with regards to crewing issues, and the loss of experienced staff.
The accident report into the collision last year between a Tanker and a frigate in the Norwegian fjords has identified the inexperience of the OOW as a contributing factor. A more experienced OOW would have seen the object misidentified as a refinery jetty, maintaining a constant bearing, something stationary objects only do if you are heading towards them, not passing them.For now, everything hangs on implementation of the CoDF report.
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Originally posted by na grohmiti View PostAn interesting aside with regards to crewing issues, and the loss of experienced staff.
The accident report into the collision last year between a Tanker and a frigate in the Norwegian fjords has identified the inexperience of the OOW as a contributing factor. A more experienced OOW would have seen the object misidentified as a refinery jetty, maintaining a constant bearing, something stationary objects only do if you are heading towards them, not passing them.
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A more experienced OOW would have seen the object misidentified as a refinery jetty, maintaining a constant bearing, something stationary objects only do if you are heading towards them, not passing them.
The helmsman, a conscript, was the only one to see the approach, but assumed the OOW was aware, and it wasn't his place to question the officer.
Whatever happens make a decision..... right one... all goes smoothly, Wrong one we'll learn from it and won't do it again, don't make one at all and the possibilities are endless.
I've seen the helmsman 'advise' the OOW, no OOW worth his salt would not at least investigate what the helms man offers.
Its all the helms mans fault... he could have had a voice but chose not to.Covid 19 is not over ....it's still very real..Hand Hygiene, Social Distancing and Masks.. keep safe
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The AIBN’s investigation reported that the situation in the Hjeltefjord was made possible by a number of operational, technical, organisational and systemic factors:
As a consequence of the clearance process, the career ladder for fleet officers in the Navy and the shortage of qualified navigators to man the frigates, officers of the watch had been granted clearance sooner, had a lower level of experience and had less time as officer of the watch than used to be the case. This had also resulted in inexperienced officers of the watch being assigned responsibility for training. Furthermore, several aspects of the bridge service were not adequately described or standardised. The night of the accident, it turned out, among other things, that the bridge team on HNoMS Helge Ingstad did not manage to utilise the team’s human and technical resources to detect, while there was still time, that what they thought was a stationary object giving off the strong lights, in fact was a vessel on collision course. Organisation, leadership and teamwork on the bridge were not expedient during the period leading up to the collision. In combination with the officer of the watch’s limited experience, the training being conducted for two watchstanding functions on the bridge reduced the bridge team’s capacity to address the overall traffic situation. Based on a firmly lodged situational awareness that the ‘object’ was stationary and that the passage was under control, little use was made of the radar and AIS to monitor the fairway.
[When Sola TS set out on its northbound passage with the forward-pointing deck lights turned on, it was difficult for the frigate’s bridge team to see the tanker’s navigation lights and the flashing of the Aldis lamp, and thereby identify the ‘object’ as a vessel. The shipping company Tsakos Columbia Shipmanagement SA had not established compensatory safety measures with regards to the reduction of the visibility of the navigation lights due to deck lighting. Furthermore, radar plotting and communication on the bridge did not sufficiently ensure the effect of active teamwork to build a common situational awareness. This could have increased the time window for identification and warning of the frigate.The Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) had not established human, technical and organisational barriers to ensure adequate traffic monitoring. The functionality of the monitoring system with regards to automatic plotting, warning and alarm functions, was not sufficiently adapted to the execution of the vessel traffic service. Lack of monitoring meant that the VTS operator’s situational awareness and overview of the VTS area were inadequate. Hence, Fedje VTS did not provide the vessels involved with relevant and timely information and did not organise the traffic to ensure the tanker’s safe departure from the Sture Terminal.On the southbound voyage, HNoMS Helge Ingstad sailed with AIS in passive mode. This meant that the frigate could not be immediately identified on the screens at Fedje VTS or Sola TS. None of the parties involved made sufficient use of available technical aids. It was a challenge for maritime safety that the Navy could operate without AIS transmission and without compensatory safety measures within a traffic system where the other players largely used AIS as their primary (and to some extent only) source of information.
Watch keeping experience too is a concern. Those commanding our flotilla today were cadets 10 to 15 years ago, and have spent half of the years in between holding shore appointments.For now, everything hangs on implementation of the CoDF report.
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Originally posted by na grohmiti View PostCould easily see it happening here. I often see visiting naval vessels arrive on AIS, completely invisible, except for the attached tugs.
Watch keeping experience too is a concern. Those commanding our flotilla today were cadets 10 to 15 years ago, and have spent half of the years in between holding shore appointments.
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