Originally posted by Helihead
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Agusta Westland AB139 for Irish Air Corps
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"From Shell Aviation:
We’ve now received confirmation from Agusta Westland that the Brazil AW139 accident has involved the loss of a tail rotor blade and bears similarities to the blade failures of the 2010 Hong Kong accident and 2011 Qatar blade failure.
As a result an Airworthiness Directive (AD) is being issued by EASA that will restrict use of tail rotor blades to a 700hr life limit. The blades that failed on this and the other accidents were between 1500hrs and 2200 hrs. Because that AD is currently held up in EASA, this email is to be taken as an instruction for Shell operations to , before next flight, confirm the current tail rotor blade flight hour life of contracted AW139 aircraft and, until further notice, restrict all AW139 flight to those aircraft with tail rotor blades below 700hrs.
Further advice may be given on the AD when issued and SAI guidance will be reviewed when that is received.
Agusta Westland is developing further testing methods that may extend the 700hr limit, but until those have been proven, the restriction is likely to stay in place.
Consideration has been given to stopping the use of AW139 helicopters altogether, but with the information known, this limitation is considered appropriate at this time.
I’m aware that this news may not lessen concern amongst our travelling staff, so further briefing material will be prepared for BU use. If you have any questions or specific concerns, please call
Regards Shell Management"
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BT 139-265 IS OUT.
COMPLIANCE:
Part I: within 25 flight hours from receipt of this Bollettino and then every 25 flight
hours after first compliance with PART I.
Part II: within five (5) flight hours or thirthy (30) days from the receipt of this
Bollettino, whichever comes first.
DESCRIPTION: as a result of the first available information of the AW139 event in
Brazil, while the investigation is ongoing and waiting for additional
information/analysis, as a precautionary measure this Bollettino prescribes
inspection and quarantine of the tail rotor blades meeting the criteria reported in the
above paragraph.
NOTE
If the number of landings applicable to each single
blade is not known throughout the entire service life
of the blade, the number of landings shall be
calculated multiplying the blade flight hours by a
factor of 4 (four).
Example:
0-150 FH: landings unknown
150-450 FH: accumulated landings 550, based on
helicopter logbook
Total landings = 150*4 + 550 = 1150
Remaining landings = 1500 – 1150 = 350 landings
In the meantime collection of all necessary evidence is going on in order to isolate
the root cause and determine the final corrective actions
Part II:
1. Prepare the helicopter for safe ground maintenance. Disconnect the battery and all
the electrical power sources and/or the external power supply.
2. Get access to the tail rotor and remove the tail rotor blades P/N 3G6410A00131 or
P/N 4G6410A00131 having logged more than 600 flying hours or more than 1500
landings whichever occurs first. Refer to AMP, see DM n° 39-A-64-11-01-00A-520AA
or n° 39-B-64-11-01-00A-520A-A for the remove procedures.
3. Quarantine the removed tail rotor blades at step 2 in an appropriate segregated
area, and contact Product Support Engineering (FOCSE.
mbx@agustawestland.com) for further instruction, providing the following details
of the removed tail rotor blades: helicopter S/N and total time , tail rotor blade P/N,
S/N and total time since new and landings.
Last edited by MS29513-017; 25th Aug 2011 at 08:47. Reason: note added
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The thing about an Airworthiness Directive as opposed to an Airworthiness Information Bulletin, is that the AD is mandatory. Groundings are imminent here, if not already in force.
Given the scale of this, with worldwide grounding, due to demand for replacement tail rotor blades there will be a supply and demand issue with replacements.
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When a long term solution is found, I'd assume the Agusta Westland will have to rectify them free of charge?!Covid 19 is not over ....it's still very real..Hand Hygiene, Social Distancing and Masks.. keep safe
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BOLLETTINO TECNICO N° 139-265
The technical content of this document is approved
under the authority of DOA nr. EASA.21J.005 DATE August 25, 2011
SUBJECT: PRECAUTIONARY INSPECTION AND QUARANTINE OF TAIL ROTOR
BLADES
REASON: to introduce a precautionary inspection and quarantine on tail rotor blades.
NOTE
This Bollettino supersedes BT no. 139-251
HELICOPTERS AFFECTED:
Part I: All AB139/AW139 helicopters equipped with tail rotor blades P/N
3G6410A00131 or P/N 4G6410A00131.
Part II: All AB139/AW139 helicopters equipped with tail rotor blades P/N
3G6410A00131 or P/N 4G6410A00131, having logged more than 600 flying
hours or more than 1500 landings whichever occurs first.
This almost mean the whole fleet.
DESCRIPTION: as a result of the first available information of the AW139 event in Brazil, while the investigation is ongoing and waiting for additional
information/analysis, as a precautionary measure this Bollettino prescribes
inspection and quarantine of the tail rotor blades meeting the criteria reported in the above paragraph.
In the meantime collection of all necessary evidence is going on in order to isolate the root cause and determine the final corrective actions.
Rotorheads - AW139 Accident rate discussion - Sav, As ramblingrotors mentioned, there was also the loss of the first pre-production aircraft (I-ACOI) during autorotation testing in 2001, with the unfortunate death of Vincenzo Iellamo. Previous thread here . I/C
Last edited by Helihead; 25 August 2011, 17:30.
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Dev.
Here's the official piece of paper.
Maybe someone with engineering expertise could answer that one.
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Is it not just a case of grounding aircraft after a certain amount of hours, checking the tail rotor blades and if they are not from the 2 effected batches carry on
The items quoted are not batch numbers they are part numbers. Therefore the 2 part numbers stated are likely to include ALL A139 tail rotor blades currently in service / storage / production.
The maintenance regime then kicks in as follows:
Part 1: If blades are under 600 hours or 1500 landings inspect for damage. If no damage found continue in service with new inspection every 25 hours until 600hrs or 1500 landings then Part 2 kicks in.
Part 2: If over 600hrs or 1500 landing since new the blades must be removed, even if it has been inspected every 25 hrs up to this limit.
Considering that landings are never logged for tail blades and if an operator cannot say how many a blade has been exposed to they must log 4 landings per FH that could have the limit for removal as low as 375 FH.
To my mind the most significant item in this is the inclusion of landing cycles. Dynamic components do log cycles for starts etc but never landings. This would suggest that Augusta are concerned that the tail blades are potentially being damaged by the high torque segment of flights, ie the take off and landings. Thats all well and good for commercial operations but what about operators who spend increased time at high torque settings, for example SAR, USL, Fast Roping etc. These aircraft may only take off and land once in an operation but could spend many multiples of the flight time, of a take off or landing, in the hover at high torque setting. How are these operators going to be dealt with?
I certainly wouldn't be comfortable sitting in a 139 for the foreseeable.Last edited by Tadpole; 25 August 2011, 19:03.
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