CASA Replacement

[EUFighter]

220million still strikes me as high for two Maritime Patrol C-295's.

It is!
Back in 2007 Chile had an offer of 8 C295MPA aircraft for $250m, accounting for inflation that would be $295m today or €272m. It was planned to have 4 ASW, 3 MPA and a single transport version. In the end they ordered 2 ASW and 1 MPA versions for $105m.
In 2008 Columbia ordered 4 C295 transports for $100m.
And one of the earliest orders in 2006 came from Portugal which order 5 C-295MPA and 7 C-295 transports for €350m, 12 aircraft that today would cost €420m. So taking that as a basis for our €220m we should get 3 MPA versions and 3 Transport versions!

Of course not knowing what is covered by the €220m it is difficult to say if we were overcharged or not. Perhaps it covers the entire 30 years of operations, all the spares and future updates otherwise as you suggest the cost is a bit on the high side.

[EUFighter]

We also should note that the CN-235's have been used as an MPA which accelerates stresses on critical airframe areas such as the CWB compared to a vanilla light transport aircraft, which could likely make it seriously uneconomic.

But the main issue with the CN-235 in an air mobility role is geography. Ireland is a smallish island in comparative terms. Too small for viable intra country use yet too far away for the CN-235 to have efficient use as a transport aircraft as range payload factors come into play. The NZDF experience with the C.1 Andover provides an for a example.

Domestically it is more efficient, cheaper, and often faster to move a tactical/pax loads of say under 6000kg around the country by an Army flatbed. That is why when the RNZAF got rid of its old C.1 Andovers 20 odd years ago and never replaced them - a bus and a truck was cheaper and faster point to point even accounting for the cross strait shipping. The other issue, the CN-235 like the old Andovers we flew is that they lack range to offer any realistic contribution in terms of strategic transport to the places overseas where the IDF traditionally plies its trade the Leb, Mali, Chad, Kosovo. The NZDF like the IDF, both island nations, necessitates when it comes to air mobility requirements which we do and which you should do is principally about tactical loads - strategic distances. ie. The Don to those destinations mentioned above, the NZDF into the Pacific. Someone mention a possible CASEVAC role but that has principally been a rotary tasking for the last 50 years, if it is a deployment component the government wishes the IAC to get into, best to prepare ballistic protection upgrades and send a AW-139M or two instead (more much more likely to be accepted by the mandated Force Commander who decides what get accepted into his theatre and what does not). Lastly the logistics tail and manpower requirements to keep two aircraft operational in a deployment which we once did with the Andovers in Somalia 30 years ago requires a strategic support chain and dozens of people involved, all very busy trying to keep old and u/s airframes available.

Ireland, like New Zealand, both peacekeeping orientated defence forces maintaining contributions to coalition deployments 1000's of kilometres away from home require a strategic airbridge emphasis and not a intra theatre light twin tactical transport. Best to sell the CN-235's to Africa when the time comes to replace them with the new larger CASA's then and then conduct a proper study into what whole of government requirements are for Irish air mobility.

Battlefield CASVAC is a helicopter role but normally as you move up the chain and the distances become greater fixed wing tends to take over. Today we use the CN-235's to move patients from Ireland to England when necessary. And in Mali our troops were flown around in everything from An-26's to DHC-7's, if you can afford CH-47's then that s great but it is often more cost effective to move people with small tactical transports. Look at RAAF, they go from their strategic C-17's to their C-130's to their C-27's to their CH-47 before ending with their NH-90's. We would love to have some of that but no TD would vote for it today.

Even to get to the level of the RNZAF would be something, P8 for MPA, C130J for transport, NH90 for utility and SH2 for maritime operations, we are far from that and need to take small steps to show the benefit of having dedicated aircraft for certain missions. Clearly we do not foresee flying freight around in Ireland with the CN235 or with a C295 but there are missions we can use them on. We take part in EU Battlegroups, this year should be in Germany but we will have to see. There an aircraft like the CN235 could be useful.

Hopefully we will also be deploying the PC12's once they are delivered. They too today are intended to be multi-role, to provide ISR and transport!

[Jetjock]

It is also worth pointing out that beyond the day to day uses, by the time you realise you need a transport aircraft it's usually too late.

Irish CN235 have in the past been pressed into emergency transport roles with MPA equipment still installed, including the evacuation of citizens from Tripoli when the sh1t was hitting the fan.

[Anzac]

What a stripper CN-235 or two remaining in service could do is provide a training development pathway for a fit for purpose fixed wing air mobility platform downstream. Learning tactical multi-engine flight profiles, loadmaster curriculum, tasking planning, the necessary capability assurance processes et al. It would in the least enable a Basic Level Of Capability (BLOC) within the IAC to exist and evolve that to build up to a Directed (DLOC) then Operation Level of Capability (OLOC) when the the right platform solutions arrives. Because the reality is they are the readiness benchmarks that have to be attained before a unit is safe to deploy at OLOC into a UN ChpVII coalition environment. Nevertheless it is the first 1000 miles of an air mobility capability that the emphasis should be on first rather than the last few miles as you cannot "be there without getting there."

[EUFighter]

The "stripper" CN-235 would be a potential route but a lot will also depend on the wiliness to deploy the assets.

When the PC12's arrive hopefully we will not just have them flying around spotting Covid-19 infringements but that we get to deploy them at least on training exercises. The EU Battlegroups would be an opportunity but we could also do exercises with Sweden and Finland, the latter operate the PC12 in a liaison role so they might be interested in what we bring along!

[Anzac]

The "stripper" CN-235 would be a potential route but a lot will also depend on the wiliness to deploy the assets.

That is why I'd humbly suggest focusing on a strategic capability to get from Ireland to a secure airport in theatre where ever that maybe, offload IDF personnel and material using the in-situ air movements support crew from the larger coalition partner be it French, Spanish, British, Aussie, gas up and go home rather than have all the bother of tactical last mile stuff and hanging around. Job done. And there is nothing wrong with that.

When the PC12's arrive hopefully we will not just have them flying around spotting Covid-19 infringements but that we get to deploy them at least on training exercises. The EU Battlegroups would be an opportunity but we could also do exercises with Sweden and Finland, the latter operate the PC12 in a liaison role so they might be interested in what we bring along!

And if Ireland is going to deploy Air Corps assets to hang around for a few months in theatre one day in the future what the PC12's will bring is a far better and meaningful niche contribution than intra theatre light tactical.

[Jetjock]

That is why I'd humbly suggest focusing on a strategic capability...

A stand-alone strategic capability is beyond our reach politically and a combined capability with a group of other countries would also pose political problems here. Irish government's are simply not serious about defence. Token trumps actual capability in Irish defence acquisition.

The reason the retention of the CN 235 is being pushed is that they are minimal cost to convert and already wholly owned. An opportunity retention, if you will, providing some capability rather than none. There will most likely be no alternative!

We can paint ideal-world Tier 1 transport scenarios all day but they will never happen.

Now on the other hand, if we can retain assets at minimal cost and prove them useful, then in 10 years there is a case to make. It is much easier to petition for the type of money required for replacement and enhancement of an existing capability, than for one that has never existed at all.

[Charlie252]

A stand-alone strategic capability is beyond our reach politically and a combined capability with a group of other countries would also pose political problems here. Irish government's are simply not serious about defence. Token trumps actual capability in Irish defence acquisition.
The reason the retention of the CN 235 is being pushed is that they are minimal cost to convert and already wholly owned. An opportunity retention, if you will, providing some capability rather than none. There will most likely be no alternative!
We can paint ideal-world Tier 1 transport scenarios all day but they will never happen.
Now on the other hand, if we can retain assets at minimal cost and prove them useful, then in 10 years there is a case to make. It is much easier to petition for the type of money required for replacement and enhancement of an existing capability, than for one that has never existed at all.

Totally agree all AC procurement is based on the replacement model..

If they can retain the CN-235's and prove them in some kind of transport role, then at some time in the future they will need to be replaced.

[Anzac]

A stand-alone strategic capability is beyond our reach politically and a combined capability with a group of other countries would also pose political problems here. Irish government's are simply not serious about defence. Token trumps actual capability in Irish defence acquisition.

The reason the retention of the CN 235 is being pushed is that they are minimal cost to convert and already wholly owned. An opportunity retention, if you will, providing some capability rather than none. There will most likely be no alternative!

We can paint ideal-world Tier 1 transport scenarios all day but they will never happen.

Now on the other hand, if we can retain assets at minimal cost and prove them useful, then in 10 years there is a case to make. It is much easier to petition for the type of money required for replacement and enhancement of an existing capability, than for one that has never existed at all.

Strategic air mobility can simply be operating a second hand narrow body Airbus viz A319/320 instead of a medium executive jet like a Lear 45 or Gulfstream.

How is there political problems flying an aircraft that is there for global good? HADR operations into 3rd countries flatten by tropical cyclones, famines, earthquakes, forest fires ect. Repatriations of stranded nationals ....

[Anzac]

Totally agree all AC procurement is based on the replacement model..

If they can retain the CN-235's and prove them in some kind of transport role, then at some time in the future they will need to be replaced.

Hopefully the IAC and the Irish government will seek advice from current air mobility operators and their experiences before they attempt to do anything.

[na grohmiti]

Unfortunately the Replacement model in the past has not served us well at all.
Gloster Gladiator was replaced during the Emergency by Spitfire/Seafire, we had 17 in 1952. The F16 of its day. We replaced them with? Nothing really, though the DH vampire got their role. Flont line modern prop interceptor replaced with armed advanced jet trainer. We got 7 vampires in the early 60s. We replaced them with 7 Fouga Magister in 1976, replacing a 1st gen jet trainer with a 1st gen Jet trainer.
New pilots in the Air Corps during the emergency learnt to fly on a combination of aircraft. Lets ignore the unique circumstances there and say we Started into the Post war years doing basic flying training with 12 DH chipmunk, 2 more arriving in 1965. Three of these are still actively flying in Ireland. These were replaced in service with a total of 12 Siai SF260W Marchetti side by side piston prop armed trainers. These were retired from service in the Late 90s, many ending up as agressor aircraft for those who want to experience aerial combat, and have a big wallet. They were replaced with Nothing. When the Fouga retired it was directly replaced with 8 Pilatus PC9 tandem Turboprop armed trainers, with no lead in training aircraft.

At one time in the 80s, we had 8 Alouette III, 2 Gazelle, 5 Dauphin Helis. (Total 15, not including GASU). We lost 1 Gazelle and 1 Dauphin, (Dh248 with loss of 4 crew, RIP, Gazelle with no injuries) which were replaced by 2 EC135 and just 6 AW139. 15 is just under double our current fleet of military helis.

We started the Emergency with 9 Anson Mk1 Maritime Patrol/Transport aircraft. In 1946 we got 3 Avro Anson XIX.Twin engine military transport. All were retired by 1962, replaced with 4 DH dove in 1959 On their retirement We had 2 MPA Kingairs, plus one used for VIP transport, multi engine training. It was replaced by 2 Casa 235MPA. 9 is not equal to 2.

Back to the 1940s again and the Emergency years saw us start with a total of 13 Hawker Hectors in the Army Co-Op role, replaced in 1939 by the Westland Lysander, six in total. The Lizzie was an STOL armed transport which you could also use for recce, I guess the PC12 is as close as we get to that today, if you strapped a few GPMGs to the underwing. Not sure how long they served for, but nothing did dedicated army Co-Op until 8 Rheims Cessna 172H arrived in 1972. So 13>6<8>4 with 4 representing the total of 4 PC12 we will shortly bear the roundel.
If we replaced Like for Like, We should have a large fleet of modern Combat aircraft, not civil aircraft painted in military colours. But hey, somewhere along the way it was decided we needed VIP jets, and much of the Air Corps money in the 70s, 80s and 90s went to keep our international image in the VIP jet world flashy. How many Hercs could we have got for the Prise of a HS125/G3/G4?

[Jetjock]

Strategic air mobility can simply be operating a second hand narrow body Airbus viz A319/320 instead of a medium executive jet like a Lear 45 or Gulfstream.

How is there political problems flying an aircraft that is there for global good? HADR operations into 3rd countries flatten by tropical cyclones, famines, earthquakes, forest fires ect. Repatriations of stranded nationals ....

Anything that could be perceived as a large government jet would be deeply unpopular and politically risky. Rightly or wrongly.

[EUFighter]

Unfortunately the Replacement model in the past has not served us well at all.
Gloster Gladiator was replaced during the Emergency by Spitfire/Seafire, we had 17 in 1952. The F16 of its day. We replaced them with? Nothing really, though the DH vampire got their role. Flont line modern prop interceptor replaced with armed advanced jet trainer. We got 7 vampires in the early 60s. We replaced them with 7 Fouga Magister in 1976, replacing a 1st gen jet trainer with a 1st gen Jet trainer.
New pilots in the Air Corps during the emergency learnt to fly on a combination of aircraft. Lets ignore the unique circumstances there and say we Started into the Post war years doing basic flying training with 12 DH chipmunk, 2 more arriving in 1965. Three of these are still actively flying in Ireland. These were replaced in service with a total of 12 Siai SF260W Marchetti side by side piston prop armed trainers. These were retired from service in the Late 90s, many ending up as agressor aircraft for those who want to experience aerial combat, and have a big wallet. They were replaced with Nothing. When the Fouga retired it was directly replaced with 8 Pilatus PC9 tandem Turboprop armed trainers, with no lead in training aircraft.

At one time in the 80s, we had 8 Alouette III, 2 Gazelle, 5 Dauphin Helis. (Total 15, not including GASU). We lost 1 Gazelle and 1 Dauphin, (Dh248 with loss of 4 crew, RIP, Gazelle with no injuries) which were replaced by 2 EC135 and just 6 AW139. 15 is just under double our current fleet of military helis.

We started the Emergency with 9 Anson Mk1 Maritime Patrol/Transport aircraft. In 1946 we got 3 Avro Anson XIX.Twin engine military transport. All were retired by 1962, replaced with 4 DH dove in 1959 On their retirement We had 2 MPA Kingairs, plus one used for VIP transport, multi engine training. It was replaced by 2 Casa 235MPA. 9 is not equal to 2.

Back to the 1940s again and the Emergency years saw us start with a total of 13 Hawker Hectors in the Army Co-Op role, replaced in 1939 by the Westland Lysander, six in total. The Lizzie was an STOL armed transport which you could also use for recce, I guess the PC12 is as close as we get to that today, if you strapped a few GPMGs to the underwing. Not sure how long they served for, but nothing did dedicated army Co-Op until 8 Rheims Cessna 172H arrived in 1972. So 13>6<8>4 with 4 representing the total of 4 PC12 we will shortly bear the roundel.
If we replaced Like for Like, We should have a large fleet of modern Combat aircraft, not civil aircraft painted in military colours. But hey, somewhere along the way it was decided we needed VIP jets, and much of the Air Corps money in the 70s, 80s and 90s went to keep our international image in the VIP jet world flashy. How many Hercs could we have got for the Prise of a HS125/G3/G4?

Missed a few like the Supermarine Walrus, one of which Serial No: N18 is now in the Fleet Air Museum. Very interesting history on that particular aircraft!
That the Lysanders were better armed than the Fougars, so we will need a few guns and bomb racks on the PC-12s.
That the Seafires and Vampires had 20mm cannons! Nothing that size in the Aer Corps today, we could try strapping a few Rhinos under the wings of the PC-9s.
Actually the PC-9 only just matches the performance of the Seafire, and that 75 years later!

[na grohmiti]

I decided to leave the Walrus out, with its colourful history. The Emergency was a boom time for the Air Corps in terms of aircraft. Even if some were delivered free of charge by their former owners. It was to be expected that an air corps pilot would try to return the favour.

[GoneToTheCanner]

The AC begged to keep the other King Airs when 240 was kept but to no avail and they found out how good a King Air really is, as they had to fly the arse off it to meet commitments and for a while, it was the world's busiest King Air,apart from the RFDS in Oz,clocking up far more than the average KA ever did. The other KAs were sorely missed and if they get rid of the CN 235s, instead of keeping them as cargo lifters, they would simply be repeating an old mistake. Don't forget, if they are kept on, they won't be kept thumping around at low level over the Atlantic, which is the real killer of airframes. They'd be flying at the usual turbo prop altitudes and they still have plenty of life left in them and, as C252 has indicated, spares are plentiful for a bog-standard Casa. Another advantage of the Casa is that, like the King Air, it can use all the current airports in Ireland and even a lot of the smaller airfields so it can fulfil an emergency airlift on this island (in the vein of the airlift of IAA and IAC and AAIU personnel and equipment to Blacksod after the S-92 crashed). There are a wealth of uses for an airlifter on this island and off the island for the DF and the Casa's relatively small size is not a deal breaker.