Just as unobtainable, but slightly more realistic, rebuild Bal' to a modern standard, get a proper search radar, retain the Pc-9m, retain the EC135's and the Casa's, replace the AW139's with Seahawks on a airframe by airframe basis, [say one a year], Go with Casa for transport aircrafts, try as I might, I can't really accept a case for larger aircrafts, Urgently replace the Cessanas with more EC135's, Send a bunch of the best, youngest, and fittest pilots off to a fast air operator to learn their trade, at the same time order 5 [five] Gripens [one in maintenance, 2 training, 2 on alert] with an option for 5 more to be delivered on a one every 2 year basis, get rid of the Garda, and the air ambulance...concentrate on 3 issues; supporting the Army, supporting the NS, and Air Defence. [Air Defence and they noisy fast jets is the option on this plan].
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The key with any development plan is overseas and in particular Europe, along with a realistic appraisal of what is needed to operate jointly with European allies, and what the country can afford.
Firstly it is slowly dawning on the Department and politicians of all parties that the overseas mission of the future will be more akin to Chad than to Lebanon MK one type peacekeeping.
Secondly the pressure on increasing defence spending comes from Europe, and that pressure is only going to increase
The UN very helpfully publish a manual for military aviation operations, (which is freely available in the internet via the US army) where they detail the requirements they need and for us the obvious units we could contribute
They list four types of rotary units (see page 30)
Light Utility Helicopter Unit (page 32)
Medium Utility Helicopter Unit (page 35)
Heavy Cargo Helicopter Unit (page 38)
Attack /Armed Helicopter Unit (page 41)
And two types of fixed wing units (Page 30)
Light Air Reconnaissance Unit (page 44)
Transport/Tactical Airlift Unit (page 47)
Now of the six units listed by the UN manual one of either of the utility helicopter units of four helicopters and the light air reconnaissance unit with three Caravan type aircraft are more than achievable.
The experience in Chad showed that no Irish patrol can operate for more than an hour’s distance from base without access to medevac helicopters and thus this is a key requirement. That explains the Hip leasing fiasco in Chad
From there the light air reconnaissance unit of three ISR aircraft in thr Cessna Caravan Class is also very achievable.
The next is air combat, no matter what way you look at it there is no conventional air threat to Ireland that requires an investment in fighters of the class of Rafael. Despite the “bear” scare, the Russian air force would be shot from the sky long before they reached Irish airspace in any real conflict. Much larger air arms like Sweden, Austria and Switzerland find it impossible to maintain a 24 hour intercept capability, so we have no chance unless we cooperate with another state, and the noly option there is the Brits, which is politically impossible.
But turning to overseas, the mission in Chad there was an aerial QRF to provide air support for long range patrols and that has a long history,via Liberia an Ukranian Hinds, going back to the Congo, where Indian Canberra bombers and Swedish Fighters were deployed in support of UN forces.
The key decision is what to replace the PC-9M with in 2023. The PC9 was bought because militarily it offered the bare minimum air intercept capability necessary. The politicans in the late 1990;s would happily have followed the department and relegated the bluffwaffe to an of thsupport arm of a Scotish fisheries protection style navy till it was pointed out to them that if you want to hold a major international conference like EU presidency meetings in Dublin or play host to the US president, you need a minimum air defence capability. But the decision to buy the PC-9 to meet a minimum air defence capabilities was actually taken in the pre 9/11 era, in fact it came from price waterhouse in 1998, and reflects 1997 era thinking on threat level. The government have to retain that capability, and given the massive changes in the security environment since 2000 will have to upgrade it IMHO .
The second thing is that there is an arc of instability surrounding the EU at the moment from the Baltic to Algeria that is no going to go away. And with our corparation tax regime, other EU states can fairly claim that they can’t spend on defence because of it.
I’d argue that the sensible thing would be to replace the PC-9 m with what ever the Italians are going to replace their AMX ground attack aircraft with (which has done sterling but unheralded work in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Libya) which is likely to be a dedicated light combat version of the M-346 (the Poles also have a requirement for a Su 22 replacement and are looking at it). Even the mighty USAF are looking at lighter fighters than the F-35 as the past decade has worn out their F-16 fleet with their T-X trainer which the m-346 is a competitor is looking more and more sophisticated. and combat capable as we speak. They wouldn’t operate in airspace with sophisticated air defences, but would have the ability to support UN mandated missions, as in the DRC where South African air support has proved decisiove in supporting the UN>
So the air corps in 2026 would have the following flying units
No 1 Operations wing
Light strike squadron with 12 light fighters in the M3436 class and the ability to deploy a detachment of four overseas for a six month period
Maratime Squadron with the 2 Casa Replacement
Transport Squadron, with the learjet or its replacement, 2 light transports in the M28 Skytruck class for utility work
Light air reconnaissance squadron with 3 ISR Caravans for overseas work
No 3 Wing
Medium lift helicopter squadron with eight helicopters in the AW149/Blackhawk Class dedicated to providing a detachment of 3/4 helicopters overseas
Utility Helicopter Squadron with the existing Aw139 and EC0-135 for training and feeding crews into the ML squadron and general on Island duties.Last edited by paul g; 29 March 2016, 18:47.
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Excellent analysis Paul. However I would take issue with the assumption of a long history of QRF dating back to the Congo. The history is of QRF NOT being available when needed. Indeed the Canberras and Saabs were only made available after Jadotville which is when they were most critically needed. Lets face it - assuming QRF airpower when any contributing country will be subject to their own political pressures, not to mention the issues of any country on the flight path of a QRF force denying use of it's airspace. That implies, in my opinion, that "native" assets must be embedded in any force deployed. Given our inability to deploy even minimal air assets that means strong AA assets under command to defend against a repeat of the Congolese Fougas, and sufficient artillery/mortars to provide indirect fire support.“The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.”
― Thucydides
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Originally posted by paul g View PostNow of the six units listed by the UN manual one of either of the utility helicopter units of four helicopters and the light air reconnaissance unit with three Caravan type aircraft are more than achievable
And arguably more importantly manage to recruit to establishment (and retain them)
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Originally posted by Shaqra View PostExcellent analysis Paul. However I would take issue with the assumption of a long history of QRF dating back to the Congo. The history is of QRF NOT being available when needed. Indeed the Canberras and Saabs were only made available after Jadotville which is when they were most critically needed. Lets face it - assuming QRF airpower when any contributing country will be subject to their own political pressures, not to mention the issues of any country on the flight path of a QRF force denying use of it's airspace. That implies, in my opinion, that "native" assets must be embedded in any force deployed. Given our inability to deploy even minimal air assets that means strong AA assets under command to defend against a repeat of the Congolese Fougas, and sufficient artillery/mortars to provide indirect fire support.
UN peace keeping has come on so much since Bosnia, that’s it’s a given that there will be appropriate air support in any future mission. But anybody who thinks that we can go to EU meetings on defence and security over the coming decade and plead the poor mouth or say we’re neutral is living in a fool’s paradise, especially as we’ll be isolated geographically and politically if and when the brits vote to leave, and our corporation tax policy is costing EU governments a fortune.
Or to put it bluntly, if Urugray can afford to deploy utility helicopters and small numbers of fixed wing aircraft to support un missions so can we.Last edited by paul g; 30 March 2016, 00:38.
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Paul, where does basic flight training come into your new set up? can one type provide it or is it outsourced?An army is power. Its entire purpose is to coerce others. This power can not be used carelessly or recklessly. This power can do great harm. We have seen more suffering than any man should ever see, and if there is going to be an end to it, it must be an end that justifies the cost. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain
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Originally posted by X-RayOne View PostPaul, where does basic flight training come into your new set up? can one type provide it or is it outsourced?
The training school gives them a raison d’etre and pretentions to wear a blue uniform. “We have these planes to train pilots on so if needed we could buy fighters in an emergency” has been the argument they’ve used since the Vampire was introduced in the 1950’s. And as I said even price waterhouse pointed to the need to have some sort of air policing capability in 1997/1998 when the PC-9 was first conceived.
But the PC-9 were not cheap, they cost over 60 million in 2003, which would at the time have paid for a further 40 mowags, and offered very little in capability in return. Be honest the most they could do would be to intercept a Cessna towing a protest banner over an EU meeting, which in 1997 was the level of threat assessment.
Now no matter who gets to be taoiseach, they will want to hob nob with Trump or Clinton and hold the presidency of the EU, and some sort of intercept capability is a given.
More importantly UN mandated and run Peace support missions are very different these days. It’s a myth peddled by the hard left that they’re all peaceful, in reality they all vary according to the mandate, for example in the DR Congo UN troops are effectively waging war. So it makes sense that the air combat capability to replace the PC-9 will have the ability to deliver precision guided munitions in support of peace support missions and survive against opposition armed with manpads and 23mm cannons on technicals if necessary.
The security environment has changed so much that a like for like replacement for the PC 9 though possible would be unlikely, hence the white paper saying that the PC9 are so limited that they would need something more capable both in the air to air and air to ground roles when they’re replaced in 2025. If they get that then they won’t need basic training to justify their blue uniforms anymore.Last edited by paul g; 30 March 2016, 14:14.
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you look at all the air arms that are actually in combat in Africa at the moment and they are using the likes of Hawks/Alpha jets/K8s and so on. With regard to our own AD, the Bofors are mothballed and the NS has the only other light AA, apart from the Army's 50 cals. have they ever trained to use the 50s as anti-aircraft weapons?.......right now, the DoD is winning the struggle and they keep vetoing heavier warry-er weapons and the utility of taking them abroad so the Df goes overseas with no helicopters, no artillery, no armour bearing anything heavier than a 30mm, so in effect, it has been reduced to the role of a gendarmerie in it's own country. As our French friends have shown, you cannot go to Africa unless you bring all of the above and be prepared to use them and that every man who goes there knows that if hurt, he will be helivaced out and further airlifted out thereafter and not dependent on the goodwill of allies.
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Let's keep is BASIC, the department's default since 1922.
10 IF DF < IRA THEN GOTO 20, ELSE GOTO 40
20 BUY FN
20 IF DF = REAL ARMY THEN GOTO 30 ELSE GOTO 60
30 CUT FUNDING
40 WAIT 10
50 CUT FUNDING
60 IF AC < MINISTERIAL JET GOTO 70 ELSE GOTO 80
70 BUY LEARJET
80 GOTO 10Last edited by expat01; 31 March 2016, 00:10.
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To put into perspective the cost of Blackhawks.
Sweden bought 15 UH-60Ms for USD 546 million (€ 480 million)
Austria bought 3 UH-60Ms for USD 137 million (€ 120 million)
The first 4 AW139s cost the AC, under €50 million
So if the AC had got the Blackhawk at best we could have got 3 (most likely 1).
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Originally posted by paul g View PostNine Blackhawks would cost Euro 240 million, that's going by the current Slovak Contract.
Its a lot, but not unaffordable to the Irish state if they spread the payments over five to six years."We will hold out until our last bullet is spent. Could do with some whiskey"
Radio transmission, siege of Jadotville DR Congo. September 1961.
Illegitimi non carborundum
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Originally posted by paul g View PostNine Blackhawks would cost Euro 240 million, that's going by the current Slovak Contract.
Its a lot, but not unaffordable to the Irish state if they spread the payments over five to six years.
The AW139 payments were more than likely over 2-3 years.
Originally posted by Turkey View PostIs there any reason why we have to buy equipment in batches? would it not be better to spread out the purchases?
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Originally posted by DeV View Post
240 million up front.
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